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Abstract 
My goal in this work is to outline a specifically legal harm principle that is derived from 
John Stuart Mill’s harm principle in On Liberty. I will do this by providing a close reading of On 
Liberty and comparing it to what he says in chapter V of Utilitarianism. I believe that these two 
works provide a foundation for a harm principle that defines the domain and limits of the law. 
While this goal is not new, I focus on Mill’s general harm principle and the two maxims that he 
believes make it up in order to construct a relatively clear legal harm principle which becomes a 
part of his general principle. I believe that this may also make clearer what Mill’s view of the 
limitations of speech are and that he would allow that certain sorts of hate speech are not only 
within the domain of the law but that they could legitimately be prevented through the law. 
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A Note on Citations 
Much of this work will rely on John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and Utilitarianism. I will, 
therefore, use abbreviated in text citations for his works. I will use the following abbreviations 
for these texts:  
 
Works by John Stuart Mill will be referenced by abbreviated title, chapter, and paragraph 
number. Ex. (OL II: 14) 
(OL)  Mill, On Liberty.  
(U)  Mill, Utilitarianism. 




 My goal in this work is to outline a specifically legal harm principle that is derived from 
John Stuart Mill’s harm principle in On Liberty. I will do this by providing a close reading of On 
Liberty and comparing it to what he says in chapter V of Utilitarianism. I believe that these two 
works provide a foundation for a harm principle that defines the domain and limits of the law. 
While this goal is not new, I focus on Mill’s general harm principle and the two maxims that he 
believes make it up in order to construct a relatively clear legal harm principle which becomes a 
part of his general principle. I believe that this may also make clearer what Mill’s view of the 
limitations of speech are and that he would allow that certain sorts of hate speech are not only 
within the domain of the law but that they could legitimately be prevented through the law. 
 In the introduction I will focus on preliminary definitions and concepts that help to frame 
the overall project. I will look at liberty and why liberty is seen as such an important value. I will 
also describe what the criminal law is and why—because of its coercive and invasive nature—it 
is important to focus on understanding its limits. I will then propose why I believe the harm 
principle is a likely starting point for understanding the limits to liberty interference.  
 After framing the issue in the introduction, the first section of this work will focus on 
what I call Mill’s general harm principle. I will attempt to parse out Mill’s goals with his 
principle and discuss the ways in which his principle is a very general principle that describes all 
manners of liberty infringement from the most basic to the serious. Doing this requires 
examination of the limits of the general harm principle regarding individual liberty as well as 
separating what Mill believes is the inviolable self-regarding sphere of liberty from the harm 
principle. This section serves as an exegesis of Mill’s general principle in On Liberty. 
 The second section will focus on defining a specifically legal harm principle that I 
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believe can be found in On Liberty though Mill is not focused on this task. I believe that Mill 
leaves several clues as to where he believes the domain of the law and the extra-legal domain 
come apart. By looking at what he says in On Liberty regarding harm and rights I will argue that 
chapter V of Utilitarianism can give us the rest of what we need to get a legal harm principle 
from Mill that is not only consistent with the general harm principle but is extracted from it and 
serves as an important principle within it. 
 The final section will serve as an application of the legal harm principle. I will focus on 
the issue of speech because while Mill spends a large portion of On Liberty defending the right 
to free speech, he also recognizes its limitations. Mill’s corn dealer example (OL III: 1) shows 
that, in principle, Mill allows for limitations to the free expression of speech. I will use this to 
then argue that Mill could claim that certain types of controversial hate speech fall within the 
domain of the law. I believe that the legal harm principle allows for such a discussion and 






The Importance of Liberty and Autonomy 
 
I.1 The Importance of Liberty 
 Robert Paul Wolff in A Defense of Anarchism and John Stuart Mill in On Liberty note 
that one of the most important issues within political philosophy is determining whether the 
moral autonomy of individuals is compatible with the legitimate authority of the state.1 While 
there are many definitions of individual liberty or autonomy, it can most easily be described as 
the ability to choose how one shall live one’s life or the ability to self-govern. Legitimate state or 
governmental authority, on the other hand, is the right to govern or to have others obey orders, 
laws, or rules. There is an undeniable tension that exists between these two essential 
philosophical notions. The prevailing argument which illustrates the strain between these two 
concepts is as follows: if it is the case that individuals are and should be considered autonomous 
agents, then this means they are self-governing agents. If they are self-governing, autonomous 
agents, then these agents have sole authority over their own actions. This legitimate authority 
implies the right to govern. If they are the sole legitimate authority over their own actions, then it 
seems inconsistent that there are others (i.e. the state) that have legitimate authority (i.e. the 
right) to dictate how individual agents behave. If an outside agent (i.e. the state) has legitimate 
authority over another individual, then this means that the outside agent (the state) has the right 
to govern and the right to be obeyed when governing. If this is the case, then individual agents 
are not autonomous after all.2 This tension with autonomy and government is inherent in (most, 
if not all) societies which 1. have a body of laws and a system of government that forbid its 
                                                 
1 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, (New York: Harper Torch books, 1970) 3–4; John Stuart Mill, On 
Liberty, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1956) I: 2. 
2 Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, 3–4. 
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citizens, who are presumed to be autonomous, from performing certain acts and 2. such 
government is thought to have a genuine right to be obeyed. While I am not concerned with 
arguing over how states gain authority or if the authority they have is rightful or not, I am 
concerned with how liberty serves as a moral limit on the sorts of actions that the state can 
prohibit and how a penal law can be morally justified when it leads to the coercion and liberty 
invasion of its citizens. 
 At this point, it is important to note that there are different conceptions of liberty. The 
anarchist, such as Wolff, claims that liberty is absolute and consists of the ability to do what one 
wants, when one wants. Furthermore, since the only way in which the state is able to obtain 
authority over its citizens is by encroaching on this ability of its citizens to do what they want 
when they want, then such authority to rule is never legitimate.3 However, while the liberal, such 
as Mill, agrees that there is tension between liberty and authority, one of the primary reasons to 
support governmental authority is to obtain security and protection against the threat of others—
which actually helps to maintain and even expand liberty. The liberal argues that the anarchist 
concept of absolute liberty comes with too many problems. If everyone were absolutely free to 
do whatever it was that he/she wished to do, as the anarchist demands, then agents are free to 
assault and murder others.4 This absolute liberty does not seem likely to produce any kind of 
working society and actually restricts much more than it expands liberty. Each agent would lack 
security of person and property and would have no recourse to prevent threat other than to 
produce threat in kind. This unbridled liberty, therefore, seems undesirable and not very 
valuable—at least not very valuable to all agents, only the strongest among them would tend to 
benefit.  
                                                 
3 Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, 3–4, 51. 
4 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973) 22–3. 
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 To remedy this problem with unrestrained liberty, liberals and most other theorists often 
propose a more limited version of liberty which allows for the greatest amount of liberty for each 
individual that is consistent with the same amount of liberty for others.5 These autonomous 
agents choose to sacrifice certain freedoms for security and protection. This understanding of 
liberty, while giving up the ability to do whatever one wants, when one wants, is a much more 
secure and even robust version which, in actuality, would allow for a more extensive liberty 
base. This wider liberty is gained by employing a state to which agents give certain authority to 
restrain certain liberty-invading behaviors. This authority allows for agents to go about 
unmolested in exchange for refraining from molesting others.6 Hence, there is a reason or 
motivation to give up absolute liberty for the sake of security and a more limited, albeit 
expansive, liberty. This tradeoff of absolute liberty for protection is not unqualified and there are 
still moral limits that the government must maintain to claim moral legitimacy. Mill’s method of 
determining acceptable infringement of liberty, which is the primary focus in what follows, 
comes in the form of what has been labeled “the harm principle” which states that “the sole end 
for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can 
rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others” (OL I: 9). This dissertation serves as a commentary on how this principle can be 
used as a method of protecting, preserving, and maintaining liberty generally and I will further 
argue that the harm principle can be used to derive a legal principle to determine limits for the 
law as well. Yet before this principle is even defended and/or analyzed, a natural question that 
                                                 
5 This concept is often associated with John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), 60. 
6 This interpretation borrows heavily from the social contract tradition as represented by Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 




arises is: why is there such a presumption of liberty and autonomy? 
 
I.2 The Presumption of Liberty  
 As legal philosopher Joel Feinberg7 notes, “whatever else we believe about freedom 
[liberty], most of us believe that it is something to be praised, or so luminously a Thing of Value 
that it is beyond praise.”8 Indeed many other values that we have, it seems, presume that we also 
have a certain degree of liberty. H.L.A. Hart claims that  
The unimpeded exercise by individuals of free choice may be held a value in itself 
with which it is prima facie wrong to interfere; or it may be thought valuable 
because it enables individuals to experiment—even with living—and to discover 
things valuable both to themselves and to others.9  
 
Mill also argues that liberty is one of the highest social and individual values. He believes that 
certain liberties, namely the liberties of speech, thought, and certain sorts of non-harmful actions, 
make up individuality and this is “one of the principle ingredients of human happiness, and quite 
the chief ingredient of individual and social progress” (OL III: 1). The ability to choose what we 
are going to do and how we are going to act is a way to decide what sort of person we are going 
to be. It is what makes us good or bad people, moral or immoral, or good or bad citizens. Liberty 
and a presumption of liberty, all things being equal, allows for and contributes to social and 
individual progress, many people see the liberty of choice to act/think/speak (or not) as one of 
the key elements of social and individual progress. It seems, then, that there is a presumption of 
liberty and autonomy built into our everyday concepts, values, and the idea of the “good life.”  
 It is noteworthy that even critics of liberalism, and not merely the above quoted liberals, 
                                                 
7 Feinberg believes the presumption of liberty is so important that he developed a four-volume series, The Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law, which delves into the moral restrictions on the criminal law. Feinberg’s work was 
invaluable and much of what follows was influenced by these texts. 
8 Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 20. ‘Freedom’ and ‘liberty’ will be used relatively interchangeably. 
9 H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963) 21–2.  
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place a high degree of importance on liberty and the presumption of liberty seems to be a 
common ground for most theorists—indeed, even the anarchist agrees here. Similarly, those who 
hold that Mill’s harm principle, which will be examined in this work, is insufficient and that the 
state can legitimately interfere with liberty for reasons over and above harm do not claim that 
liberty is insignificant. Such critics of liberalism—and the harm principle specifically—such as 
Patrick Devlin, Sarah Conly, and Michael Moore, still hold liberty as one of the most significant 
values.10 They also believe that coercive interference and obstruction of liberty and autonomy 
must be justified; however, where they differ is in deciding what actually justifies interference in 
liberty. Many critics of the liberal harm principle believe that while liberty and individual 
autonomy are important values, this does not mean that there are not other important values that 
may trump the presumption in favor of liberty.  
 Feinberg claims that  
while it is easy to overemphasize the value of liberty, there is no denying its 
necessity, and for that reason most writers on our subject have endorsed a kind of 
‘presumption in favor of liberty’ requiring that whenever a legislator is faced with 
a choice between imposing a legal duty on citizens or leaving them at liberty, 
other things being equal, he should leave individuals free to make their own 
choices. Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special 
justification.11 
 
And most theorists, liberal or not, believe this to be the case. So, when the state interferes with 
our liberty, it interferes with our ability to lead our lives as we see fit. But remember, to a certain 
extent this interference is justified in order to provide security and a greater amount of liberty 
                                                 
10 For Legal Moralists see: Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); 
James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); 
Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Robert P. 
George; For Legal Paternalists see: Danny Scoccia, “In Defense of Hard Paternalism,” Law and Philosophy 27 
(2008); Plato, Republic. Sarah Conly, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
11 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 4 vols. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984) 9. 
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overall. Yet, once this system of government is put into place, it is important to ensure that the 
laws that are enacted do not restrict liberty further than ensures security of person because when 
liberty is restricted by an outside force it interferes with the autonomy of agents and while such 
agents give up some liberty to such an authority they do not give up all or even most liberty. 
Hence, it is especially important to justify liberty invading practices by the government. Mill and 
subsequent liberals focus on the importance of maintaining individual liberty from illegitimate 
outside (state and/or social) interference. But it is not clear when such interference is illegitimate. 
So, the question arises: when is such interference unjustified or illegitimate? One way to help 
address this question is by determining the proper domain of the law. Part of my goal in 
developing a legal harm principle is to address this domain question. 
 Because we find ourselves living in a society with others and we value liberty highly, we 
are generally willing to give up certain sorts of liberty so that we are protected against serious 
infractions and limitations on our liberty that tend to occur when agents live together. I am not 
working from within any sort of theory, such as social contract, and am not concerned with how 
governments gain legitimate authority (this is an important question). I am going to presume that 
governments have some sort of authority and what I am concerned with is the idea that 
governments—when they already exist (as they do)—have moral limitations because of the 
importance of liberty and finding those limitations helps us to preserve a robust and valuable sort 
of liberty. In other words, because there is such a presumption of liberty and because agents are 
autonomous, there must be some principled reasons, like Mill’s harm principle, that either justify 





I.3 What is the Criminal Law? 
 While there are many ways in which others may interfere in the liberty of individuals, 
generally the most imposing way in which the government can infringe on liberty is through the 
penal law. States offer protection to its citizens by enacting laws, specifically criminal laws, 
which coercively interfere by punishing those who do not follow its dictums. In this work, I will 
focus specifically on the criminal law as a particularly insidious form of coercion and liberty 
invasion. Following Feinberg and other legal theorists, I will not focus on all legal forms of 
liberty invasion like the many relatively “subtle uses of state power, like taxation, indoctrination, 
licensure, and selective funding,”12 and other types of law such as tort and regulatory law. My 
focus on the criminal law stems from the desire to derive a specifically legal harm principle in 
order to provide 1. a relatively clear and principled method for legislators to use to determine if 
acts fit within the legal domain which can then be considered for criminal regulations, 2. a 
defense for applying Mill’s harm principle as a basis for a legal harm principle, and 3. an 
interpretation of the harm principle as a legal principle that is robust and useful in delineating 
wrongful interferences of liberty from acceptable interferences. By focusing specifically on the 
criminal or penal law, we can better understand the domain in which some of the most costly and 
serious invasions of liberty belong and why they commonly involve steep consequences for the 
behaviors in question. The focus on criminal law also enables us to focus on an aspect of liberty 
invasion that has a tendency or at least has the potential to be particularly difficult to escape.  
 
I.3.1 The Criminal Law’s Reach 
 The criminal law’s steep consequences do not end when the violator “serves his time” 
                                                 
12 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 2. 
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and indeed tend to persist into his/her life after punishment. The official punishment for crimes, 
as invasive as they are, are not necessarily the most problematic invasions of liberty. Many of the 
consequences and liberty invasions that follow the proscribed punishment are problematic and 
often not justified. As Feinberg notes,  
Penal statutes can reenforce social pressures, and also create effective restrictions 
of their own. The threat of legal punishment enforces public opinion by putting 
the nonconformist in a terror of apprehension, rendering his privacy precarious, 
and his prospects in life uncertain. The punishments themselves brand him with 
society’s most powerful stigma and undermine his life projects, in career or 
family, disastrously. These legal interferences have a prior claim on our attention 
then, not merely because of their greater visibility and theoretical accessibility, 
but also because of their immense destructive impact on human interests. Given 
the inherent costs of criminalization, when a particular legal prohibition oversteps 
the limit of moral legitimacy, it is itself a serious moral crime.13 
 
As this quote suggests, because of the sort of coercion, punishment, and consequences involved 
in the criminal law, special justification is often called for. John Stuart Mill claims that there are 
always questions as to “the proper limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far 
liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident. It is one of the 
undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before it has been 
committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards” (OL V: 5). My discussion focuses on 
what Feinberg calls “the moral limits of the criminal law”14 and attempts to address how we can 
utilize the harm principle to determine which acts may legitimately be included in the criminal 
law while maintaining a proper respect for liberty. More specifically, Mill’s harm principle in On 
Liberty will be analyzed, discussed, and clarified to show how it may serve as a principled way 
to determine which acts fall within the domain of the criminal law. While many theorists, 
especially Feinberg, rely on Mill to concoct a morally acceptable legal principle that restricts 
                                                 
13 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 2. 
14 See Joel Feinberg’s four volume work, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. 
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liberty, Mill does not have such a narrow focus and analyzes the interference of individual liberty 
on a broad scale which includes all manner of liberty infringement from pleading to education, 
from shunning to imprisonment. I will begin my search for a principle with Mill as well, 
however, I will follow Feinberg’s lead and attempt to derive a specifically legal principle, unlike 
Mill, to focus more specifically on those liberty infringements that are on the more severe side of 
the spectrum (i.e. imprisonment, fines, forced community service, and other sorts of 
punishments).  
 When discussing and developing a normative theory of the criminal law, there is 
frequently a division made between “real” crimes that are a part of the criminal law and crimes 
that are not a “proper” part of the criminal law. However, it is not necessarily clear what it means 
to be a proper part of the criminal law. There are two potential interpretations of proper: one is 
descriptive/categorical and the other is normative. In this section, I will focus on the descriptive 
understanding of the criminal law, or what is—or what it means for something to be—an actual 
part of the criminal law. In the rest of this work I, in turn, focus on understanding and developing 
a normative moral system which identifies the limits of the criminal law by outlining the 
“principles, values, and aims that should guide legislatures in making such decisions.”15 In other 
words, I will discuss what may be a part of the criminal law, not what is a part of the criminal 
law or what criminal law means.  
 
I.3.2 Distinguishing the Criminal Law and the Moral Law 
 It is important to note that there is a real distinction between the criminal law and the 
                                                 
15 R. A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, SE Marshall, Massimo Renzo, and Victor Tadros (editors), “Introduction: Towards a 
Theory of Criminalization?” in Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 2. The distinctions made in the remainder of this section follow Duff, et al. 
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moral law.16 These are not and should not be equated. R. A. Duff, et al., make the point that the 
moral law is not what binds us as citizens to a country, state, or political institution. And while 
morality does not bind us to such an institution, the institution can be understood to abide by 
certain moral principles in order to claim legitimacy.17 We must keep in mind that any work on 
legal theory is also a work in political philosophy which ought not be separated from the political 
world in which we live. We must realize and consider that a morally corrupt and bankrupt 
individual may well be an excellent citizen because not only are the moral law and criminal law 
distinct, but the collective civic values that the state ought to concern itself with do not and ought 
not cover all of morality.18 However, this does not mean that we can ignore the moral elements 
that aid political entities in living and cooperating under a coherent system of laws that serve 
collective interests.19 Indeed as Arthur Kuflik states, “Liberalism requires that citizens who 
disagree with one another on a number of morally significant matters nevertheless coexist and 
cooperate within a political framework of basic rights protections.”20 This Rawlsian or 
Scanlonian understanding of society is common in that many of us recognize that we live among 
a variety of individuals with different conceptions of the good, morality, or the good life and that 
we must all live together under a minimal set of rules that most individuals would be reasonably 
expected to endorse or, as Scanlon would say could not reasonably reject.21 
 Still, since I am primarily concerned with the criminal law, much will be left unsaid on 
other parts of the law, such as regulatory infractions and tort law. Because I am singling out the 
                                                 
16 I will talk more about this distinction in section 2, chapters 3–4 when discussing rights. 
17 Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 19–20. 
18 I will discuss this distinction more in Chapter 4.2. 
19 Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 19–20. 
20 Arthur Kuflik, “Liberalism, Legal Moralism and Moral Disagreement” (Journal of Applied Philosophy 22, no. 2 
(2005)) 185. 
21 Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 20; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 




criminal law as distinct from other types of law, there is some clarification needed that indicates 
which types of acts are properly called criminal and which fall (or ought to fall) under some 
other category of law. The law, as it is written in many countries today, is difficult to clearly 
classify; however, there is something that can and needs to be said about analyzing the morality 
of the criminal law proper as distinct from other types of laws (some of which may, as a matter 
of fact, be part of an already existing body of criminal law) because there is a very real 
distinction between the types of behaviors that are properly characterized as criminal and those 
which do not have the same qualities necessary to make a behavior criminal. A crime is most 
colloquially understood as an act that the law prohibits us from performing. So, we understand 
that murder, rape, theft, and arson are crimes. It is a behavior that the law prohibits us from 
performing. However, this prohibition alone is not enough to describe the criminal law. There 
are many things that we see ourselves as being prevented by the law from doing, such as parking 
on a street facing the opposite direction from traffic, practicing medicine without a license, and 
tax evasion and yet these are not crimes in the primary sense alluded to above. There is an 
important distinction between those prohibitions that are a “proper” part of the criminal law and 
those that are not.  
 
I.3.3 Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita 
 There are two common interpretations of how the criminal law is divided.22 The first is 
between mala in se and mala prohibita. Mala in se describes “conduct that is wrong 
independently of its being regulated.”23 This aligns with Feinberg’s claim that the crimes 
                                                 
22 When laying out the general understanding of the criminal law in the next several paragraphs, I follow much of 
what R. A. Duff, et al. outline in their introduction “Toward a Theory of Criminalization?” in Criminalization: The 
Political Morality of the Criminal Law. 
23 Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 3. 
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covered within the criminal law are those in which  
‘punishment is used in the first instance’ and not merely ‘as a last resort,’ where 
punishment is clearly for something other than (or in addition to) mere 
disobedience to authority as such, and it can be specified what punishment is for 
independently of the rules of legal institutions set up for some purpose.24  
 
These are acts which do not need the law to exist in order to define the behavior and can be 
thought of as acts which are “pre-legally wrongful.”25 However, using the concept of pre-legal 
wrongness may not be as helpful as it seems because there are some things that seem pre-legally 
wrong that ought not to be covered, such as lying.26 The pre-legal wrongness is a part of what 
makes an action prohibitable but cannot serve as the whole picture for what it takes for an act to 
be legislated through the criminal law proper.  
 Mala prohibita, on the other hand, is “conduct that is wrong only in virtue of its being 
regulated.”27 This distinction is an important one when dividing crimes into those that fit into the 
criminal law “proper” and those that are, for instance, mere regulatory infractions, as it is not 
always clear in the vernacular what we mean when we say something is a crime (part of the 
criminal law proper) and many things that are not a part of the criminal law are often understood 
or labeled as penal crimes when they fit more accurately into another category.  
 
I.3.4 Punishment and Penalties 
 The second common contrast of crimes that fit into the criminal law and those that do not 
is “between offenses that are deemed punishable and those to which mere penalties are 
                                                 
24 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 21. Feinberg’s discussion here seems to follow the division of mala in se and mala 
prohibita offenses but he is talking of “primary” and “derivative” crimes. 
25 Duff, et al., “Introduction,” in Criminalization, 8. 
26 Ibid., 8. 
27 Ibid., 3.  
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attached.”28 This contrast and the contrast between mala in se and mala prohibita are often 
conflated and they are, in a way, related. For instance, contempt of court (mala prohibita) is not 
something that is punished as a crime in the same way that murder (mala in se) is punished. If 
one unjustly kills, they are punished harshly, generally with imprisonment. Something like 
contempt of court or tax evasion is a behavior that may result in a warning, a citation, or a fine 
but is not usually punished as a crime in the first (or subsequent) instance. So, when someone 
violates the rules of the court, the individual may be warned and then fined and may eventually 
be jailed, but this punishment is only meted out as a last resort or backup sanction. The “crime” 
in this case amounts to disobeying authority or attempting to undermine a regulatory system. In 
this way, it is not the behavior that is being punished but the disobeying of authority, which must 
be built into the system in some way to allow for efficient and practical regulation and 
government. As Feinberg correctly points out, “if we are going to confer authority on designated 
officials in order to make some governmental program or institutions work, we are committed 
thereby to granting them enforceable powers, since unenforceable authority is, in effect, no 
authority at all.”29 Without such authority to be obeyed in these cases, the institutions, programs, 
and appointed officials lose authority which in turn could lead to a collapse of these important 
institutions which would then lead to greater amounts of harm. For instance, if a court system 
does not have authority, then one can argue that a miscarriage and failure of justice ensues 
because the perpetrators of crime are unable to be punished. Further, one may also believe that 
the purpose of the court system is to compensate victims, so if the court system does not have 
authority then the victims are not compensated for harms done against them.30  
                                                 
28 Ibid.  




 There are many different non-penal sanctions that the law does and should appeal to for 
certain acts that we (incorrectly) call crimes; however, those acts that are considered crimes in 
the pre-legal sense that initiate penal sanctions as the primary mode of punishment generally 
interfere with liberty to a greater extent than non-penal sanctions and have punishments rather 
than penalties. These types of crimes are the main focus of this work. It is important to note that I 
will not provide a guide to what sorts of punishment can or should be used, i.e. I am not 
advocating or endorsing imprisonment, fines, capital punishment, etc. My goal is not to say how 
the penal law should respond to violations or what is the appropriate punishment (though in 
some instances I will highlight a balancing test that should be applied to make the punishment fit 
the crime, so to speak),31 only what it may say or at least consider as acceptable behaviors to 
consider as crimes. I will attempt to provide a guide for determining when it is acceptable to 
limit someone’s liberty through the criminal law, not how the criminal law should actually 
punish. 
 
I.3.5 Regulatory Infractions and Crimes 
 According to R. A. Duff (et al.), there are generally three primary differences between 
regulatory infractions and those crimes that are a proper part of the criminal law; they are that  
[1.] they do not attract the formal censure that attaches to criminal convictions; 
[2.] while they may be sanctioned by fines, or disqualifications from the activities 
in which the infraction occurred, imprisonment is not a possible penalty; and  
[3.] the procedures through which they are dealt with are simpler than those of a 
criminal trial.32 
 
While these three differences often indicate the division between regulatory infractions or tort 
                                                 
31 See chapter 6.6. 
32R. A. Duff, et al., “Introduction” in Criminalization, 33. 
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law and the criminal law proper, there may be a backup threat of criminal proceedings which 
make the regulatory infractions, and those actions like them, seem more serious or on par with 
those acts covered by the criminal law. However, for the most part such crimes are handled 
through the many different non-criminal penalties at the government’s disposal. Clarifying this 
issue, Feinberg explains that “it is not the central purpose, the raison d’etre, of the law of torts to 
punish contempt of court, any more than it is the purpose of legal marriage to prevent adultery; 
but it is the whole point of the law of criminal homicide to prevent and punish wrongful 
killings.”33 Tax evasion and contempt of court, draft dodging, escape from prison, driving 
without a license, etc. are crimes that are secondary or that are only comprehensible under a 
preexisting system of rules and regulations. Murder and rape can be understood as crimes 
independently of such systems. As Feinberg notes, “one can wrongfully kill whether or not there 
is a criminal law of homicide, but one cannot commit contempt of court unless there is already in 
existence a complex legal structure (the court system) whose rules already confer powers and 
immunities, and define authority.”34 
 While there are notable differences among these divisions of law, it is not always clear 
which action falls under which type of law and indeed, oftentimes a single policy can discuss and 
combine several different types of law, notably criminal law and a regulation such as 
immigration.35 This further muddies the water when one is attempting to understand the 
distinctions. However, discovering principles on which legislators ought to base the criminal law 
is entirely possible and indeed may help to clarify how laws should be drafted. Again, the 
purpose of this work is to look to those crimes that can be categorized as falling under the proper 
                                                 
33 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 20. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Duff, et al., “Introduction” in Criminalization, 37. 
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domain of the criminal law and to explain how the harm principle can serve as a principle for 
determining legitimate governmental coercion. This is to limit the discussion to a manageable 
range of topics as well as to distinguish between parts of the law that have multiple purposes and 
very well may have alternate principles that serve as a guideline for performance. 
 Critics may claim that by limiting the discussion to only those acts which would require 
penal legislation, we are ignoring acts and behavior that are counterproductive to liberty and a 
cohesive and harmonious society. However, while this may be the case, and while there are 
many ways in which the law can attempt to “change, alter, and limit the behavior of its 
citizens,”36 such as through incentives, taxes, or appealing to civil or tort law, the penalties that 
result from such practices are generally far less invasive of liberty and also fall outside of the 
realm of criminal law. But again, this does not mean that there is nothing the law can do to curb 
such undesirable behaviors and that preventing such acts is not an interesting study; it is just a 
separate issue from the focus of this project. I wish to focus on the harshest of the legal penalties 
(legal/penal coercion) because if we can justify the most invasive restriction on liberty, it not 
only makes those less invasive restrictions clearer, but may also provide us with a greater basis 
for justification of coercive legal measures because, as Mill says, “unless the reasons are good 
for an extreme case, they are not good for any case” (OL II: 9).37  
 
I.4 The Case for Principles 
All practical reasoning involves the application of principles to the facts. The 
principles, in turn, must be clarified and tested tentatively against hypothetical 
possibilities. ... But the principles at hand, at least as simply stated, are rarely 
clear. They must be fleshed out; otherwise they are mere rhetorical slogans, empty 
                                                 
36 Gerald Dworkin, “Harm and the Volenti Principle,” (Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation 29, no 1(2012)) 309. 
37 While in this passage Mill is specifically discussing freedom of speech, the sentiment is applicable to the topic at 





 Not all criminal laws that restrict the liberty of people are morally legitimate. Defining 
and defending principles which are supposed to justify such coercion is thus critical to 
determining their moral legitimacy. There are several attempts to justify state coercion of 
individuals that appeal to a variety of principles, notably legal paternalism, legal moralism, the 
offense principle, and the liberal harm principle (the latter is the primary topic of the current 
work). However, why is it the case that the state must rely on principles at all? For instance, it 
seems that one way to ease the tension between liberty and authority is to look at each individual 
case, determine the main concern that arises, and then create a solution to resolve the tension. 
 
I.4.1 Consistency of Application 
 One of the main issues with a case-by-case method of dealing with the law is that it lacks 
a consistency of application that one generally demands of the law and social justice in general. 
For instance, if one were to decide in each circumstance which acts were crimes and which were 
not, there would be instances of the same act being both a crime and not a crime in different 
cases.39 If there are not principles that are appealed to in the law, it is easier to have lapses of 
justice and fairness which are key components of the law. The law is created to dictate rules for 
everyone equally. Because the law is created as a system of rules that apply universally, for the 
law to unpredictably apply to some cases and individuals and not to others causes serious issues. 
                                                 
38 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 16. 
39 One could argue that even with clear principles this may occur. For instance, despite having a law against a 
particular act, it is often more common that one group is prosecuted disproportionately for the crime than others. For 
instance, in today’s US legal system black people are disproportionately punished for drug crimes as compared to 
white people. However, this is an issue of application and does not mean that we should not use principles or rely on 
principles, only that we should enforce the principles fairly. And, really, it is not that the same act is a crime in one 
case and not the other, in both cases it is a crime, it is just not punished in one case and it is in the other. 
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As Gerald Dworkin notes  
It is by now widely accepted that those who act and claim moral justification for 
their conduct must be prepared to accept as legitimate certain universalizations of 
their action. There must be consistency in conduct, a refusal to make special pleas 
in one’s own behalf or to consider oneself an exception to general principles.40  
 
If we allow for rulings on a case by case basis there is a greater possibility that exceptions will be 
made unjustly.41 For instance, if two agents are convicted of the same crime, and the situation is 
roughly the same, most believe that the same consequences ought to follow.42 This is not to say 
that the law cannot provide exceptions to certain rules, for instance there is a law against 
speeding, but ambulances are allowed to speed if there is an emergency.43 An important thing to 
keep in mind with such exceptions is that they are not arbitrary and they are reasoned and 
universal exceptions that most people would accept as legitimate. While the law can make such 
exceptions, when the law is applied to those that are not legitimately excepted, a similar result 
ought to obtain.44  
 However, based on a case-by-case examination, oftentimes it may be that grave 
irregularities result. This may occur if one gives certain groups or individuals preference over 
others without just cause. When we consider the law, however, there is a necessity for 
impartiality. The reason for this is that in order to be effective, the law must provide clear 
guidelines and rules so that agents know and understand ahead of time what behaviors and acts 
are or are not acceptable. In addition to this, the concept of justice or fairness is an important 
                                                 
40 Gerald Dworkin, “Non-Neutral Principles,” (The Journal of Philosophy 71, No. 14 (1974): 491–506) 491. 
41 This is not to say that unjust exceptions could not be made with principles, only that it would not be as pervasive 
as it would be without them. 
42 While most of us believe this to be so, it is also happens that in actual cases such principles and situations are in 
fact judged and ruled differently. This is not a problem with the theory but rather the application and those involved 
in the decision-making process.  




component of the law. If an agent does not know which acts will result in a penalty or which acts 
will fall under a certain law, then that agent is constantly at risk of performing acts that are, 
unbeknownst to the agent, criminal. And even if the law is written in a clear and concise manner, 
a case-by-case basis will still result in an unfair and erratic application.  
 
I.4.2 Fair and Unbiased 
 In addition to the necessity for clear and consistent application of principles, such 
principles must be applied to fair and unbiased laws. For instance, if a legislator enacted an 
arbitrary law that all and only those people of Celtic descent are forbidden from riding bicycles, 
then the law would no longer be impartial or consistent. It would depend upon facts that agents 
do not have any control over and that are not relevant to the behavior in question. This 
observation is not based on a sophisticated philosophical understanding of legitimacy or 
relevance but is fairly straightforward and normal understanding of relevance and fairness.45  
 Not only are there problems of this sort, but also knowing that a particular act is wrong 
does not provide any guide to figuring out what it is that makes such acts wrong. As Socrates 
pointed out in Euthyphro, it is not a question of whether a particular act is impious, but rather 
what impious acts have in common such that they are thought to be impious. In other words, a 
particular act of murder is wrong, but understanding what features it shares with other instances 
of murder such that actions of this type can be made wrong according to the law is what is 
necessary.46  
 In order to have a well-functioning system of laws, laws need to be reasonably clear and 
                                                 
45 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 6–7. 
46 Plato, Euthyphro, in Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1 translated by Harold North Fowler. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1966) 10a–11a. 
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appeal to principles which provide reasons that promote consistency and impartiality. Mill states 
that contrary to what he believes should be the case, “there is, in fact, no recognized principle by 
which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested” (OL I: 8). 
Relying on principles to decide when government interference is acceptable is important and 
something that is needed; yet, the protection of the rights of individuals,47 such as liberty, is 
rarely decided on matters of principle but rather is decided on the whims of those in power or 
those who are in great numbers. Mill believes that utilizing and relying on the harm principle is 
the best, and really only, way to determine when interference in the rights of individuals by 
others (government or otherwise) is acceptable (OL I: 9). He argues that it is really a matter of 
intuition and feeling that tends to decide when rights are protected and when they are not. If 
people do not like something that is happening in a particular instance, only then do they tend to 
decide that that particular behavior ought to be stopped, almost regardless of whether it infringes 
on the rights of others (OL I: 7). Generally, people want their own rights protected but when 
someone else is doing something they do not like, they tend not to care or they tend to ignore that 
it would violate the others’ rights.48 By utilizing principles, there is a clear and accessible way to 
                                                 
47 By this I do not mean there is harm or threat to actual “rights” but rather that there is harm to individuals that 
implicate rights. The harm is always to the individual and while I will utilize language that suggests the harm is to 
the rights, such as protection of rights, violating rights, infringing rights, harm to rights, etc., this is never the case. 
In this instance I mean something like ‘protect individuals in their rights.’ 
48 A rare principle “maintained with consistency”: Mill does note that there is one rare instance in which principle, 
as opposed to sentiment, personal preference, or majority morality ruled/rules, and that is in the matter of religious 
belief and tolerance for religious diversity. He claims that here, with freedom of religious belief and nowhere else, 
one has “the only case in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with consistency” 
(OL I: 7). However, even here, where freedom of religious belief is given more consideration, Mill admits that in 
instances when one has a geographical area with a majority or dominant religion, tolerance of other religions only 
goes so far and “it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed.” This tendency to vacillate is pervasive 
even today and Mill sees this as problematic as this domain seems to be the best instance of principle trumping 
sentiment. However, it is also a particularly interesting example as it shows the distinction between how individuals 
(and Mill) view the law in relation to custom or public opinion. While most people believe that religious belief (and 
liberty?) ought to be protected in principle, custom and public opinion seem to lean toward intolerance in practice. 
So, while individuals want religious freedom to be a protected right, they also want others to do as they do which 
frequently leads to legal moralism, a principle Mill believes to be illegitimate. This disparity between thought and 
action is what leads Mill to state that the harm principle ought to be employed to avoid inconsistencies and 
violations or infringements of rights. Interestingly and importantly, he states this as a universal principle which 
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determine what is expected of citizens and what rights are protected. Appealing to principles 
provides a consistent and clear guideline for agents and law-makers alike. This is not to say that 
such principles are absolute and never conflict, but rather that there needs to be principles or 
reasons that always count as good reasons for or against a particular law. As Feinberg claims, 
liberty limiting principles are those that always provide a “morally relevant reason in support of 
penal legislation even if other reasons may in circumstances outweigh it.”49 This allows for 
consistent reasons to be considered in enacting legislation. This way everyone has a clear idea of 
what laws are legitimate and which actions are allowed. Principles such as these allow for 
consistency of application and a concept of fairness that is necessary in a legal system where 
liberty is a significant value and that has a presumption of liberty.  
 
I.4.3 A Formal Theory of Justice 
 In other words, what we are attempting to produce is a formal theory of justice. In the 
above discussion, the formal theory that is appealed to is derived from Aristotle when he states 
that like cases ought to be treated in a like manner and dissimilar cases ought to be treated in a 
dissimilar manner50 “(and in direct proportion to the differences between them).”51 While this 
principle is helpful, it does not exactly outline what it means for cases to be similar or what 
                                                 
covers not only the way in which the law may act toward citizens but also the way in which society qua public 
coercion can act toward its individual members. Mill claims that his principle covers all coercive dealings between 
people, “whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public 
opinion.” (OL I: 7). 
49 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 9–10. 
50 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V; Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 99; However, Aristotle also called for the 
law to give preference to certain conceptions of freedom and that “freedom sometimes requires that government and 
law not be neutral with respect to questions of the good life, with respect to moral and religious questions. Freedom 
is not a matter of autonomy or choosing whatever we happen to want. Rather, to be free is to live a certain mode of 
life: the good life.” Charles Fried, “The Nature and Importance of Liberty,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy 29 no 1 (2005): 7. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian principle of fairness is a key component to a theory that 
appeals to principles as a necessary feature of the law. 




makes things dissimilar. Since every case or situation differs in some respects it is important to 
determine the relevant differences in order to justify treating cases similarly or differently. When 
(relevantly) like cases are treated alike it is just, when (relevantly) like cases are treated 
differently it is unjust. Injustice then, Feinberg claims, amounts to “unfair discrimination, 
arbitrary exclusion, favoritism, inappropriate partisanship or partiality, inconsistent rule-
enforcement, ‘freeloading’ in a cooperative undertaking, or putting one party at a relative 
disadvantage in a competition.”52 Feinberg points out that writers such as Isaiah Berlin believe 
that this principle is not merely “one among many ethical principles vying for our allegiance, but 
is rather an instance of a more general principle that is constitutive of rationality itself.”53 
However, whether or not the principle—that like cases ought to be treated the same—is a part of 
rationality does not really need to be decided in this work and I will remain neutral on this point. 
But it is interesting and useful to point out that this principle plays an important and, in some 
cases, necessary part of justice, impartiality, and the law.  
 However, again, the formal principle alone is not enough and a variety of material 
principles are necessary to understand and interpret the formal principle of justice which does not 
provide which reasons are relevant in a given situation. There are a variety of material principles 
of justice and there does not seem to be one overarching or supreme principle of material justice 
that applies to all cases. Indeed, Feinberg claims that “there is no one kind of characteristic that 
is relevant in all contexts, no single material principle that applies universally.”54 Instead he calls 
for utilizing H. L. A. Hart’s understanding of material principles which rely on “a shifting or 
                                                 
52 Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 99. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 102. 
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varying criterion.”55 Such criterion would be interpreted through the context in which the 
principle is applied. In other words, as Hart claims, “There is therefore a certain complexity in 
the structure of the idea Justice. We may say that it consists of two parts: a uniform or constant 
feature [formal principle] … and a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when … 
cases are alike or different [material principle].”56 Relevant differences are going to depend on 
the contexts of the case in question.57 This does not mean we should reject formal principles of 
justice altogether, only that interpreting the cases to which the principles apply is difficult.58 
 
I.5 A General Harm Principle and a Legal Harm Principle 
 As Feinberg claims, the liberal, at bottom, must endorse the presumption in favor of 
liberty. However, there are a variety of ways in which agents can adopt this presumption and 
even the paternalist and moralist endorse this presumption which “could be thought of, at one 
extreme, as powerful enough to be always decisive, and at the other, as weak enough to be 
overridden by any of a large variety of liberty-limiting principles, even when minimally 
applicable.”59 However, because of this, the presumption in favor of liberty alone cannot be what 
determines a liberal. To have any relevance, then, the liberal is “one who has so powerful a 
commitment to liberty that he [or she] is motivated to limit the number of acknowledged liberty-
limiting principles as narrowly as possible.”60 Indeed, John Stuart Mill claims “the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
                                                 
55 Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 160 quoted in Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 
102. 
56 Hart, The Concept of Law, 160. 
57 Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 102. 
58 Again, this is not a problem unique to this project. This applies to all attempts to define and determine a criminal 
law. 




his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant” (OL I: 9). This principle serves as the cornerstone of what follows. I will attempt to lay 
out the various parts of the harm principle and this dissertation will serve as a commentary on 
and defense of Mill’s harm principle.  
 
I.5.1 Deriving a Legal Harm Principle 
 In addition to explicating Mill’s harm principle, my goal is to define a “legal harm 
principle” that is derived from Mill’s general harm principle in On Liberty in order to defend the 
liberal position as a particularly useful and robust method for interpreting legitimate uses of the 
penal law. This legal harm principle will resemble what Feinberg calls the “Extreme Liberal 
Position” in referring to the idea that the only morally legitimate criminal prohibitions by the 
state are those based on the harm principle.61 I will defend this by outlining Mill’s harm principle 
as clearly as possible and highlighting its nuances in order to defend its use in constructing a 
specifically legal principle. This approach, while not uncommon, is still criticized as a mistaken 
endeavor because some critics, such as Bernard Harcourt and Piers Norris Turner, claim Mill is 
not trying to define so narrow a principle that it applies only to the law.62 According to this view, 
attempting to articulate a legal harm principle is missing the point of what Mill is really doing—
attempting to outline all instances of interference in liberty, not solely legal interferences. While 
this criticism does highlight the ultimate goal of Mill’s view in On Liberty, I do not believe it is 
problematic to attempt to parse out where Mill would fall on such a principle. I will argue that 
one is able to reasonably derive a harm (sub) principle that applies solely to the law relying on 
                                                 
61 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 26. 
62 Bernard Harcourt, “The Collapse of the Harm Principle” (Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1999): 109–
94); Piers Norris Turner, “‘Harm’ and Mill’s Harm Principle,” (Ethics 124 (2014): 299–326). 
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what Mill has to say about harm and his harm principle.  
 Mill believes that invasions of liberty based on legal moralism and legal (hard) 
paternalism,63 the two most commonly proposed alternatives to the harm principle, are never 
legitimate means of state coercion because the level of interference with individual liberty and 
personal autonomy is too great a sacrifice and is not morally justified. While rejecting the above 
conservative liberty-limiting principles is always a concern of the liberal, it is not the primary 
aim or focus of this work and while these principles are mentioned occasionally, the primary 
motivation is to delineate a liberal legal harm principle that is derived from Mill’s more general 
one. I will then focus on the issue of speech, specifically hate speech, in the third section to 
analyze how I might apply my legal harm principle.   
                                                 
63 Feinberg makes a distinction between hard and soft paternalism, with soft paternalism actually comprising a 
subset of the liberal harm principle and thus, serving as a legitimate interference in the liberty of others. This seems 




Limiting Liberty: Situating John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle 
 
1.1 Mill and the Harm Principle 
 When considering which acts ought to be covered by the criminal law, it is likely that 
many people will list similar acts as being appropriately covered. For instance, most people hold 
that if I stab you, steal from you, deliberately destroy your property,64 threaten you, or beat 
you—in other words, if I harm you—I should be held criminally liable and punished. Famously, 
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty claims that the only legitimate interference in the liberty of an 
individual is to prevent harm to others (OL I: 9). In essence, this is an endorsement of the liberty 
limiting principle65 that has become known as the “harm principle” and though it may not have 
originated with him, it is most frequently associated with Mill and liberalism.66  
 However, while associated with liberalism, it seems that whatever a person’s moral or 
political background, he/she generally believes that causing harm to others, whether in their 
person or their property, is wrong and should be punished, often through the law.67 As Gerald 
Dworkin notes, “there has been a remarkable consensus that whatever other principles might be 
                                                 
64 This particular act and those that involve restrictions on individual liberty based on the idea of property rights are 
a bit more controversial than others because there are a variety of theories regarding the legitimacy of private 
property, specifically land. The most problematic being trespassing and breaking and entering. If I destroy nothing, 
is it still an invasion of liberty? And if it is, on what grounds? If it is harm, there needs to be a clear interference in 
liberty that results in a wrongful harm. 
65 Here I am referring to Joel Feinberg’s definition of liberty limiting principles which “put fort[h] a kind of reason it 
claims always to be relevant—always to have some weight—in support of proposed legal coercion, even though in a 
given instance it might not weigh enough to be decisive, and even though it may not be the only kind of 
consideration that can be relevant” (Harm to Others, 10). See my Introduction for discussion. 
66 For instance, versions of the harm principle are echoed in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen, The Hippocratic Oath and other “do no harm” principles, as well as Socrates’ view expressed in Plato’s 
Crito where he claims that it is never justified to harm another (though here he seems to be talking more about harm 
to the soul than harm to interests as Mill and other contemporary liberals understand it). 
67 Even relatively conservative legal theorists or those decidedly against liberalism, especially the liberalism of Mill, 
notably Patrick Devlin, Michael Moore (though Moore is more moderate), and Sarah Conly hold some sort of harm 
to others thesis/principle. An obvious exception to this idea is the anarchist who believes that no government 
coercion is legitimate. 
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required for an adequate theory of criminalization, some form of a harm to others principle is 
required.”68 But, because of the shared and almost universal presumption of liberty69 and the 
idea that individual autonomy warrants prima facie respect, it falls on those who support any 
liberty limiting principles—even one that is relatively universal and interferes with liberty to a 
lesser extent than other such principles—to defend why such coercive measures are legitimate 
interferences in individual autonomy.  
 
1.1.1 Distinguishing the Harm Principle from Other Liberty Limiting Principles 
 Because there are many ways in which individuals and governments may interfere with 
the liberty of others, proper legislation needs to distinguish and highlight acceptable levels from 
unacceptable levels of interference. The harm principle, then, as defined by Mill is “that the sole 
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty 
or action of any of their number is self-protection” (OL I: 9). Mill continues this definition by 
expanding what he means by self-protection. If I want to protect myself or the community wants 
to protect itself, then “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (OL I: 9). This 
means that the only appropriate interference of the liberty of citizens by the government or 
individual citizens is to protect oneself or others from harm or the likelihood of harm.70 
 While it seems that Mill does not go into as much detail when defining his principle as to 
                                                 
68 Dworkin, “Harm and the Volenti Principle,” 310. 
69 Because liberty seems to be a necessary feature of a good life or happiness (discussed below) and is seen as an 
important value, there is a general presumption that, all things being equal, liberty should be the norm and coercion 
or interference with liberty should be the exception, or should be justified. See my introduction for a discussion on 
the presumption in favor of liberty. 
70 I will refer to “harm” throughout and in most cases I mean harm and/or the likelihood of harm. Including the 
likelihood of harm occurring and not relying on actual harm occurring is important for harm prevention. This 
sentiment is found in Mill, On Liberty, IV: 10. However, the likelihood of an act causing harm must be high and a 
common consequence of the act in question. 
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what he means by harm as we might like, he does give a rough idea of how harm can be 
prevented and who may prevent it.71 He suggests two overlapping categories. The first category 
involves how individuals or society may interfere in instances of harm to others: “physical force 
in the forms of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion” (OL I: 9). The second 
category discusses who may interfere in the liberty of others for the sake of self-protection: the 
individual or society collectively.72 Society collectively can include either governmental 
interference or social interference more generally (the latter being extra-legal73 or non-
governmental).74 Furthermore, the individual or society may interfere in the liberty of others to 
protect “any of their number” or “any member of a civilized community” (OL I: 9) from harm. 
These latter terms would—and I believe ought to—include a wide range of individuals, such as 
immigrants, refugees, visitors, and even non-terrestrial beings (if such were to exist), and would 
apply to all instances of liberty invasion.  
 While this discussion of harm indicates that agents may interfere in the liberty of others 
                                                 
71 One of the most frequent criticisms of Mill’s conception of liberty and the harm principle is that he fails to 
adequately define “harm.” Jonathan Riley claims that Mill is “rather cavalier” about his notion of harm early on 
(Mill on Liberty, New York: Routledge, 1998) 75. An analysis of his understanding of harm will be discussed in the 
remainder of this work.  
72 “The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action 
of any of their number, is self-protection.” Mill, On Liberty, I: 9.  
73 By extra-legal here I mean those forms of coercion that are not the domain of the law. I do not mean illegal or 
above the law. I do mean something like outside the law but again, by this I do not intend anything like illegal but 
rather those coercive means that entities outside of the law, such as individual citizens or society, enact. Most 
frequently this means something like social pressures or what Mill calls “moral coercion” though this can also be 
physical coercion by those who are not representatives of the law. 
74 Now when we combine these categories, we come up with several potential options: a. I may prevent harm to me 
or, more generally, one may protect oneself through either moral coercion or physical force; b. individuals can 
prevent harm to other individuals through either moral coercion or physical force; c. society collectively (non-
government) may prevent harm to others through either moral coercion or physical force; d. society (via the 
government) may prevent harm to others through either moral coercion or physical force. However, in the first 
general category in the text above, namely the legal versus extra-legal social interference, it seems that physical 
coercion is reserved for the state via legal penalties. Mill seems to suggest that the community or society (non-
government) can only prevent harm to others through “moral coercion of public opinion” though not physical 
coercion. It is not really clear at this point and it may be that Mill is talking generally here but he does say elsewhere 
that individuals may stop others from doing or risking harm to others and this prevention may be physical and not 
merely moral pressure (OL V: 5). 
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when someone is inflicting harm directly on another and acting in a manner that is likely to cause 
harm to others, Mill is explicit that this does not cover an agent harming himself, consenting 
agents engaging in behavior that may cause harm to themselves, or even agents performing 
immoral (but harmless) acts.75 Mill claims that an individual’s  
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant [for interference in 
an agent’s liberty]. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or to forbear because 
it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the 
opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons 
for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or 
entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case 
he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, 
must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct 
of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In 
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign (OL I: 9). 
 
In other words, Mill does not allow for others to limit which acts an agent may or may not 
perform unless such acts cause or risk harm to another. And while he does allow for the 
legitimacy of certain types of intervention in non-harmful situations, it is only in the form of 
verbal persuasion or education and not tyranny, physical, or even moral coercion.76 However, it 
is important that Mill stresses that this principle only applies when the agent in question harms or 
risks harm to others and does not apply in instances of harm or risk of harm to the self or any 
other act which only concerns himself.  
 
1.1.2 Alternate Liberty Limiting Principles 
 The qualifications that Mill presents in the above quote ultimately serve as a rejection of 
many of the principles that are suggested as alternative (or perhaps additional) liberty limiting 
                                                 
75 Mill, On Liberty, I: 9, I: 12, I: 13, and Chapter IV.  
76 A general discussion on types of intervention will be discussed below in Chapter 2.4. 
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principles. As noted, theorists generally agree that harm or likely harm to others ought to be a 
legitimate reason for interference; however, some theorists do not believe that the harm principle 
goes far enough.77 The most common theories that are suggested as supplements to the harm 
principle are legal moralism, legal paternalism, and as Gerald Dworkin argues, moral 
paternalism which can be thought of as a form of moral perfectionism which seeks to understand 
and develop an objective concept of the good life and aid agents in striving toward that life 
(which often utilizes paternalistic principles to achieve its goal if agents are not performing those 
acts necessary for reaching “the good life”).78  
 
1.1.3 Legal Moralism and Legal Paternalism 
 Again, while the harm principle allows for interference only in cases where there is harm 
or likely harm to others, legal moralism allows for interference in the liberty of others in order to 
prevent acts that may be considered immoral, but not necessarily harmful, such as homosexual 
sex and other “deviant” but consensual sexual acts. These acts are usually considered to be 
offensive to others but not really harmful to others.79 They may argue that the harm that occurs is 
to the participants but this is not harm to others. Legal paternalism increases those actions and 
behaviors covered over and above those included in the harm principle by allowing for 
interference in the liberty of another for that agent’s own good, which is usually interpreted as 
preventing self-inflicted harm to the agent, such as mandating seat belts or laws against suicide, 
or benefit to the agent, such as being required to pay into social security (though the latter sort of 
                                                 
77 See, Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968); Sara Conly, Against 
Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) among many others. 
78 Gerald Dworkin, “Moral Paternalism,” (Law and Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2005): 305–31. 
79 See chapters 1.2.6 and 5.4.1 for discussions of offense.  
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interference generally does not apply to criminal law).  
 
1.1.4 Moral Paternalism 
 Moral paternalism is often a version of perfectionism and, according to Dworkin, allows 
for the interference in the liberty of another to improve that agent’s moral good or well-being (as 
opposed to preventing self-inflicted or consensual physical harm) or to prevent harm to the 
agent’s moral character or soul.80 This can be understood to mean either improvement to or 
salvaging of one’s moral character or prevention of harm to one’s moral character, an example 
would be something like making people volunteer at a charitable venue to promote generosity, or 
not allowing them to consume certain products such as drugs or alcohol. 
 It is interesting to note that most, if not all, of the theorists who advocate these additional 
liberty limiting principles include some type of harm to others principle in their arsenal but wish 
to also restrict more behaviors through the criminal law. For this reason the harm principle seems 
to be the most common ground for discussion and best place to begin. 
 
1.2 Defining the Private Sphere of Liberty 
 As noted, Mill’s principle relies on a notion of harm to “others” serving as the only 
legitimate means of interference in the liberty of individuals and Mill distinguishes his principle 
from other liberty limiting principles such as moralism and paternalism which consider harm to 
self in addition to harm to others as legitimate grounds for interference. However, while it may 
seem intuitive or obvious what “harm to others” means, Mill purposely outlines what he intends 
the sphere of other-regarding actions to encapsulate so as to ward off potential criticisms that 
                                                 
80 Dworkin, “Moral Paternalism,” 305–31. 
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stem from the idea that “no man is an island” and all acts are other-regarding in some manner, 
even seemingly self-regarding behaviors. Mill’s distinction here also serves as a way to address 
the legal moralist and paternalist who attempt to increase controllable or prohibitable behaviors 
beyond that of the harm principle. For instance, many people claim that they are affected when 
someone else does something immoral or when they are offended by something another does. Is 
it the case that this is harm to others and properly covered? Mill addresses these concerns by 
drawing a distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts as they relate to the harm 
principle, preventing harm, and the limits of the law and society at large (OL I: 9, I:12, I:14, IV, 
V: 6).81  
 
1.2.1 Self-Regarding Versus Other-Regarding Acts 
 Mill divides actions into two (very rough) categories, those that are primarily self-
regarding and those that are primarily other-regarding because in understanding the scope of 
authority over individuals, Mill claims that “to individuality should belong the part of life in 
which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests 
society” (OL IV: 2). Mill asserts that in any case in which an individual does not significantly, 
primarily, or chiefly affect the lives of others by his/her action, then “there should be perfect 
freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences” (OL IV: 3). Even in the 
case where the individual is in error as to what is morally right or even what is harmful to the 
agent, it is better for society, according to Mill, that he/she be left alone to act in whatever 
manner he/she sees fit (so long as there is not harm to others) contrary to what both the moralist 
                                                 
81 Some portions of the discussion on self-regarding and other-regarding acts have appeared in Kathryn Zawisza, 




and the paternalist would likely claim. Those in society who are concerned for the moral well-
being of the individual may offer advice or plead for a change, others who condemn the acts of 
the individual may choose to separate themselves from the individual; however, it is not the case 
that others are permitted to “make his life uncomfortable” or actively seek to control the actions 
of the individual (OL IV: 7). For Mill, even moral coercion is not an acceptable form of 
interference in those actions that are primarily self-regarding. If, on the other hand, harm is likely 
to be caused to others, then it is acceptable for the individual to be prevented from performing 
the act. 
 
1.2.2 Is the Self- and Other-Regarding Distinction Helpful? 
 Despite his attempt to delineate what exactly he means by self- and other-regarding acts, 
Mill’s distinction here has resulted in a great deal of criticism, much of which Mill himself 
addresses (OL IV). Indeed, David O. Brink believes that the self/other-regarding distinction is 
unhelpful despite Mill’s effort at exposition.82 However, I believe this discussion is incredibly 
helpful in making a distinction between those acts that can be regulated and those that cannot. 
For instance, we know there are two (admittedly rough) categories and that one, the self-
regarding, is never permissible for legislation. The second category, the other-regarding, may be 
eligible for regulation but that does not mean that it must be regulated.  
 For instance, as Brink points out, there are seemingly other-regarding acts that are merely 
offensive, Mill does not believe that they should be regulated, but this does not mean that they 
are not other-regarding only that they are perhaps not harmful. In discussing offensive behaviors, 
Mill indicates that this sort of behavior is primarily self-regarding even though people take 
                                                 
82 David O. Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 141. 
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offense to it (so there is some aspect of other-regardingness) because the actions of the individual 
do not impact/harm the interests of others. For Mill we do not seem to have a significant interest 
in not being offended. To cite some of Mill’s examples, after discussing the Muslim aversion to 
eating pork he claims 
the majority of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offensive in the highest 
degree to the Supreme Being, to worship him in any other manner than the 
Roman Catholic; and no other public worship is lawful on Spanish soil. The 
people of all Southern Europe look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, 
but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think of these 
perfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against non-
Catholics? Yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each other’s liberty in 
things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible 
consistently to exclude these cases? or who can blame people for desiring to 
suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man? No stronger 
case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal 
immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those 
who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of 
persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and 
that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of 
admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the 
application to ourselves (OL IV: 15). 
 
This highlights the idea that every group has actions or ideas that offend them and that they think 
are immoral. However, when we look to examples of things that we do that others think are 
impious, it provides a striking and clear case in which we believe it should not be prohibited. As 
Mill says, “no stronger case can be shown” for why prohibiting immoralities is a “gross 
injustice” (OL IV: 15). What Mill seems to be doing is using this distinction between offensive 
and harmful conduct to refine the categories. So, conduct that is other-regarding becomes a 
candidate for prohibition only insofar as it is also harmful. If conduct is only self-regarding it is 
not eligible, even if there is harm to the agent performing the act. Mill states that “but with 
regard to the merely contingent … injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which 
neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable 
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individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake 
of the greater good of human freedom” (OL IV: 11).83 So, there are divisions that may not be 
decisive because even some other-regarding harmful behavior may not be legislatable, i.e. 
offensive conduct or “immoral” conduct.  
 While these distinctions may not be decisive, I do not think they are “false” or 
“unhelpful” as Brink believes.84 Part of the reason why Brink believes the distinction is false or 
unhelpful is because he is reading Mill as claiming either that “the harm principle is equivalent to 
letting society restrict all and only other-regarding conduct” or that “on this view it is … perhaps 
always permissible to regulate other-regarding conduct.”85 This is much too strong of a claim 
and Mill does not make it. Brink’s claim here would include too much because all and only 
other-regarding conduct would also include other-regarding beneficial acts, such as charity. This 
clearly affects the interests of others but it is a beneficial act and not harmful. Thus, the harm 
principle would not cover nearly as much as Brink suggests in this quote. If Brink meant all and 
only those harmful other-regarding conducts, even this would be too broad of a claim as Mill 
would say that there are certain instances of harmful other-regarding conduct that should not be 
prohibited because the harm of prohibition would be more invasive than the initial harmful 
behavior. However, Mill would say that all harmful other-regarding behavior is eligible for 
discussion as to whether it should be prevented or not.86  
 Where things get messy is when one admits that the distinctions are not sharp, always 
clear, or mutually exclusive. Mill admits that acts that are primarily self-regarding or primarily 
                                                 
83 This passage could be interpreted as suggesting that even if offensive conduct is harmful in some way, the 
prohibition of it is more harmful than allowing it. 
84 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 141. 
85 Ibid., 139. 
86 This is a question of domain and will be discussed in chapters 3–5. 
38 
 
other-regarding are to be considered. But when we look at the distinctions, we find that it may be 
the case that an act is primarily self-regarding but does affect others in some ways, i.e. a single 
man gambling away his money is primarily self-regarding, but it does affect his family through 
their disapproval, his bad influence on children, etc. However, the significant interests of the 
others are not affected. They have no claim on his money, he has not promised it to them, etc. 
So, this falls in the category of primarily self-regarding conduct. Analogously, while some 
conduct may be merely offensive and not harmful, some behavior is harmful and offensive, so 
even these categories are not mutually exclusive. So, there are really two sets of overlapping 
categories, those related to harmful/non-harmful conduct and those related to other-/self-
regarding conduct. Indeed, Brink notes that for Mill “only other-regarding conduct that is 
harmful can be regulated.”87 This highlights the two important components of the harm principle 
but fails to recognize that the self-/other-regarding distinction is not meant to be a sharp or hard 
distinction just as the offensive/harmful distinction is not always sharp. And while these 
categories individually may not provide a final conclusion as to which conduct may be interfered 
with or not, they are useful in the categorization process. This failure to draw a conclusive 
division may be what Brink meant by Mill’s self/other-regarding categories being “unhelpful,” 
but I think that many distinctions involve such sloppy language and diving in and dividing the 
conduct provides helpful clues as to what conduct is appropriate and which is not for legislation. 
Therefore, examining what Mill says on the matter is a useful endeavor. 
 
1.2.3 Social Obligations and Other-Regarding Acts 
 The main criticism of the distinction between self- and other-regarding behavior has been 
                                                 
87 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 141. 
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the focus of a debate over what it can mean for an act or “part of life” to involve only the 
individual to the exclusion of others (OL IV: 8). This characterization of the division is 
problematic for the reasons stated above, namely it does not have to involve only the individual 
but must primarily involve only the individual. However, Mill further clarifies what he means by 
other-regarding conduct when he claims that while there is not a social contract that binds 
individuals together, the fact that all citizens receive protection—and I would add many 
benefits—from living in a society or state creates an obligation “to observe a certain line of 
conduct towards the rest” (OL IV: 3). This obligation serves to outline the realm of “other-
regarding” conduct which amounts to those actions which directly and significantly affect the 
interests of others. Such conduct, according to Mill,  
consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain 
interests, which either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding ought 
to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share (to be 
fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for 
defending the society or its members from injury and molestation (OL IV: 3). 
 
The second obligation that he states describes the responsibilities that citizens have to the 
protection of the state. For Mill, this is part of the obligation that agents incur upon utilizing the 
protections that society grants in times of peace. The first condition, though, is generally 
considered to define those acts which agents may or may not perform precisely because they 
interfere with the rights and liberty of others against their will. The limits that the government 
may impose on the liberty of citizens is based upon preventing them from harming others.  
 However, he notes that there are certain acts and behaviors that do not violate or infringe 
on rights88 or significant interests of others but “may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due 
                                                 
88 Again, by this I do not mean there is harm or threat to actual “rights” but rather that there is harm to individuals 
that implicate rights. The harm is always to the individual and while I will utilize language that suggests the harm is 
to the rights, this is never the case. Such as protection of rights, violating rights, infringing rights, harm to rights, etc. 
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consideration for their welfare” (OL IV: 3). These acts, he claims, may be “justly punished by 
opinion, though not by law” (OL IV: 3).89 These acts may very well contain some of the 
aforementioned “offensive conduct” that Mill discussed as being primarily self-regarding. It is 
not the case that it does not interfere in the interests of others, surely none of us want to be 
offended, but the interference is not of a significant interest that one has. To prevent such 
conduct it seems, for Mill, would fail a balancing test and would be overly invasive of individual 
liberty because such conduct falls into the primarily self-regarding sphere that still affects others 
to some degree.90 We do not have a “right” not to be offended and some offensive acts may be 
considered “wanting in due consideration” for others but are not intrusive of significant interests 
of others.91 
 
1.2.4 Division of Acts  
 So, there are at least three types of acts and these types of acts may be regulated in 
different ways. The type of acts are: 1. those that interfere with the liberty/rights/significant 
interests of others. These are other-regarding acts that interfere with the significant interests and 
rights of others.92 2. Those that do not interfere with the rights/interests of individuals but do not 
properly respect the welfare of others. Mill claims that these may be “hurtful to others, or 
wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their 
constituted rights” (OL IV: 3). These are other-regarding but, for Mill, fall on the line between 
primarily other-regarding and primarily self-regarding. These are minor infractions which are 
                                                 
89 These acts will be discussed in later chapters and belong in what I call the “extra-legal domain.” See for instance, 
chapter 3.1. 
90 The balancing principle that Mill utilizes will be discussed in Chapter 6.6 and will be referenced throughout this 
work. 
91 See chapter 1.2.2.  
92 These other-regarding acts may be covered by other branches of the law, such as tort or civil law but some may 
not be covered by the criminal law.  
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still other-regarding but do not cause the sort of harm that is relevant for the criminal law.93 As 
indicated above, some offensive behavior may fall into this category though it seems that Mill 
would classify most offensive behavior as primarily self-regarding. And most important for 
Mill’s discussion here, 3. those acts that primarily affect the individual (or others with their 
consent) and are self-regarding. These are clearly self-regarding but may also include some of 
the offensive behavior that does not harm others.  
 The latter domain is frequently criticized as a chimera because all important actions 
affect the feelings and lives of others to some degree. However, this seems to be missing Mill’s 
point. He is not saying, and does not pretend, that the actions of individuals do not affect others, 
what he is doing here is providing a delineation (an admittedly sloppy one) as to which sorts of 
acts are acceptable to restrict in order to preserve the liberty of others while also granting the 
most robust liberty to those who would be restricted. But it is this third category of self-regarding 
acts which are of central importance for a liberal iteration of the harm principle because Mill 
believes that they may not be prohibited under any circumstances because they do not harm 
others. The second category, Mill seems to suggest, may be covered by extra-legal social 
pressures. They may be hurtful or harmful but do not violate or infringe any rights. And while 
they fail to consider the welfare of others, they may not be prevented by legal means.94 Here 
extra-legal just means those things that are not covered by the law. It does not refer to illegal 
coercive interferences but rather things such as social pressures or “moral coercion.” The first 
category contains those acts that are generally accepted legitimate restrictions on the liberty of 
certain people because those individuals are harming others. 
 
                                                 
93 The harm relevant is that that implicates rights. I will discuss rights in chapters 3-4. 
94 This will be covered in more detail in chapter 2.4.2. 
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1.2.5 Direct and Indirect Effects 
 There is another distinction that Mill attempts to make to clarify his harm principle. This 
division can be seen when he claims that “there is a sphere of action in which society, as 
distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest” (OL I: 12). This sphere 
contains acts which affect the individual alone “or if it also affects others, only with their free, 
voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation” (OL I: 12). Mill, nevertheless, admits that 
many may still disagree that the aspect of an individual’s life that both affect and do not affect 
others are indeed distinct. Critics may claim that there can be no actions that harm, affect, or 
involve only a single individual. The critic may claim that “it is impossible for a person to do 
anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself without mischief reaching at least to his 
near connections, and often far beyond them” (OL IV: 8). When Mill claims that it affects only 
the agent in question and not others he means directly and not indirectly.  
 Many actions, if not all, affect others to some degree indirectly. This means that others 
are affected but only obliquely through the agent him/herself. In other words, anything that an 
agent does will affect others; however, the manner in which others are affected matters when 
performing an act. If someone merely dislikes or disapproves of an act that the agent is 
performing, this affects that person but not appreciably and it definitely does not interfere with 
the other’s significant interests. What a co-worker, friend, lover, child does, believes, and thinks 
affects those around him/her95 but if a person chooses, for instance to partake in a juice fast, this 
does not really affect those around him/her directly (but rather indirectly) even if others think 
                                                 
95 While we may think that what someone thinks or believes does not affect others, it does because what one 
believes and thinks is often expressed through actions, etc. Even if the agent who believes and thinks things does not 
realize that he/she is expressing these things. Think of racism. People who have racist beliefs or thoughts often 
reflect these thoughts both unconsciously and unintentional through behavior.  
43 
 
that juice fasts are foolish or harmful to the body.96 The same goes for drinking an alcoholic 
beverage, which is the example that Mill favors, because while it may be the case that people 
dislike or disapprove of drinking alcohol, it does not harm or significantly affect those others in 
the usual case. These are examples of primarily self-regarding acts. They may be immoral, they 
may be offensive, but they are not significantly harmful to others or do not harm their significant 
interests.  
 
1.2.6 The Self-Regarding Sphere 
 Mill lists several categories which he believes to be part of the self-regarding sphere. The 
first is the inner “domain of consciousness” including the “liberty of thought and feeling; 
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, 
moral, or theological” (OL I: 12). This domain also includes the separate but related area of 
public expression and freedom of press. (Mill spends considerable time defending the thesis that 
freedom of thought and speech are of fundamental importance and I will come back to this 
topic.)97 The second area of the self-regarding sphere is the “Liberty of tastes and pursuits; of 
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like … so long as what we 
do does not harm them” (OL I: 12). The second aspect contains those actions like drinking 
alcohol or going on a juice fast. It may also contain other, more controversial, things like 
euthanasia, suicide, and doing drugs. These acts are often perceived as harmful to the agent who 
                                                 
96 The direct and indirect distinction is an important one to make and Mill makes this distinction in order to highlight 
the self-regarding/other-regarding distinction. However, we must also consider harm and if an act is other-regarding 
and harmful, the degree of harmfulness then becomes the most significant factor in determining legitimate or 
illegitimate legislation. 
97 The discussion of free speech will occur in chapter 5–6 comparing and contrasting harmful language and speech 
in order to showcase the role of the legal harm principle in determining legislation. I ultimately believe that Mill 




performs them (and those who voluntarily participate in the acts with them); however, they are 
primarily self-regarding acts and are undertaken voluntarily. The third aspect of the self-
regarding sphere covers the “Freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others” 
(OL I: 12). The third self-regarding aspect of liberty covers consensual acts and is also 
significant when considering issues such as Ku Klux Klan or white supremacist rallies or other 
such gatherings that stray dangerously close to legislatable other-regarding behavior.98 Acts like 
engaging in prostitution or promiscuity, engaging in homosexuality, and attending book clubs or 
other meetings are part of this arena.  
 There is also additional criticism related to such acts because of behavior that may follow 
from participating in these acts. For instance, it could be the case that agent A decides to visit a 
prostitute. His visit to the prostitute affects not only himself and the prostitute (a willing, 
consenting, adult participant), but also perhaps his brother, child, friend, sister, mother, neighbor, 
etc. (OL IV: 9). In many cases, it is not direct harm of others but indirect harm that critics 
describe. Indirect harm caused to “near connections,” such as embarrassment, failure of a role 
model to behave accordingly, disgrace of a family, or even most instances of offense (that are not 
also harmful), are not enough to transform an act from a self-regarding to an other-regarding act 
because it is not the case that the “harm” caused in these cases is sufficient enough to infringe on 
an individual’s liberty.99 To do so would have negative repercussions for liberty and individual 
freedom.  
 If, on the other hand, through this self-regarding action, agent A inflicts direct harm on 
others, such as passing on AIDS or other sexually transmitted diseases to offspring or other 
                                                 
98 This topic will be further discussed in chapter 5–6 when discussing the limits of freedom of expression. 
99 Part of the reason for this is that they do not have a claim on us or we do not have a duty toward them. This issue 
with claims will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
45 
 
sexual partners, use of funds that would prevent the care of dependents, physical harm to others, 
or the breaking of a vow, then his behavior may be subject either to the law or social pressures. 
For example, if agent A spends her child support money on gambling or some frivolity, and is 
thus unable to take care of her child, it may be the case that her behavior should be censured and 
she should be held liable. However, in this case, Mill stresses that it is not the act of gambling 
that is reprehensible, but the failure to fulfill the parental duties that is the actual problem with 
the act. So, again, it is not exactly clear that even in cases of direct harm to others due to an 
individual’s acts that the act that people may attempt to prohibit—gambling—is morally 
unacceptable because it is often corollary behavior that makes the act wrong—the failure to pay 
child support. In other words, gambling as an act should not be prohibited because it does not 
harm others but failure to pay child support is really what causes the harm and that behavior, not 
the gambling per se, should be prohibited (OL IV: 10). When a society condemns certain acts, 
such as prostitution, gambling, and drug use, as harmful, it is often not based on the self-
regarding action, but some other act that may be prohibited by law or morality. Thus, Mill argues 
that many acts that are typically reviled as impermissible for others to perform are really self-
regarding actions that in themselves are not wrong, and the law or the state has no justification 
for prohibiting them simply because they flout custom or have the potential in some cases to lead 
to harmful acts.100  
 
1.2.7 The Individual Case 
 While the above-mentioned actions themselves are generally harmless to others, if in 
individual cases negative consequences to others follow on a regular basis, for instance a certain 
                                                 
100 The topic of “overcriminalization” is related to this idea. For an excellent discussion that seems to be in line with 
Mill, See Douglas Husak, Overcriminalisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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individual consistently abuses a spouse or fights others when under the influence of alcohol, such 
a case may justly warrant interference in this case because the predictable likelihood of harm that 
would follow. Mill claims that  
The right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent 
precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely self-
regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention 
or punishment. Drunkenness, for example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject 
for legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, 
who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence 
of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself; 
that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if 
when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to which he 
would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity. The making 
himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a 
crime against others (OL V: 6 Emphasis added).  
 
However, if there is no harm to others then such things “cannot without tyranny be made a 
subject of legal punishment; but if … a man fails to perform his legal duties to others … it is no 
tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation” (OL V: 6). Yet, it is important to emphasize that the 
legitimate restriction would be for that particular individual or to use Mill’s words “personal to 
himself” and not for everyone who participates in the action in question. So, if the individual is 
known to be violent when consuming alcohol, that individual can legitimately be prevented from 
drinking alcohol. Additionally, on this account, gun laws which restrict certain violent felons 
from using firearms or those with psychiatric illnesses would be acceptable on a Millian account 
because they cease to be primarily self-regarding and begin to fall into the realm of other-






1.3 The Harm Principle, Self-Regarding Acts, and Consent 
1.3.1 The Magic of Consent 
 In dividing acts into those with which it is permissible to interfere and those it is not, acts 
that are both harmful and other-regarding seem to clearly fall into the permissible realm of 
interference in the liberty of others. For instance, you punch me in the face. This is harmful and 
other-regarding. This act would be covered by the harm principle and could be prohibited. But 
what about boxing? On the surface, boxing is you punching me in the face but it is not generally 
thought to be an acceptable realm of interference. Why not?—because of the magic of consent.  
 Consent takes acts that on their face seem to be unacceptable and transforms them into 
acceptable and legitimate acts which are protected by Mill’s self-regarding sphere of liberty. 
Here is another useful illustration: someone removes a perfectly healthy kidney from my body. 
The kidney is healthy and non-diseased, kidneys are useful to me, and thus I have an interest in 
keeping my kidney. To take my kidney would be harmful and other-regarding and would rightly 
be prevented by the harm principle. However, if I freely consent to you taking my kidney, it 
seems that it is no longer an unacceptable act with which others may interfere. 
 When discussing such self-regarding acts, Mill claims “there is a sphere of action in 
which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; 
comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it 
also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation” 
(OL I: 12 Emphasis added). The harm principle states that acts that cause harm to others are a 
legitimate reason for interference in the liberty of individuals. Acts that harm only the self or 
other non-harmful self-regarding acts are not legitimately interfered with and we see that when 
Mill considers and outlines self-regarding acts, his third category of self-regarding acts includes 
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agents uniting of their own free will. While this third category of self-regarding acts seems to be 
other-regarding (after all, it seems that if my actions involve another that means it is other-
regarding), Mill focuses on the idea that they are consensual. Indeed, one of the concepts Mill 
builds into the harm principle is consent and when someone offers his/her valid consent to what 
would ordinarily be considered a harmful act, the consent transforms the act so that it is no 
longer legitimately prohibited as a harmful other-regarding act.  
 In a way, consensual acts between several individuals transform the act so that, for Mill 
and most liberals, these consensual acts are not really other-regarding and now fall into the 
primarily self-regarding sphere. It is perhaps better thought of as several individuals performing 
self-regarding acts together, this still has an other-regarding component but it is not an 
impermissible sort of other-regarding act. This category of actions is specifically delineated by 
Mill’s third category of self-regarding conduct, namely the “Freedom to unite, for any purpose 
not involving harm to others” (OL I: 12). This category concerns all consensual acts. Consent 
effectively legitimizes certain acts that, without consent, could be legislatable as coercive other-
regarding acts. This consent takes these acts out of the sphere of legitimate interference and 
places them firmly into the inviolate self-regarding sphere.  
 For an act to be consensual, all parties must voluntarily grant permission. If they are not 
consented to by each party they may be harmful other-regarding acts. But, when an agent 
consents to an act, the act becomes a part of the self-regarding sphere. When something is self-
regarding and not harmful, others are not permitted to interfere in the liberty of those acting 
agents. The harm principle is concerned with determining legitimate coercive interference in the 
liberty of others. Because of the consent, these acts are no longer a concern of the harm principle 
since the acts are now transformed into self-regarding acts, which are not properly regulated by 
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the harm principle (the exception of course, is unless such consensual group actions would harm 
innocent nonconsenting third parties). And while consensual acts do involve others, since there is 
consent, they seem to revert back into primarily self-regarding acts that are done with others 
(who are also doing something that is primarily self-regarding). Consensual acts are not 
regulatable because they are not interfering with the person’s interests; in fact, it seems that we 
are respecting the interests of the agent in question when we do not interfere with consensual acts 
and to prohibit such behavior would be to go against the agent’s interests. 
 
1.3.2 Consent and Personal Autonomy 
 In part, consent plays such a significant role in legitimizing certain sorts of conduct 
because of the value that Mill and other liberals place on the concept of liberty and personal 
autonomy. While Mill does not speak in terms of “autonomy” he seems to provide an account of 
personal freedom and autonomy that speaks to subsequent liberals. Indeed, even the Kantian 
philosopher Onora O’Neill claims that “contemporary conceptions of rational autonomy … owe 
more to John Stuart Mill than to Kant” and “they rely on background theories that see rational 
action as guided by individuals’ desires, preferences, beliefs, and ‘identities.’”101 My 
autonomous realm is an inviolable realm in which others may not impede without my direct 
consent, i.e. it is a primarily self-regarding realm. If another interferes with me, they are doing 
something wrongful, i.e. something that unjustifiably sets back my interests, harms me, violates 
or infringes my rights, and that person’s actions may be subject to the law.102 On the other hand, 
if I consent to an act, I cannot legitimately complain to the government or law when the act 
                                                 
101 Onora O’Neill, Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics, and Interpretation In Kant’s Philosophy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015) 127.  




 Consent seems to be a common and necessary determining moral factor in permissible 
and impermissible human interactions. It determines the difference between battery and sport, in 
fist fighting vs. boxing, for instance, of theft and gift, rape and sex, and more generally, perhaps 
most importantly for this analysis, between wrongful harm and legitimate voluntary acts.104 
Consent represents a norm for determining permissibility. When an agent consents to an act, the 
act is no longer legislatable because it is taken from the harmful other-regarding sphere and 
placed in the self-regarding sphere. Yet once again, it is the act of consent that serves as a 
legitimizing factor. But not all instances where there appears to be consent legitimizes the shift 
from the other-regarding sphere to the self-regarding sphere. When consent does have this 
legitimizing ability it is considered to be valid consent. For this shift to be legitimate the consent 
must be valid. If the consent is invalid, then there is not a legitimate shift into the self-regarding 
sphere. But what exactly makes consent valid?105 
 
1.3.3 Valid and Invalid Consent 
 Generally, there are three conditions that distinguish valid from invalid consent: 1. mental 
competence, 2. voluntariness, and 3. not being deceived (sometimes understood as being 
                                                 
103 Unless the consent was gained through illegitimate means, such as force or fraud, in which case it is not valid. 
See discussion below for valid consent. 
104 These examples are common in the literature on consent and are used frequently without citation by authors, see 
Igor Primoratz, “Sexual Morality: Is Consent Enough?,” (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4, no. 3 (2001)) 201; 
Leo Katz, “Choice, Consent, and Cycling: The Hidden Limitations of Consent,” Michigan Law Review 104, no.4 
(2006): 628; Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Clarifying Consent: Peter Westen’s The Logic of Consent” Law and 
Philosophy 25, no.2 (2006): 194, in reference to a statement by Peter Westen in his text p. 15 and subsequent 
articles, etc. 
105 Some of what follow on consent draws from sections in chapter 3 of Kathryn Zawisza, The Ins and Outs of 
Prostitution: A Moral Analysis. 
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informed).106 If any of the three components are missing, the consent is invalid. Mill himself sets 
forth criteria along these lines when he argues that the “freedom to unite” only extends to those 
“of full age, and not forced or deceived” (OL I: 12). And later he claims that “there is no room 
for entertaining any such question [relating to interfering with an individual] when a person’s 
conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they 
like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding)” 
(OL IV: 3). These components determine when acts are consensual or coercive (not valid 
consent). In other words, if an individual does not have the relevant understanding of the 
situation, the act is coercive. If the person is physically or verbally forced, the act is coercive. If 
the person is too young/immature mentally, the act is coercive. In all of these cases, we could 
justifiably interfere.  
 
1.3.4 Mental Competence 
 The first criterion, mental competence refers to agents being able to adequately 
understand what is occurring. There are different reasons why a person would lack the necessary 
capacity to make a decision, some of these capacities are a permanent condition and others are 
temporary. A person who is mentally ill or mentally disabled is considered incompetent to 
validly consent in many circumstances. Determining the degree of the impairment is important, 
as in some cases those with mental impairments are not impaired to such a degree that all acts of 
consent are automatically invalidated. However, while severe mental diseases or disabilities are 
often permanent or develop into a semi-permanent condition (consider senility), this is not 
                                                 
106 These criteria are generally agreed upon by most theorists who discuss consent. See Peter Westen, The Logic of 
Consent; David Archard, Sexual Consent; Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing and Harm to Others. Even Mill 
refers to these criteria. 
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always the case and indeed some mental diseases or disabilities can be reversed using medicine 
or are merely temporary conditions (consider intoxication or a concussion).  
The most clear-cut and common instance of someone with a “temporary” case of mental 
incompetence is in children who are under the “age of consent.” At one point in all our lives we 
were unable to give valid consent to an act because we were unable to fully comprehend the 
nature of the situation or to make an informed decision about it. As we grow and mature, we gain 
the ability to comprehend situations and provide valid consent. This ability varies in all 
individuals and each individual may gain the ability at different times. The law attempts to 
reflect this when it determines ages of consent. There are different ages set by law for different 
situations depending on the impact the decision could have on a minor’s life (such as sexual 
intercourse or the legal drinking age) or even society at large (as is the case with setting a voting 
age or the legal drinking age).  
 Unfortunately, the age of consent that is set by law can oftentimes be problematic as it is 
generally used to determine mental maturity and some individuals mature at differing rates.107 It 
is important to recognize that while age of consent laws attempt to capture the reality that those 
without mental maturity ought to be protected, the law itself does not determine actual mental 
maturity. Nevertheless, setting an age under which one lacks the ability to consent is both 
essential and beneficial because it protects the interests, well-being, and liberty of children who 
oftentimes cannot adequately protect themselves. However, once a person “comes of age” they 
are generally deemed competent to consent, thus making the incapacity merely temporary.108  
 This position regarding the age of consent is reflected in On Liberty. For instance, Mill 
                                                 
107 Having an age set by law does not mean that individuals cannot appeal to the law to have this age of consent 
waived, as is the case where minors petition to live on their own or get married when underage or have charges of 
statutory rape removed. 
108 Archard, Sexual Consent, 44. 
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claims that  
it is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to 
human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, 
or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or 
womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by 
others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external 
injury (OL I: 10). 
 
This would also apply to the above cases of those with severely diminished mental faculties that 
are permanent disabilities since those individuals “are still in a state to require being taken care 
of by others” (OL I: 10). Paternalistic policies for such individuals are acceptable for the law in 
general and the criminal law may only consider paternalistic policies if they apply to such 
individuals. Other cases that affect the ability of individuals to validly consent to otherwise 
harmful acts include the use of drugs and alcohol as well as temporary mental disturbances. 
These cases are some of the more difficult cases in which to determine valid consent because the 
nature of the incapacitation as well as the degree is not always clear.  
 
1.3.5 Being Informed or Not Being Deceived  
 Receiving all the relevant information is the second necessary condition for valid 
consent. This allows us to make an informed decision so that we do not unintentionally give our 
consent to something which we would not have otherwise.109 Protecting citizens from the harm 
of such fraud is legitimate. What it means to receive all the “relevant facts” before validly 
consenting is difficult to outline. David Archard argues that “the person does not need to know 
everything, only everything that would make a real difference to whether or not she 
                                                 
109 This focus on consent and being adequately informed is related to the idea that Mill believes that utilizing our 
deliberative faculties is essential to well-being. Things that undermine such capacities or faculties are problematic. 




consented.”110 Some facts are easily understood to be relevant and others not. The relevant facts 
can include a number of things but tend to include “what is being consented to, prior or 
background information bearing on that which is consented to, or what may transpire in 
consequence of the giving of consent.”111 
 
1.3.6 Voluntariness 
 The last necessary component of valid consent is voluntariness which in some cases is 
closely related to the second knowledge criterion but in other ways surpasses simply being 
properly informed. When an agent is properly informed, that agent is able to assess whether or 
not to give valid consent. The less we know, the less free we are in choosing to consent. 
However, there are cases at the top of the scale in which there is no choice given to consent, such 
as when force, threat, or coercion is used. In all three of these cases valid consent is never 
legitimately given because of the lack of voluntariness.  
 Interferences that prevent this sort of interference are legitimate. All the same, there are 
cases in which an agent appears to “freely” consent to something which on the surface seems 
valid (i.e. there is no outward coercion or threat perceived) but upon further inspection is actually 
a case of other-regarding harm and can be condemned using the harm principle.112 There are 
certain cases in which an action or choice falls somewhere on a line between completely unfree 
(compulsion by physical force) and free (completely voluntary). Compulsion and force are ways 
of acting toward a person without permission, there is no consent involved, it is something done 
                                                 
110 Archard, Sexual Consent, 46. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Cases like these are many and varied. There is the issue with offers versus threats, or acts that are semi-coercive 
(i.e. offers you cannot refuse).  
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to a person, not something to which there is any choice.113 However, there are many other ways 
in which consent can be invalidated which have to do with illegitimate forms of coercion. 
Consent is important because it helps to delineate when a person’s rights have been violated or 
infringed.114 For any act of consent to be valid, it must be free and informed, as well as given by 
an agent that is mentally competent. If these criteria are not met, the act is coercive and the 
consent is not valid. If the consent is not valid and there is harm to others, then the government 
may be permitted to enact laws to prohibit such a violation of another’s rights. If the consent is 
valid then it falls within Mill’s sphere of self-regarding liberty and outside of the domain of the 
harm principle. 
  
                                                 
113 Feinberg, Harm to Self, 190. 




A “Simple” Principle? 
 
2.1 Mill’s Very General Harm Principle 
 While Mill believes that all coercive actions, whether by the individual or the 
government, can be governed by “one very simple principle”—the harm principle—it seems he 
does not always distinguish which behaviors are acceptable for the law to cover and which are 
not (OL I: 9). In other words, it is not always clear which acts he considers to warrant 
interference by the government and which acts are merely within the domain of public extra-
legal115 coercion or even completely independent of coercive intervention by anyone, even when 
harmful.116 He makes claims such as  
Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may 
be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the 
unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of 
mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make 
himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in 
what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and 
judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that 
opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, 
to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost (OL III: 1). 
 
This passage suggests that there is a distinction and a line to be drawn between acts that are of a 
certain type which warrant some kind of interference by others (harmful other-regarding) and 
those that are not (self-regarding), but he seems to make a further distinction between those 
other-regarding acts that warrant legal interference and those that warrant merely extra-legal 
social interference. In other passages, Mill suggests that there is indeed a division between legal 
and extra-legal social coercion. For instance, he claims in some instances “the offender may then 
                                                 
115 Those acts that fall outside of the legal domain and into the public domain, such as social pressures and “moral 
coercion” though this can also be physical coercion by those who are not representatives of the law. 
116 A rough taxonomy of harmful behaviors will be discussed below. 
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be justly punished by opinion, though not by the law” (OL IV: 3). And that “if anyone does an 
act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal 
penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation” (OL I: 11). However, he does not 
actually clearly set that line because he was not directly concerned with doing so in On Liberty. 
 In other words, Mill is concerned with the harm principle as a principle which is “entitled 
to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and 
control” (OL I: 9). His goal is general in that it does not matter “whether the means used be 
physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion” (OL I: 9 
Emphasis added). But even here he recognizes that there are different criteria governing extra-
legal social coercion and legal coercion. I believe that to understand the differences we really 
need to describe two separate principles, Mill’s “general harm principle” which dictates all 
behaviors which become the business of others when considering coercive intervention and a 
“legal harm principle” which determines which behaviors become the business of the state.  
 While I am not alone in recognizing this distinction—indeed Feinberg’s harm principle 
and four-part Moral Limits of the Criminal Law depend upon such a distinction117 and later 
theorists such as Simester and von Hirsch depend upon it as well118—I wish to draw attention to 
                                                 
117 Feinberg recognizes his break from Mill at the start of his work on The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law when 
he states in Harm to Others that Feinberg’s principle “though broad, is still narrower than John Stuart Mill’s famous 
concern in On Liberty with ‘the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over 
the individual,’ since our concern is only with power exercised by the state by means of the criminal law. Unlike 
Mill, we shall be concerned here only with the exercise of political power, thus neglecting those interferences with 
individual liberty that come from private associations, public opinion, or the ‘despotism of custom.’ Moreover, we 
shall ignore the subtler uses of state power, like taxation, indoctrination, licensure, and selective funding, so that we 
may focus more narrowly on statutory prohibitions enforced by penal sanctions. What our question has in common 
with Mill’s broader one is its emphasis on determining the legitimacy of exercises of power” (3). I follow Feinberg’s 
lead here. 
118 In their introduction to Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011), A.P. Simester and Andreas von Hirsch highlight their dependence on Feinberg who uses this 
distinction. Indeed, when laying out their theory they recognize that Mill utilizes the harm principle much more 
broadly than they do: “Mill’s endorsement of the harm principle as the sole basis for state intervention is not specific 
to the criminal law: it applies to any exercise by the state of coercive power over its citizens. As Mill conceived it, 
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the fact that it is a distinct or perhaps a sub-principle that Mill does not make explicit in On 
Liberty. Part of the reason it is important to make this distinction explicit and to look to what 
Mill says regarding both his general principle and a specifically legal one is that confusions tend 
to be introduced when we fail to acknowledge or emphasize this difference. It seems that many 
argue over whether he is primarily concerned with the law or extra-legal social pressure when 
defining his principle.119 However, he is primarily concerned with neither and distinguishing 
between acceptable legal interference and extra-legal social interference is a separate but 
intimately connected issue with which he was not particularly concerned. 
 It seems that if we want to understand what Mill means by harm being the justifying 
criterion for interference and, further, what Mill intends to serve as a division between those acts 
that warrant interference by law and those that do not, we need to do a bit more interpretive work 
since he does not lay out a plan for dividing interference in this manner. As the above statements 
by Mill suggest, he acknowledges that there is some sort of division between what the law can 
and cannot cover but he does not lay out exactly what that division is. As I will outline in 
chapters 3 and 4, it seems that if we want to understand where the lines are drawn to separate the 
                                                 
the Harm Principle applies both to civil and criminal law, to contract or tort as much as crime” (143). They do not 
here even acknowledge the even broader appeal by Mill to the extra-legal. 
119In Mill’s Progressive Principles, Brink states that in On Liberty “Mill is concerned with articulating principles to 
apply to restrictions on liberty in various contexts, involving different potential actors and different forms of 
coercion. He is perhaps most interested in cases where the state uses civil or criminal law to forbid conduct and 
applies sanctions for noncompliance” (136). He later says, “But the central case that concerns him, it is still fair to 
say, is that of legal prohibition by the state” (136).  
 Against the idea that Mill was primarily concerned with the law is Currin V. Shields in his introduction to 
Mill’s On Liberty when he claims while this text is often “praised as a classic statement of the case for individual 
liberty from governmental control [,] … such praise misses the mark” because Mill is primarily concerned with 
liberty that “does not directly concern the government” (xix). Similarly, Bernard Harcourt laments the contemporary 
tendency to incorporate Mill’s Harm Principle as a legal principle in his 1999 article “The Collapse of the Harm 
Principle” in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology and his “Mill’s On Liberty and the Modern ‘Harm to 
Others’ Principle” in Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law, ed. Markus D. Dubber. Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2014. DOI: 10.1093/acprof: oso/9780199673612.001.0001. 
 C.L. Ten, Mill On Liberty, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) and Piers Norris Turner “‘Harm’ and Mill’s 
Harm Principle,” (Ethics 124 (2014): 299–326) also argue that Mill is not primarily concerned with the law.  
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legal harm principle from the general harm principle and legal interference from extra-legal 
interference, we should focus on his discussions of interests, liberties, and rights.120 These 
concepts, I will argue, aid in developing a full understanding of what is to count as the sort of 
harm or risk of harm that ought to be regulated by the state through the penal law.  
 When determining which acts fall under the legal domain for restriction and which do 
not, I will argue that it seems that the legal harm principle only covers those things that are of a 
certain type to justify the legally mandated punishments that accompany its restrictions. It seems 
then, that the first question for Mill in On Liberty is: “is there harm to others?”121 If the answer to 
this question is “yes,” then society may intervene to prevent it—though this does not mean they 
should on balance. Mill often claims that it may be better not to intervene in some cases.122 From 
there, a second question that seems to follow is: “if society may intervene, in what manner 
should they do so?” or “If the harm is enough to warrant interference, then when is legal 
interference appropriate?” Mill lays out some vague criteria that I believe we may use to derive a 
legal harm principle that is both broad and useful and I will address the criticism that it covers 
too much or not enough.123 When assessing Mill’s understanding of harm in chapters 3 and 4, I 
will attempt to make the distinction between the general harm principle that Mill outlines and the 
legal harm principle that I am forwarding in order to understand how the harm principle can 
become a principle to determine criminal legislation. However, before delving into this 
quagmire, there is a bit more preliminary work that must be done to understand what Mill’s 
general harm principle covers. 
                                                 
120 I will discuss these in chapters 3 and 4. 
121 For an interesting discussion on this point, see Piers Norris Turner, “‘Harm’ and Mill’s Harm Principle.” 
122 Mill, On Liberty, I: 6, I: 11, II: 44, etc. 
123 For the argument that Mill’s principle covers too much, see Bernard Harcourt, “The Collapse of the Harm 
Principle.” For the argument that it does not cover enough, see Feinberg’s Offense Principle, Michael Moore’s Legal 
Moralism, and Sara Conly’s Legal Paternalism. 
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2.2 Harm to Others: Necessary and/or Sufficient Condition for Justifying Coercive 
 Interference? 
 
 One of the first things that is often discussed in order to understand Mill’s formulation of 
the harm principle is if/how the principle uses harm to decide the permissibility of the coercive 
interference of others. In other words, is harm or the likelihood of harm a necessary and/or 
sufficient condition for the legitimate interference in the liberty of others? Though there are 
different interpretations on where Mill stands relative to this question, part of this confusion rests 
on a few different conflations of what Mill is doing in On Liberty. There are two primary 
interpretive difficulties that we need to address to sort out the confusion.  
 
2.2.1 Some Interpretive Confusions 
 First, we need to understand that Mill is not focused on the legal question only. Mill does 
not separate his discussion of the general harm principle and the legal harm principle. Once we 
are clear on that, we can recognize that some interpretive difficulty is a result of theorists failing 
to make this distinction or failing to maintain adherence to this distinction. The second thing we 
need to keep in mind is what the scope of the harm principle is for Mill. This will help us to 
understand what he is actually trying to do. Mill is attempting to lay out the domain or the 
jurisdiction of society in interfering with individual liberty and is only then looking at potential 
justification of the interference, though he does mention and discuss both in various contexts. For 
instance, he seems to argue pretty strongly in his formulation of the harm principle that harm or 
likelihood of harm is necessary but it is not always clear if he thinks it is sufficient for both 
deciding the jurisdiction of society and justifying interference in liberty. And when we introduce 
the potential of a legal harm principle, there is further confusion as to whether harm is sufficient 
for justifying coercive legislation specifically because Mill is not attempting to actually create or 
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outline the conditions for a legal harm principle (OL V: 3).124 I will proceed in my investigation 
by highlighting and focusing on the various confusions and conflations that arise when 
discussing what the conditions of the harm principle are attempting to define and then I will 
propose a solution as to how the confusions may be solved.  
 
2.2.2 Necessary Condition for Justifying Coercive Interference  
 To me, it is pretty clear that when Mill formulates the harm principle he means for harm 
or the likelihood of harm to be a necessary condition for justifying coercive social interference in 
the liberty of others as well as for determining the jurisdiction of social interference. Indeed, Mill 
appears to define the harm principle in such a way that harm or the likelihood of harm is a 
necessary condition for allowing interference in the liberty of individuals and the harm principle 
serves as the only legitimate principle governing coercive human interaction. Brink claims that 
“Mill clearly says that harm prevention is a necessary condition for restrictions of liberty to be 
permissible. [But] It is not clear whether he thinks that harm prevention is sufficient to justify 
restrictions on liberty.”125 So here Brink is highlighting one of the difficulties that arises, namely 
that between conditions for restrictions on jurisdiction and justifying such restrictions. 
 
2.2.3 Jurisdiction Versus Justification 
 As Brink notes, in places Mill gives the impression that harm is sufficient “to make the 
conduct eligible for regulation”126 but it is not clear that harm justifies such regulation. Again, 
part of the reason for this confusion is that Mill was not concerned to make this distinction. For 
                                                 
124 For an opposing position, see Currin V. Shields “Introduction” to On Liberty. 
125 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 137. 
126 Ibid., 176. 
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instance, when talking of the social obligations that citizens have toward one another—not to 
injure the interests of others (harm them) and to bear one’s fair share in the labors and 
sacrifices—Mill states that these societal obligations “society is justified in enforcing, at all costs 
to those who endeavor to withhold fulfillment” (OL IV: 3). This suggests that society is justified 
in enacting and enforcing laws (at all costs this suggests) as well as less invasive forms of 
interference that prevent harm or risk of harm. This seems to introduce and discuss a sort of legal 
harm principle as distinct from the general harm principle. But this does not include all harm or 
risk of harm because Mill claims that the sorts of acts which society is “justified in enforcing, at 
all costs” are “certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding 
ought to be considered as rights” (OL IV: 3). Since not all instances of harm to others are rights 
violations or infringements, it seems that at least in this case harm or risk of harm as such is not 
sufficient to justify legislative interference (or maybe even extra-legal interference, we do not yet 
know). So, it seems that certain sorts of interference may always be justified, namely those that 
protect others from rights violations, and thus may be sufficient for justifying interference.127 
This seems to suggest that harm or risk of harm as such may not be sufficient for justifying 
coercive intervention.  
 A further confusion is then introduced when Mill claims later in the same passage that 
“As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society 
has jurisdiction over it” (OL IV: 3). If society has jurisdiction over all harmful (prejudicial) acts, 
then it seems that harm or risk of harm is a sufficient condition for justifying coercive 
interference in the liberty of others. However, deciding the jurisdiction of society is different 
                                                 
127 I make a distinction that I believe is found in Mill that rights-infringing harm and rights violations are distinct. 
Rights violations are justified, rights infringements are put into the domain of the law but legislation may not on 
balance be justified. See chapter 6.5.4 for instance. 
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than justifying coercive interference. The harm principle decides that harm is necessary and 
sufficient for the jurisdiction or domain of coercive interference but this does not mean that it 
justifies all instances of coercive interference even if there is harmful other-regarding behavior 
(which presumably is the domain or jurisdiction of the harm principle).128 Brink makes this 
distinction clear when he claims that “for society to have jurisdiction over harmful conduct 
means that the conduct is in principle eligible for regulation or perhaps even that regulation of 
that conduct is in fact permissible. But neither of these claims implies that regulation is required 
or obligatory.”129 This seems correct. However, he then says that this “demonstrates that Mill is 
not committed to a simple version of the sufficiency of harm for restrictions on liberty.”130 
 
2.2.4 Mill’s Two Maxims 
 I believe that there is a passage in chapter V of On Liberty that can clear up some of these 
issues. Mill claims that the “doctrine of this essay” is divided into “two maxims” which together 
define the harm principle and must be “balanced” in order to determine “which of them [the 
maxims] is applicable to the case” (OL V: 1–2). First, he has the general harm principle to decide 
the domain of acceptable coercive interference (when society has jurisdiction) which he says is 
other-regarding harmful behavior. He claims that his first maxim holds “that the individual is not 
accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no other person 
but himself” (OL V: 2). This defines the self-regarding realm which is not open to discussion of 
interference in liberty (unless it interferes with the interests of others).  
 This is the main limitation on coercive interference because there is no harm to others. In 
                                                 
128 Thanks to Richard Lee for pressing me on this point. 
129 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 176. 
130 Ibid., 176. 
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the second maxim Mill defines the other-regarding sphere as an appropriate domain for 
discussing coercive interference as well as justifying it. He claims that “for such actions as are 
prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected to either 
social or to legal punishments, if society is of the opinion that the one or the other is requisite for 
its protection” (OL V: 2 Emphasis added). This latter part of the second maxim suggests that 
there is something further needed to justify the actual interference once the domain has been 
established. So, individuals may be subjected to the law or extra-legal intervention if certain 
other things are considered. This is one of the places in On Liberty where Mill seems to 
recognize the need for sub-principles, such as the legal harm principle. He actually seems to use 
his second maxim, which is itself something like a sub-principle, to build these sorts of 
subsidiary principles into the general harm principle which may expand the scope and usefulness 
of the harm principle as a method for determining legislation. 
 
2.2.5 Jurisdiction 
 So, I suggest that the discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions in relation to the 
harm principle rests on a confusion as to what the harm principle’s main goal is. The harm 
principle, while worried about justifying coercive interference, nevertheless focuses on 
determining the proper jurisdiction of the harm principle first (determining if society may 
interfere not saying it ought to). However, this is not to say that Mill ignores the need for 
justification when defining his harm principle. Indeed, he claims that while harm is necessary for 
determining justification of liberty invasion, there are several other balancing factors that may 
decide if society should interfere. When Mill claims that “… if society is of the opinion that the 
one or the other [social or legal interference] is requisite for its protection (OL V: 2),” or that 
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“the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, 
becomes open to discussion (OL IV: 3),” it is these sorts of claims that breed confusion as to 
whether harm or risk of harm serves as a sufficient condition for justifying interference in the 
liberty of others or serves as a sufficient condition for determining the jurisdiction of society, 
especially legislative interference.  
 When Mill introduces considerations of balancing to determine when society ought to 
interfere, he is building criteria for justification. So, when discussing “prejudicial” or harmful 
conduct he is specifying the domain or jurisdiction for discussing coercive interference. Once the 
acts are in the domain of the harm principle, Mill suggests that there are certain sorts of harm to 
others that are acceptably/justifiably interfered with by the law and those that are not. He claims 
that all agents have an obligation to refrain from conduct that injures the interests of others “or 
rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought 
to be considered as rights” (OL IV: 3). This begins his demarcation of a legal harm principle as 
distinct from the general harm principle. As will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4, it is in these 
cases that we may interfere with the liberty of others through the law.  
 Mill claims there are other cases in which we are not able to interfere using the law. 
These acts that may not be limited may include those that are “hurtful to others, or wanting in 
due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted 
rights” (OL IV: 3). Mill then claims that someone who acts in a manner that is hurtful (but not a 
rights violation) “may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by the law” (OL IV: 3). So, 
it seems that while Mill is claiming that with the harm principle harm or risk of harm is both 
necessary and sufficient for putting the act into the domain of discussion of interference by 
society, he is not really making any claims as to whether harm or risk of harm is sufficient for 
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justifying coercive interference. This is not to say that he does not suggest that it is not sufficient 
when he highlights several alternate considerations that would counter-balance or deny the 
justified interference in liberty as he does in the passage above. 
 For instance, Mill states that just because harm can justify intervention does not mean 
that it always justifies it (OL V: 3). If anything, Mill specifically states that he does not believe 
that harm is sufficient for justifying societal interference when he says that “it must by no means 
be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone 
justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference” (OL V: 
3). In other words, harm or risk of harm to others is the only thing that can justify interference, 
but this does not mean that it will justify interference in each case or even most cases; 
countervailing reasons often arise. 
 
2.2.6 The Importance of Separating Justification from Jurisdiction 
 However, Brink suggests that there is a problem if Mill does not hold that the harm 
principle is a sufficient condition for justifying interference because  
if Mill wants to defend one very simple principle about restrictions on liberty, 
then harm prevention had better be a sufficient, as well as a necessary, condition 
for restriction. Because if harm prevention were only necessary, then it looks like 
we would need additional principles to determine if regulations were appropriate. 
So there is at least prima facie reason to treat Mill, at this point, as claiming harm 
prevention is both necessary and sufficient for restricting liberty.131 
 
Indeed, later he claims that  
if Mill rejects strong sufficiency then this compromises his one very simple 
principle. For only strong sufficiency shows that the harm principle is the 
complete guide to the regulation of liberty, telling us when regulation is 
permissible and when it is required. Even weak sufficiency [pro tanto or prima 
facie] implies that the harm principle must be supplemented with some other 
                                                 
131 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 137. 
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principle, such as the utilitarian principle, in order to determine if regulation is 
permissible, much less required.132 
 
However, while Brink earlier highlights the difference between jurisdiction and justification,133 it 
seems that here Brink is failing to make this distinction clear. Once that distinction is made we 
can see that harm or risk of harm may be a sufficient condition for determining the jurisdiction 
of the harm principle but not for justifying legislation, which is what Brink seems to be 
discussing here. It need not be a sufficient condition for the latter because for the principle to be 
“simple” it need only have harm as a sufficient condition for determining jurisdiction not 
regulation because the harm principle as such is not even attempting to determine what 
legislation or regulation should or could be enforced. Mill is only, at this point, concerned with 
whether it is acceptable for society to interfere or not, and he is not really concerned overall in 
On Liberty to settle how society is to interfere (though he frequently discusses applying the 
principle of utility in the balancing of harms to make such a consideration).134  
 The harm principle is a very general principle and does indeed provide a basic guide to 
determine if society may interfere. Further principles may be necessary to determine how and 
when they should interfere. This, I believe, is what theorists, including Brink, often overlook. 
While Brink recognizes Mill’s mixed motivations he neglects to maintain this distinction and 
claims that while Mill is interested in “restrictions on liberty in various contexts” Mill is 
“perhaps most interested in cases where the state uses civil and criminal law to forbid conduct 
and applies sanctions for noncompliance.” And “it may be worth remembering the variety of 
                                                 
132 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 178. 
133 Ibid., 137, 176. 
134 It is important to note that he is asking a domain question but addresses justificatory questions throughout, 
especially when discussing his examples and defending his argument in favor of free speech in chapter II of On 




restrictors and restrictions that concern Mill. But the central case that concerns him, it is still fair 
to say, is that of legal prohibition by the state.”135 This view is mistaken. It seems that in our 
desire to apply the harm principle to legal regulations—which would be a useful tool—we miss 
the fact that Mill is not actually trying to do that with the harm principle. Though Mill seems to 
acknowledge that the law is appropriate in some situations and extra-legal means are appropriate 
in others, he does not use the harm principle to yet solve that problem. We do in fact need a 
secondary or sub-principle that determines how and when society can interfere but that is not to 
say that Mill is mistaken when he claims that this is the only principle necessary to determine 
“the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the 
means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public 
opinion” (OL I: 9 Emphasis added). Because here, he even states that he is not concerned with 
which types of coercion is used, only that coercion occurs.  
 
2.2.7 The Use of a Separate Legal Principle 
 Introducing a kind of legal harm principle that acknowledges and relies on the general 
harm principle that Mill supplies and interpreting Mill’s view on when and how society may step 
in would be beneficial and address Brink’s and other theorists’ concerns while also noting that 
Mill is less specific (because that is not his primary goal) on the necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions for justifying legislation. This is not to say that Mill is silent on the matter and indeed 
his discussions on the law and legal restrictions are part of what breeds confusion. When Mill 
discusses the sorts of regulations that may or may not be acceptable or legitimate for the law to 
enact, he seems to have specific sorts of harm in mind. This is most clear when he singles out 
                                                 
135 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 136. 
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“rights violations” as being justifiably limited through the law but harmful acts that do not 
violate rights are not justifiably limited through the law though they may be through extra-legal 
means (OL IV: 3).136 He seems to consider the nature of the harm or potential harm, the 
seriousness of the harm, and the likelihood of the harm that the regulation would prevent and the 
harm that restriction would produce as being the primary considerations one ought to make when 
determining whether forbidding or restricting a potentially harmful act is justified through a 
particular method. Harm or risk of harm must occur, but the harm or risk alone is not always 
enough to justify interference legally or otherwise. Mill allows, as do most theorists, for there to 
be additional countervailing reasons not to regulate the behavior.137  
 This consideration may seem like a utilitarian proposal; however, preventing harm, on 
virtually all theories, is the (or at least “a”) primary concern of the criminal law, regardless of the 
theory.138 Yet, if the harm in question is a relatively minor rights infringement or does not violate 
a “right” as Mill states it, then there is little reason to restrict the behavior and the harm in this 
circumstance would not provide a reason to enact any kind of penal regulation because the harm 
of the regulation in these cases is much more severe than the harm of the acts in question. Many 
theories rely on a balance test such as this.139 Trivial occurrences are, on balance, too minor to be 
a decisive measure for the criminal law (though all harm, one could argue is relevant).140 Such 
                                                 
136 This is the main discussion in my Chapters 3–4 below. 
137 See, for instance Joel Feinberg’s formulation of liberty limiting principles which “put fort[h] a kind of reason it 
claims always to be relevant—always to have some weight—in support of proposed legal coercion, even though in a 
given instance it might not weigh enough to be decisive, and even though it may not be the only kind of 
consideration that can be relevant” (Harm to Others, 10). See previous chapters for discussion. 
138 This consideration is really an anti-paternalistic policy and is attempting to distinguish those acts that may be 
interfered with and those that are not. 
139 Again, even Paternalists and Moralists such as Michael Moore and Patrick Devlin utilize such considerations and 
methods when determining regulation and legislation. I will discuss this balancing test further in chapter 6.6 though 
it is not the focus of my argument. 




trivial sorts of harm would generally not be enough to legitimize legislation and no one really 
believes that they ought to be covered through the penal law even if they are included in its 
domain. The harm that would happen to individual liberty if such acts were regulated, as well as 
practical considerations—like increases in taxes to cover the cost of imprisoning individuals for 
minor infractions—would be much more harmful than the initial act. And while it is the case that 
other-regarding acts of harm are sufficient for determining the jurisdiction of society under the 
general harm principle, there is a threshold of harm to others under which even Mill believes 
individual liberty ought to prevail against the interference of others. This is seen when Mill 
argues that in some instances of harm to others the individual him/herself may be the best means 
for preventing the harm because any interference by others in any manner would be more 
harmful than the initial harm.141  
 Brink, acknowledging Mill’s utilitarianism, later argues that Mill seems to support a 
“weaker version of sufficiency” based on the idea that there is a prima facie or pro tanto case for 
regulation whenever one is harmed or is likely to be harmed.142 He rightly claims that “if the 
regulation is more harmful than the behavior in question, it may be best not to regulate, despite 
the pro tanto case for regulation.”143 This seems relatively straightforward and uncontroversial 
but still seems to miss the point of what Mill is doing. Again, yes. Mill believes that harm 
provides a pro tanto or prima facie case for regulation but regulation is only one means of 
interfering in the liberty of others and regulations and the law are only a steeper consequence or 
more formal sanction than extra-legal interference which is often the more appropriate means of 
                                                 
141 Though he does not always indicate which acts these may be, throughout On Liberty there are examples (some 
may be found in chapter V). One example that Mill addresses is alcohol use. While we may claim that drinking is 
bad and that others should not drink because some people are prone to violence when they drink, prohibiting 
drinking based on these cases would be more harmful than beneficial because of the level of interference in liberty 
would not be less than the initial drinking.  
142 Mill, On Liberty, I: 11, Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 176–7. 
143 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 177. 
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interference according to Mill’s harm principle.  
 However, if Mill supports a “weak sufficiency,” as it appears, then Brink still contends 
that “this compromises [Mill’s] one very simple principle” because the harm principle must rely 
on other principles, such as the principle of utility or Mill’s two maxims144 (to which we know 
Mill appeals) and what Feinberg calls mediating maxims145 (which may include the former two 
principles). However, claiming that the harm principle is the primary or “absolute” governing 
principle (OL I: 9) does not necessarily preclude other sub-filters or balancing considerations 
from aiding in determining the application of the harm principle as it relates to regulation 
especially considering that Mill’s overall goal is much broader than just legislation or legal 
restrictions and applies to all interventions in liberty. I will discuss this question of application 
and mediating maxims in chapter 6. 
 
2.3 Justifying the Harm Principle: The Tyranny of the Majority 
 Mill claims that On Liberty is concerned with the “limits of the power which can be 
legitimately exercised by society over the individual” (OL I: 1). While I, for the most part, am 
concerned with the legitimate limits of the penal law (not even of government generally) Mill 
concentrates here not only on the limits of government and the criminal law, but also (or 
according to some interpretations, perhaps primarily146) on the limits of society and its pressures 
on individuals. Mill believes that societal pressures can be as invasive, sometimes much more so, 
than governmental intrusion into the lives of individuals because there are pressures that 
                                                 
144These maxims are discussed above. 
145 I will discuss this in Chapter 6.6. 
146 For example, Currin V. Shields, in his introduction to On Liberty claims that while this text is often “praised as a 
classic statement of the case for individual liberty from governmental control [,] … such praise misses the mark” 
because he is primarily concerned with liberty that “does not directly concern the government” xix. 
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individuals can put on others that are more constant than legal strictures, such as customs, 
morals, and rules of conduct (OL I: 6), over which the government generally does not, and ought 
not, have any say. Mill claims that the oppression that stems from the “tyranny of the majority” 
goes further and oftentimes is more nefarious than political oppression because “it leaves fewer 
means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul 
itself” (OL I: 5).  
 It is important to stop and explain what Mill means by tyranny of the majority because it 
brings to mind the idea of numerical majority and it need not be an actual majority. Indeed, when 
Mill discusses ideas of liberty he notes that in reality, neither government of oneself by oneself 
nor the will of the people is an accurate depiction of what tends to occur because there is a 
community in which certain ideas tend to dominate and this may lead to subjugation of others in 
the community. He claims that  
The ‘people’ who exercise the power are not always the same people with those 
over whom it is exercised; and the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not the 
government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, 
moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part 
of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted 
as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their 
number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other 
abuse of power (OL I: 4). 
 
The majority, then, may very well be those with the requisite power, even if they are few in 
number. They may manage to make their concerns, opinions, and interests of primary importance 
and attempt to quell opposition to the status quo through either social control or, if they have it, 
political control. Mill admits that until people stop to think about the influence of custom, for the 
most part they tend to be more concerned with abuses of political power (OL I: 5). However, 
even if the majority (or most powerful) do not manage to gain political control, those who are 
powerful or more numerous or even those that shout the loudest can often manage to exert 
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control through customs, morals, and sheer force of will.  
 This social tyranny, when endorsed as a public morality, can oftentimes be translated into 
a principle of law (legal moralism). Because of this, Mill believes that steps must be taken to 
ensure protection of certain basic individual liberties. He points out that  
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates 
instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to 
meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political 
oppression … Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not 
enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion 
and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil 
penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent 
from them … There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion 
with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against 
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as 
protection against political despotism (OL I: 5). 
 
In this instance, the law can actually serve as a useful tool in curbing the illegitimate extra-legal 
means of coercion that Mill cites by enacting legal barriers which protect against the tyranny of 
the majority. However, Mill’s concern is what happens if we were to allow prevailing opinion to 
impact and dictate laws because this would then interfere in the lives of individuals with a view 
in opposition to the norm. Mill believes this interference would “fetter the development and … 
prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all 
characters to fashion themselves upon the model of [the majority’s] own” (OL I: 5). This would 
be detrimental to society as truth, justice, and happiness for Mill seem to depend on individuality 
and the ability to question and reason for oneself. While controversial, I agree with Mill that it is 
more difficult to arrive at the truth or to be happy if one is told what to do rather than determine 
and reason for oneself what one ought to do. In Chapter II of On Liberty, Mill emphasizes the 
idea that freedom of speech, thought, and press are necessary components of liberty and getting 
at the truth and thus have a high utility for society which I will return to in chapters 5 and 6 when 
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discussing hate speech.147 If we allow legal moralism or social tyranny to take hold, then we are 
compromising not only society and liberty but the progress of mankind.  
 
2.3.1 The “Good Life,” Diversity, and Liberty 
 In chapter III of On Liberty Mill claims that the ability to act on those things which one 
feels is best is of the utmost importance for humans because if we only allow people to act and 
think to fit one particular understanding of “the good life” then we are not really living a good 
human life at all and are more like machines or automata. Mill states that “Human nature is not a 
machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, 
which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward 
forces which make it a living thing” (OL III: 4). Furthermore, it is not only the case that truth 
requires individuals to discuss different views and opinions, but Mill claims that to be happy and 
live a good life, one needs to be able to choose to be the sort of person and live the sort of life 
that is most conducive to what one believes one needs. He claims that 
If it were only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason enough for not 
attempting to shape them all after one model. But different persons also require 
different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more exist 
healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same physical, 
atmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one person towards 
the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another. The same mode of 
life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of action and 
enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting burthen, which 
suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are the differences among human 
beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation 
on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a 
corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share 
of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which 
their nature is capable. Why then should tolerance, as far as the public sentiment 
is concerned, extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by 
                                                 
147 I will discuss speech in Section III, Chapter 5. 
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the multitude of their adherents (OL III: 14)? 
 
The idea of fixing the morals and actions of men based on the general tendency or feelings or 
views of the average person is problematic when we consider the diversity that many people 
recognize as necessary for happiness and watering this down by an appeal to a set morality or 
code of behavior that is not one’s own seems not only unreliable but counterproductive.148 
 
2.3.2 Opinion Versus Principle 
 But while the progress of mankind and the good life is incredibly important, the main 
reason that the tyranny of the majority is problematic is that it is generally based on nothing 
more than feelings, intuitions, and preferences, that is to say, there are no real reasons or 
principles upon which such rules, customs, or laws are based.149 Those who are in a position to 
dictate what becomes law or custom have “occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things 
society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a 
law to individuals” (OL I: 7). Such a method for morality and rules (based on morality) seem 
problematic because forcing someone to do something for no other reason than you think it is the 
good thing to do is mere adherence to habit or custom and provides no set of reasons or 
justification to those who do not believe it is the good or right thing to do. Mill claims that 
“People are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire 
to the character of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than 
reasons, and render reasons unnecessary.” 150  
                                                 
148 I will return to the value and importance of diversity in chapter 6 when discussing hate speech. 
149 This is not to say that this is the case for all rules, customs, or laws. Some do have reasons and principles behind 
them. 
150 This view of the common morality is attractive to the positive legal moralist because it does not appeal to any 
kind of philosophical principles or overly reasoned understanding of right and wrong. In other words, it really 
amounts to the morality of the people or common-sense morality and when the everyday person who we find in a 
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 An example of this tendency and encouragement can be found in The Enforcement of 
Morals by Patrick Devlin.151 Devlin defines the “right-minded” person as the “reasonable 
man.”152 Yet, he claims, the  
reasonable man … is not to be confused with the rational man. He is not expected 
to reason about anything and his judgments may be largely a matter of feeling. … 
For my purpose I should like to call him the man in the jury box, for the moral 
judgment of society must be something about which any twelve men or women 
drawn at random might after discussion be expected to be unanimous.”153  
 
Devlin believes that this understanding of those who decide on the public morality which 
influences social pressure and sometimes even legal coercion (which is what Devlin, a legal 
moralist, is calling for) is consistent with the way in which society actually makes moral 
decisions and should not be a matter of academic deliberation or reasoned thought. This is 
because “the man in the jury box is not just an expression; he is an active reality. It will not in the 
long run work to make laws about morality that are not acceptable to him.”154 However, again, 
because these feelings are very changeable, frequently based in ignorance, prejudice, and are 
irrational, it is difficult to make a case that these are what ought to govern the behavior of 
citizens. Mill describes why when he states that  
The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of 
human conduct, is the feeling in each person’s mind that everybody should be 
required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to 
act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his 
own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can 
only count as one person’s preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere 
appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people’s 
liking instead of one (OL I: 6). 
 
                                                 
given society feels overwhelming feelings of “intolerance, indignation, and disgust” (17) toward particular acts, they 
ought to be prevented. 
151 For a different discussion on the rational man see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993). 
152 Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, 15. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., 21. 
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These prejudices and feelings of “intolerance, indignation, and disgust”155 (as Devlin would 
describe them) are mere preferences and are as changeable as they are (generally) irrational. And 
yet we see even today that these are the feelings on which citizens frequently base their political 
and community decisions. To prevent such a gross misappropriation of liberty, legal penalties 
ought to be in place to prevent such unreasoned/unprincipled, thus illegitimate, pressures. And 
while Devlin is calling for—and Mill is arguing against—such feelings to be the basis of law, 
they generally take the form of extra-legal social pressure and are less frequently seen as 
physical or legal coercion. While such interference comes in many forms, such as pressuring, 
ostracizing, shunning, or even rebuking and nagging, utilizing a principle, namely, the harm 
principle, as a method of determining legitimate and illegitimate interference in the liberty of 
individuals, is as useful as it is necessary. Indeed, Mill believes that the harm principle governs 
both the unofficial social pressure and the legal pressures.  
 
2.3.3 Legitimate Social Coercion 
 Once an acceptable principle is put into place, some forms of coercion, while invasive 
and pervasive, may not always be illegitimate. Indeed, even Mill repeatedly claims that 
preventing harmful behaviors is not only part of the law, but it may also be necessary for society 
via extra-legal and/or moral pressure to step in and prevent behaviors that are too minor for the 
law to safely be applied (OL I: 9, I: 11, III: 1, IV: 3). Sometimes social rules and customs are 
reasoned and legitimate and these rules are frequently the best method of preventing harm. 
According to Mill, when a person harms someone and the law is too blunt of an instrument to 
use or the harm does not infringe the rights enough for it to be considered a violation of 
                                                 
155 Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, 17. 
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someone’s rights156 there are other extra-legal means of interfering such as shunning or 
ostracizing or informing others of the individual’s transgressions, i.e. applying morally and 
socially coercive, though extra-legal, methods. Though these forms of pressure are very difficult 
to escape and Mill argues that they are oftentimes felt more frequently and are much more 
present in the daily life of individuals than that of physical coercion, governmental coercion, or 
governmental restriction, they are not always unreasoned or illegitimate.  
 While Mill stresses the pervasiveness of peer pressure, one difference that Mill does not 
really make between such community obstruction and physical (or governmental157) coercion is 
the extent, or perhaps more to the point, significance or nature, of the invasion of liberty. It 
seems that while it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to avoid peer pressures, one is still able to do 
what one wants without much extreme coercive repercussions; however, with physical pressure, 
threat of legal consequences, or institutional coercion one has a much more difficult time 
avoiding such coercion and it is much more invasive of liberty. If society were able to not only 
apply verbal pressures and coercion, but also readily and systematically employ physical or 
institutional means of coercion, individuals would be much more likely to have their liberty 
invaded arbitrarily. By taking this general ability out of the hands of the general public158 and 
institutionalizing such pressures, regulation into which behaviors and pressures are acceptable 
can be created.  
 Because of this, while Mill’s comments on societal pressures are important and 
informative, the examination of the limits of government is especially useful when discussing the 
                                                 
156 I will discuss rights in Chapters 3–5. But a rights infringement is any harm to a person that implicates that 
person’s rights. A rights violation is a harm that on balance is judged to be sufficient to warrant interference. A 
significant enough rights infringement amounts to a rights violation. 
157 Though governmental coercion is not always physical, i.e. it may rely on threats and pressures, the consequences 
of defying governmental pressures is a “legitimate” physical coercion. So, I may frequently use the two 
interchangeably but I recognize that there is a distinction.  
158 Though see below for a discussion on when society via extra-legal means is able to use physical coercion. 
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importance of individual liberty and autonomy because without such legal limits over individuals 
within society, society, through its actions, would be better able to control individuals among 
them arbitrarily and/or illegitimately using such pressures as morality and custom. Furthermore, 
without some structure in place, it seems that individuals would be much more prone to physical 
coercion from society as well. However, Mill believes that “the practical question, where to 
place the limit—how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social 
control—is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done” (OL I: 6). Answering this 
question is the purpose of On Liberty and Mill’s harm principle is the result because, he argues 
that “All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints 
upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in 
the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. 
What these rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs” (OL I: 6).  
 If the law has limits on what individuals may or may not do to others, then there is some 
protection against certain encroachments of liberty by individuals in society. If, as Mill claims, 
the tyranny of the majority is such a great concern and even legitimate liberty invasions have the 
potential to morph into illegitimate pressures, then it seems deriving a legal harm principle is one 
step toward protecting individuals from a more pervasive form of liberty invasion. Thus, if there 
is legislation in place to aid individuals in their legitimate expressions of liberty and this 
legislation protects them against its encroachment from others, then the societal pressures via 
social tyranny are reduced to a more manageable and legitimate nuisance.159 
                                                 
159This is not to downplay the seriousness of societal pressure and custom. Oftentimes custom is understood as being 
more important or as stronger than law. Also, there are instances where pressures become such that a person 
becomes terrorized, these become instances of harassment and are very much harmful and would be covered by the 
proposed liberty limiting principle discussed. Other instances of societal pressure becoming more invasive of rights 
occurs when the (legal and legitimate) contrary behavior of the individual leads others to directly impact the agent’s 
interests, such as job prospects (i.e. I am not going to hire her, she does undesirable behavior X, say smoking). 
Again, though this social pressure could be stopped once it hits such levels through the proposed harm principle 
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2.4 The Various Means of Interference in the Liberty of Others 
 It may be useful to pause here and (very briefly) discuss a rough sort of taxonomy of the 
variety of ways that an individual may have his/her liberty infringed since it seems that in many 
cases Mill and others believe that the law is appropriate in some contexts, extra-legal means are 
appropriate in others, and some contexts preclude the use of coercive interference. There are a 
variety of ways in which agents can interfere in the liberty of others. Some are acceptable and 
some are not. Mill, while mentioning different types of interference, does not generally indicate 
which types of interference are acceptable in which situations nor does he always explicitly 
explain the various types of interferences. Because he does not do this (which was not his goal) it 
may result in some confusion as to what he believes society may do extra-legally (and 
legitimately) to interfere in the liberty of others, what society may do through the law, and what 
society may not do. I will briefly discuss some different ways in which society can and does 
coercively interfere in the liberty of others in an attempt to shed some light on what Mill intends 
the general harm principle to cover and hopefully give an idea of when a legal harm principle 
may come into effect. 
 
2.4.1 Legitimate Interference 
 Some interference is seemingly always legitimate in that it does not infringe on the 
liberty of others in a way that would justify coercively preventing it, i.e. it may be considered 
“bothersome” but not harmful. For instance, encouraging, pleading, and education160 are such 
                                                 
because it is interfering in the liberty of the individual to choose to participate in the undesirable behavior. This will 
be discussed more below. 
160 For Mill on education see, On Liberty, I: 9. When individuals are being educated, they are not fully at liberty and 
their liberty is interfered with but not to a significant degree. Furthermore, this may generally happen at an age at 
which it is acceptable and even right to educate (i.e. those in their “nonage” who are dependent on others for their 
care. See Mill, On Liberty, I: 10. “It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to 
human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age 
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that they are not generally considered to be illegitimately coercive or really, they cannot properly 
be called coercive in the general sense. Other sorts of interference in the liberty of adults, such as 
persuasion, pleading, encouraging, influencing, and other types of appeals, while a type of 
interference and may be considered invasive or “coercive” to some extent when they are done 
when another wished that it was not done, are seemingly well within the rights of others and do 
not interfere to a significant enough degree to impede others in their liberty (either because 
preventing them would be more harmful than allowing it161 or the acts in question cannot 
properly be called harmful or coercive). These are mere intrusions and are more like 
inducements than coercion. It seems that Mill believes that this sort of “interference,” which I 
will label as inducement, is always or generally acceptable. When describing the harm principle 
Mill claims that an agent’s own good or benefit or self-regarding conduct is not to be considered 
acceptable grounds for interference but when we dislike something another does “remonstrating 
with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, [are acceptable] but not 
… compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise” (OL I: 9). And later 
that “Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people … are the only measures by 
which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his [self-regarding] conduct” 
(OL V: 2). This points to the line that Mill creates between acceptable interference and 
illegitimate interference or those situations in which individuals have no claim to prevent others 
                                                 
which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care 
of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we 
may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its 
nonage”). Though of course, there is a difference between education and indoctrination or brainwashing. Education 
may be coercive in that it is sometimes forced upon you, whether you want to learn it or not, but in many cases, it 
differs greatly from brainwashing and indoctrination. 
161 One instance in which Mill seems to allow for coercive interference in the lives of others even if it is a self-
regarding act would be if preventing the coercive act would be more harmful than the interference. In these cases, he 
believes that the agent that is coercively interfering should “punish” him/herself because any other sort of 
interference would be worse than the initial act. 
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from interfering with them—if the sort of interference is a mere inducement. Indeed, Mill seems 
to think we may have an obligation to help others see reason or become better people. If this is 
the case, then it may be our duty to induce others to do otherwise when they do acts that we 
consider to be bad, distasteful, sinful, etc. (OL I: 9–10).  
 If this is the case, then perhaps getting clearer on what we mean by “coercion” is 
important since some interference into the liberty of others is acceptable (beneficial interference 
and inducements for example) and some is not (coercion). Because Mill does not really provide 
an explanation here, we need to develop conditions that would lead to Mill’s understanding of 
the different means of coercion. Mill variously uses terms such as “compulsion and control,” 
“power … exercised over,” “force,” “against his will,” (OL I: 9) and “external control” (OL I: 
10) to describe coercive interference in the liberty of others. This all involves some sort of 
invasive practice that is forceful or threatening and would not generally be considered acceptable 
in circumstances in which there was not harm to others. Mill suggests two coercively invasive 
sorts of conduct: moral coercion (OL I: 9) and physical coercion. These two forms of coercion 
can be used either legally or extra-legally.162 
 
2.4.2 Extra-Legal Interference 
 Let us first consider the extra-legal forms of coercion, which are generally less invasive 
than legal coercion. A category of extra-legal interference which Mill describes is something like 
peer/social pressure or verbal coercion, which he refers to as “moral” coercion (OL I: 9). Moral 
coercion is generally negative interferences and interventions in the liberty of others through 
                                                 
162 Again, the term ‘extra-legal’ refers to those things that are not covered by the law or under the authority of the 
law. This does not mean “illegal” or outside of the law but instead refers to those kinds of coercive interferences that 
others, such as citizens and civilians, perform in a non-legal capacity. 
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non-physical means. Shunning, reproaching, ostracizing, and other forms of pressure such as 
these are examples of moral coercion. These are “moral” in the sense that they are attempts to 
prevent others from performing acts or to perhaps shame them into ceasing to perform acts 
which are deemed wrong. Moral coercion may be used legitimately when it is to prevent harm to 
others. These sorts of coercion are sometimes subtle but often result in the social tyranny that 
Mill spends the first part of On Liberty denouncing.163 These sorts of interferences in liberty may 
then become more insidious when such social pressures become institutionalized and part of the 
law when they are unjustified.164 This sort of coercive influence Mill often argues is not 
acceptable because it interferes in primarily self-regarding behaviors and prevents agents from 
obtaining the liberty that is necessary for living the sorts of lives that lead to happiness.  
 While they are sometimes used to invade self-regarding and consensual acts that do not 
impact the liberty of others, there are some circumstances in which people cause harm to others 
and social pressures, ostracizing, shunning, and morally coercing individuals are the appropriate 
methods of dealing with those harm doers because stricter or more serious sorts of interference 
and coercion are too strong because they are overly invasive.  
 The second sort of extra-legal coercion that Mill mentions in On Liberty is physical extra-
legal coercion. This may happen illegitimately if citizens take the inducements and social 
                                                 
163 Mill, On Liberty, I: 2, 6, 14, much of chapter II, among others. 
164 Indeed, when Mill is discussing the idea that ideas should only be free to be expressed when they are expressed in 
a mild or temperate manner, claims that not only are extra-legal methods problematic but “still less could law 
presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct” (II: 44). And in II: 11 he is discussing the idea that 
the law ought not interfere in instances of freedom of speech. At II: 18 he claims that “It will be said, that we do not 
now put to death the introducers of new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even build 
sepulchers to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death; and the amount of penal infliction which modern 
feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate them. But let 
us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at least 
for its expression, still exist by law; and their enforcement is not, even in these times, so unexampled as to make it at 
all incredible that they may some day be revived in full force.” And in II: when discussing infidelity and religion 
Mill claims that “It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either…” 
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pressures/coercion further into the coercive realm and “visit others with evil” or physical 
coercion (OL I: 9). This sort of coercion interferes with the liberty of others more directly and 
obviously and there are more limitations placed on this sort of interference because it is much 
more difficult to ignore or stop. However, in certain situations it may be acceptable for “society” 
or individuals in society to physically prevent an agent from performing an act that may be 
harmful. In self-defense, defense of a fellow person, or during harmful, reckless, or risky 
behavior it may be acceptable to physically stop someone from doing something. This is 
coercive in that it is exerting external control on another individual but in many circumstances, it 
is justified.  
 In other situations, this method of stopping an agent may not be justified. If for instance, 
a person punches another, it would be acceptable to physically restrain the actor that is causing 
the harm, but it seems the appropriate response or invasion of liberty would not be to shoot the 
harming agent because the level of harm in the first case does not warrant the response. In the 
one case, you are preventing harm and invading the harming agent’s liberty in the other you are 
causing more harm than you are preventing. That seems to be one of the main criteria for Mill’s 
determination of acceptable versus unacceptable interference. Mill even allows for bystanders to 
stop an agent that is about to do something risky or harmful to himself (self-regarding harm), but 
only to inform of the impending risk. If, once informed of the risk or harm, the agent decides to 
carry on, Mill does not allow for further interference. Here I am alluding to Mill’s famous bridge 
crossing example where he claims that  
If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge 
which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of 
his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement 
of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire 
to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger 
of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the 
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motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore, (unless he 
is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible 
with the full use of the reflecting faculty) he ought, I conceive, to be only warned 
of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it (OL V: 5 
Emphasis added).  
 
So, it seems in some cases it is acceptable for society to interfere extra-legally and physically 
coercively in the liberty of their members in order to prevent harm to others. Other methods of 
constraining, restraining, and coercing, seem to be too invasive for Mill to deem legitimate for 
extra-legal coercion. 
 
2.4.3 Legal Interference 
 Analogously, there are two sorts of legal interference, morally coercive and physically 
coercive. Moral coercion appears in the law both in terms of beneficial and restrictive 
inducements (i.e. tax breaks for certain sorts of behavior). The penal law generally involves 
those acts that are physically and financially coercive and in Mill’s estimation seem to be that 
this is the proper avenue for the law in general. The law in general, as noted previously, includes 
far more than the penal law. There are regulatory laws, such as traffic laws, administrative laws, 
civil laws, and tort laws in addition to penal laws that may be used by the government for a 
variety of infractions, some harmful, others not. For instance, traffic laws tend to be enacted to 
facilitate the smooth running of the roads (which also may aid in preventing harm). Hence, while 
it does not harm someone to park a certain direction on a street or in a parking garage these sorts 
of regulatory rules help to facilitate the use of automobiles. In these situations, the appropriate 
penalty would not be death or imprisonment, but perhaps a small fine (or a warning, etc.). Some 
of these may serve as a method to prevent some kind of harm to others but do not interfere too 
greatly in the liberty of others, or perhaps I should say do not cause more harm than good. In 
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those instances, however, which are very harmful or risk great harm to others, Mill believes that 
the law ought to step in and coercively prevent the harm.165 Those acts that impose great harm 
ought to be restricted to prevent greater harm but the punishment must fit the crime and not 
interfere too greatly. These sorts of acts that are justifiably interfered with through the law Mill 
identifies as serious rights-infringing harm—rights violations.   
                                                 
165 At V: 5 Mill claims that “One of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new question; the proper 
limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention 
of crime, or of accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before 
it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The preventive function of government, 
however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly 
any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and 
fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or 
even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive 
until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it.” At V: 6 he claims that “The right inherent in society, to 
ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely 




Understanding Harm: Toward the Construction of a “Millian” Legal Harm Principle 
 
3.1 Introducing the “Legal Harm Principle” 
 In On Liberty John Stuart Mill describes harm very generally in an attempt to assess what 
society may consider “its business” or as a proper realm of interference in the liberty of its 
individual members. It seems he does not always focus very much on the varieties of harm that 
can occur, on defining what exactly he means by harm, nor on devising the appropriate method 
for preventing harm to others.166 Because of this, his description of harm and the harm principle 
can be seen as vague, unhelpful, and even insufficient for many purposes. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that in On Liberty, Mill is attempting to outline the conditions under 
which it is acceptable for society to coercively interfere with the liberty of others, i.e. he is 
attempting to determine the jurisdiction of society generally. Because he is attempting to 
determine the jurisdiction or domain of societal interference, he therefore considers harm in all 
its forms and does not really need to be specific in defining “harm” to others since even minimal 
amounts of harm are seemingly within the jurisdiction of society (though society may judge that 
it is inappropriate to actually interfere167).  
 In other words, Mill wants to know what sorts of actions or what sorts of behavior are in 
the sphere of individual liberty or the “self-regarding sphere,” which he considers to be inviolate, 
or the sphere of coercion or the “other-regarding sphere,” in which it is acceptable to consider 
coercive prevention if there is harm. The short answer to this question is that it may be 
acceptable to coerce individuals if there is or is likely to be harm to others. The actual answer is 
                                                 
166 For an interesting discussion on this point, see Piers Norris Turner, “‘Harm’ and Mill’s Harm Principle.” Though 
Mill does attempt to provide some examples in the final chapter of On Liberty, it is for illustrative purposes and not 
definitional. Again, while Mill may discuss these things, it is briefly and is not the primary goal of his work. 
167 This is what I will call the balancing principle. See chapter 3.1.2 below. 
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often seen as a bit more complicated than that, in part because Mill is describing a general harm 
principle which covers any and all acceptable types of coercive intervention from minor social 
pressures to legal intervention and while harm is necessary to justify acceptable versus 
unacceptable intervention in liberty, it is not sufficient to do so (though it is sufficient to 
determine the domain).168  
 Because theorists come to On Liberty with a specific agenda, myself included, and Mill’s 
principle is so general, it is not always clear to theorists what exactly Mill is concerned with and 
they often ask if Mill’s harm principle is primarily concerned with social interactions and 
pressures such as custom and morals and is thus attempting to prevent social tyranny169 or if his 
harm principle is primarily a legal principle which is concerned with establishing conditions for 
legitimate penal legislation.170 These questions are missing the point and should not be a 
disjunction but rather a conjunction since, as I have been highlighting, Mill is concerned with 
both. Nevertheless, these questions are attempting to draw a distinction that I wish to focus on, 
namely, when someone causes or risks harm to others and the behavior falls into the domain of 
the general harm principle, how exactly do we determine when the criminal law is the 
appropriate domain for coercive intervention as opposed to extra-legal means? In other words, I 
wish to define the domain or jurisdiction of the criminal law using Mill’s general harm principle 
in On Liberty as a platform. Within Mill’s analysis of harm and liberty infringement he provides 
several different avenues for exploring what he believes counts as harm and further, I believe he 
indicates when the criminal law is the appropriate domain for harm prevention. Using this and 
statements in Utilitarianism I can construct such a principle. 
                                                 
168 See my chapter 1 for a discussion on necessary and sufficient conditions for the jurisdiction and justification of 
the general harm principle. 
169 See Currin V. Shield’s “Introduction” to Mill’s On Liberty. 
170 See David O. Brink’s Mill’s Progressive Principles for an example. 
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3.1.1 Mill’s Two Maxims Revisited 
 While Mill’s general harm principle is an overarching and general principle, it has (at 
least) two distinct mechanisms in which to prevent harm to others: legal and extra-legal. 171 At 
the beginning of chapter V of On Liberty Mill even claims that there are two maxims that 
describe the harm principle—“two maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this 
Essay” (OL V: 1). The first maxim is concerned with separating those acts that can be 
legitimately interfered with by society (harmful, nonconsensual, other-regarding acts) from those 
that cannot (those in the self-regarding sphere). The first maxim claims that “the individual is not 
accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but 
himself” (OL V: 2).172  
 I believe the second maxim of the harm principle, on the other hand, is used to determine 
when and which method of intervention may be used to prevent harm. Mill recognizes in On 
Liberty that there are two separate and general ways in which we can deal with illegitimate harm 
to others—both of which fall within the domain of the general harm principle—namely, through 
social extra-legal coercion and through legal coercion. The second maxim states “that for such 
actions as are prejudicial [harmful] to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and 
may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or 
the other is requisite for its protection” (OL V: 2 Emphasis added).173  
 
 
                                                 
171 Remember, here extra-legal coercion is just coercion that is not done through the law. This does not mean that it 
is illegal, only that it is done by those outside of the law, such as individual citizens or society in general. For Mill, 
this usually takes the form of social pressures or what he calls “moral coercion” though this can also be physical 
coercion by those who are not representatives of the law.  
172 I discussed this aspect of the harm principle in chapter 1. 
173 I also discussed these maxims briefly in Chapter 1. 
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3.1.2 Maxim 2: The Jurisdiction Principle and the Balancing Principle 
 I believe that what Mill is saying with his second maxim is that once we apply the first 
maxim (determining which actions “are prejudicial to the interests of others”) and we see that a 
certain behavior is harmful to others, then we determine which domain is appropriate under the 
second maxim of the harm principle—individuals “may be subjected either to social or to legal 
punishment.” I will refer to this part of the second maxim as the jurisdiction principle. I believe 
that Mill uses the jurisdiction principle as a way to divide the domains within the harm principle. 
Mill thinks that some harmful acts fall within the domain of the law and some fall outside of this 
domain but remain housed within the extra-legal domain (it is harmful but not the kind that is in 
the domain of the law). Once we understand which domain is to be used to prevent harm to 
others, i.e. apply the jurisdiction principle to determine the domain of the criminal law or the 
domain of extra-legal coercion, society then determines if the behavior should174 be covered by 
its proper domain, i.e. society then applies the final part of the second maxim.175  
 This latter part of maxim 2, namely when “society is of opinion that the one or the other 
is requisite for its protection,” I will call the balancing principle. The balancing principle 
addresses the practical question of applying the harm principle to determine 1. whether we 
                                                 
174 Because the practical principle involves application of balancing principles, the “should” here always implies 
“should on balance” or “should, all things considered.” 
175 Here I suggest that there are two avenues for coercion and that once we figure out which type of coercion is 
acceptable we can then deliberate on whether we should on balance cover it (i.e. I am addressing a question of 
domain, not a question of “should there be a law?”). However, there is another way to understand this. It could be 
the case that this means that all harmful acts can be covered by one of two ways (legal or extra-legal) and it is the 
job of society to then determine how they are to punish the harmful acts. In other words, there is no proper domain 
of the law, it is only society’s opinion on what they would like covered and how they decide they should punish it 
that determines whether it is covered by the law or extra-legal means. This essentially removes any kind of 
principled approach for a legal harm principle and the only real principle that is applied is whether or not there is 
harm under the general harm principle. This, to me, seems to go contrary to Mill’s project as a whole. While his 
project is general, he claims a desire for principled legislation in this work and he also seems to provide, as I will 
argue in this chapter, that there is a principled division between those acts that can be prevented through the criminal 




should use legal coercion when a harmful act falls in that domain, 2. if we should use extra-legal 
coercion even though it falls within the legal domain, 3. if we should use extra-legal coercion 
when it falls in the extra-legal domain, or 4. if we should not use extra-legal coercion even 
though it falls in that domain but should instead rely on the individual to punish him/herself. Mill 
suggests that the balancing principle is applied by determining whether preventing the acts that 
fall within the domain would cause more harm than good, relying on utilitarian considerations 
such as seriousness, probability, risk, and importance of harm. In some cases we ought not, for 
instance, prohibit the harm to others through the legal/extra-legal domain because the harm of 
regulation would be more harmful than the initial harmful act.176  
 
3.1.3 The Harm Principle as a Multi-Stage Process 
 So, I contend that Mill seems to recognize the general harm principle as a sort of multi-
stage process in which we first determine 1. whether a given act is harmful, which would indeed 
allow society to consider interference since it has jurisdiction over harmful other-regarding acts 
(maxim 1). Then, once we determine that there is in fact harm or risk of harm to others, i.e. it is 
covered by or within the domain of the general harm principle, 2. we/society next need to 
determine how we are allowed to interfere (or not), i.e. whether the domain is social/extra-legal 
or legal (the jurisdiction principle). And finally, 3. we/society then determine if we should 
interfere, i.e. apply practical consideration and principles such as the principle of utility or other 
mediating maxims to determine if regulation/prohibition is more harmful than allowing for the 
act to occur (the balancing principle).  
 Again, using maxims 1 and 2 in On Liberty Mill claims that once we determine that there 
                                                 
176 I will return to this balancing principle in chapter 6.6. 
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is harm to others, the behavior can be prevented through one of the two domains but on the face 
of it he does not seem to clearly delineate a method to determine which sort of interference is 
appropriate.177 He says things such as, acts may be punished “by law, or, where legal penalties 
are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation” (OL I: 11) and “the offender may then be 
justly punished by opinion, though not by law” (OL IV: 3). He points to the idea that in some 
cases it is not appropriate for the act to be covered, say, by the law, and so extra-legal coercion is 
the appropriate method to curb the undesirable behavior and in other cases social pressure is not 
enough to prevent the harm to others.  
 This highlights the fact that we should understand the general harm principle as a multi-
stage filtering process and that further investigation is necessary to uncover the jurisdiction 
principle and determine when criminal legislation is the appropriate domain and when it is not. 
In other words, the jurisdiction principle is where the need to develop a legal harm principle 
enters. The harm principle, as Mill states it generally, does not do this, nor does Mill purport to 
do this in On Liberty but it seems that he is aware that the harm principle only really answers the 
question of when society can interfere in the liberty of others very generally, and that something 
further is necessary to determine which method is the appropriate domain for interference.178 I 
acknowledge that Mill does not define a second principle in On Liberty; however, this does not 
mean that one is not present (the jurisdiction principle) and chapter V of On Liberty, as well as 
the other passages referenced above, suggest that he acknowledges a jurisdictional divide 
between the legal and extra-legal domains and because he claims that he wishes to provide a 
                                                 
177 See Mill, On Liberty, I: 11 “If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, 
by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation” and IV: 3 “The offender may 
then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects 
prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will 
or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.” 
178 See for instance, Mill, On Liberty, I: 8, I: 11. See Piers Norris Turner for a discussion on Mill’s general goal in 
defining harm and the harm principle.  
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principled method for determining appropriate interference in the liberty of others, a principled 
method for legal intervention seems to be a part of this broad goal (OL I: 7–11). My goal here is 
to suggest a division that seems to be present in Mill. 
 In the previous chapter I laid out Mill’s general harm principle which sets conditions for 
the jurisdiction of society generally regarding interference in liberty (maxim 1) and, as I have 
highlighted, this principle looks to all instances of harm (even very minor ones) to others in 
order to define the general domain of acceptable liberty invasion by society. Once Mill’s general 
harm principle determines which behaviors fall into the coercive domain (i.e. harmful, 
nonconsensual, other-regarding acts), then the second stage of measurement can occur in which 
we determine which general method of intervention is acceptable: extra-legal or legal 
intervention. In this chapter, I will focus on deriving such a legal harm principle from Mill’s 
general harm principle—the jurisdiction principle. This, then, can provide a useful and principled 
tool for legislatures to use when crafting and interpreting whether something should become part 
of the criminal law—the balancing principle.179 In order to make the distinction as to which 
domain is appropriate for legislation and, more specifically, understand when the criminal law 
may step in to prevent harm, several interrelated terms and conditions that Mill discusses in On 
Liberty must be defined. These notions determine whether society in the form of extra-legal 
social pressures or the law is the appropriate method of interference in individual liberty. This 
determination highlights a more specific and narrow version of the harm principle which I have 
                                                 
179 While figuring out the domain of the criminal law (the jurisdiction principle) is the goal of this work, I am not 
going to provide a detailed response as to how to apply the balancing principle though chapter 5 will focus on Mill’s 
analysis of speech and will apply both the jurisdiction principle and the balancing principle in an attempt to use the 
principle in actual cases. Mill states generally that determining whether something should be covered amounts to 
figuring out if there is more harm when the acts are regulated or more harm when they are not. In the final chapter I 
will address speech and harm and I will offer suggestions as to what I believe ought to be covered or not but this will 




been calling the “legal harm principle” or “jurisdiction principle.”  
 
3.1.4 Rights Infringements and the Legal Harm Principle  
 As subsequent theorists frequently rely on Mill’s On Liberty to determine which sorts of 
behavior are legitimately prevented through the law and which are not, it seems that deriving a 
legal harm principle from Mill’s own work is important and, (seemingly) according to the 
jurisdiction principle of maxim 2 of the harm principle, completely within the scope of his 
general principle.180 A careful reading highlights the instances in which Mill discusses, or at least 
hints at, some requirements for a legal harm principle and we can gain an understanding of what 
this principle may look like. This, I will argue, is most easily done by looking to what Mill calls 
“rights” violations (OL III: 3, III: 9, IV: 3, IV: 6, IV: 7, V: 11). Mill seems to suggest that it is 
where harm and rights intersect that we find the boundary line between the domain of the legal 
and extra-legal. I will argue that certain sorts of harm, namely rights-infringing harm, determine 
the domain of the law. However, just as he does not provide a clear definition of harm, Mill does 
not provide a clear definition of rights in On Liberty.  
 To define the domain of the law, I will do two things. 1. I will unravel and explain the 
many (intertwined) concepts found in On Liberty that help to explain Mill’s concept of rights and 
2. since Mill does not go into much detail about rights in On Liberty, I will look to chapter V of 
Utilitarianism for an understanding of what he means by rights and how they are relevant to the 
law. To address the first, I will look to the concepts that seem central to finding this jurisdictional 
division. Among the notions in On Liberty that are most significant for understanding rights and 
their relationship to defining a legal harm principle are the concepts of interests, duties, and 
                                                 
180 See among others, Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law; Simester and von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and 
Wrongs; Hart, also Law, Liberty, and Morality; Duff, et al., Criminalization. 
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liberties and how they interact with and play off one another to give a clearer understanding of 
harm. While these ideas are often defined in reference to one another, I will attempt to explore 
them each separately in order to show how each idea correlates with the legal harm principle and 
thus helps to define what Mill means by “rights.”  
 
3.1.5 Utilitarianism and Rights  
 To address the second, I will turn to chapter V of Utilitarianism which provides a more 
in-depth analysis of Mill’s understanding not only of rights but many of the other terms Mill 
relies on in On Liberty. Chapter V of Utilitarianism is not only consistent with what he says in 
On Liberty but is useful in providing a framework for the jurisdictional division between legal 
and extra-legal coercive intervention because it is in this chapter that Mill discusses his theory of 
justice and its connection to rights (as well as utility/the expedient) much more clearly than he 
does virtually anywhere in On Liberty. If one reads chapter V of Utilitarianism as a supplement 
to and an extension of On Liberty, many questions that are left at the end of On Liberty regarding 
rights are answered. Though of course while the whole of Utilitarianism provides a particular 
framework for understanding its last chapter and this normally cannot be ignored, I am reading 
chapter V through the lens of On Liberty which may alter the interpretive framework. I will rely 
less on the arguments in Utilitarianism than others who approach chapter V because what I 
really want to understand is Mill’s view on rights, harm, justice, and the law and less what Mill’s 
utilitarian commitments are.181  
 My argument will not depend on whether or not On Liberty is consistent with Mill’s 
                                                 
181 Turner in “Harm and Mill’s Harm Principle” claims that rights-based theories do this and are mistaken because it 
does not provide interpretive aid to the harm principle. However, this is only if you are concerned with the General 
Harm Principle and not the sub-principle that is concerned with the law. 
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utilitarian commitments in Utilitarianism as a whole, but will focus on the consistency of Mill’s 
understanding of rights between the two texts; it does not matter, then, which text was written 
first and the order of publication does not affect my interpretation or methodology.182 What 
matters for my purposes here is whether the idea of rights found in Utilitarianism can aid in 
developing a legal harm principle from the general principle described in On Liberty, which I 
believe it can.183 When discussing the limits of the law, there is talk of rights around every turn. 
Understanding what Mill says about rights is key to understanding what Mill says about a 
specifically legal harm principle and so looking at chapter V of Utilitarianism will help to tease 
out the boundary between the domain of the legal and extra-legal. 
 
3.1.6 A Matter of Domain (or the Jurisdiction Principle) 
 It is also important to highlight that what I am doing in the next two chapters is 
determining a question of domain. I am concerned with what may be covered by the criminal law 
(the topic I believe is at the heart of what I have been referring to as the jurisdiction principle) 
                                                 
182 Indeed, at times it may seem like I am discussing Utilitarianism as an extension of On Liberty and vice versa, but 
really, for my argument it does not matter that On Liberty was written first or that it was likely that Mill had his 
Utilitarianism defined before he wrote On Liberty. I am not reading these two texts as a historian of philosophy but 
rather in an attempt to get clear on a matter of definition. The timeline of these texts does not impact my argument 
and I will often travel back and forth between these texts in order to make my argument. What does matter is that 
Utilitarianism chapter V has the potential to fill a lacuna found in On Liberty and can help to explain the legal harm 
principle I am attempting to define. In his autobiography Mill claims that On Liberty especially, but all his works 
were heavily influenced by his wife. He claims that Utilitarianism was taken from work which had previously been 
written during the last several years with his wife, which suggests a continuity of ideas between the two works. “I 
took … a portion of the unpublished papers which I had written during the last years of our married life, and shaped 
them, with some additional matter, into the little work entitled “Utilitarianism”; which was first published, in three 
parts, in successive numbers of Fraser’s Magazine, and afterwards reprinted in a volume” (A VIII: 30). 
183 In “Harm and Mill’s Harm Principle,” Turner also believes that this methodology is mistaken. He claims that “a 
rights-violation reading is not implied or suggested by the relevant passages in Utilitarianism and that such a 
restriction would be unambiguously at odds with the text in On Liberty” (304). However, this is only the case if one 
is already reading Mill’s general harm principle as a legal harm principle only and not accounting for a more general 
goal which covers a multitude of harm and actually incorporates what Turner calls his “expansive” notion of harm. I 
believe my interpretation which utilizes those passages of Utilitarianism is able to avoid the pitfalls that Turner 
relies upon to criticize rights-based theories. I am also not convinced that Turner is giving a completely fair reading 
of some of the theories he attacks. 
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and am not providing an opinion on whether such laws should be enacted (the balancing 
principle).184 In what follows I will argue that the boundary between the legal and extra-legal 
domain is drawn depending on whether an act of harm is a rights infringement or not. In other 
words, I will argue that if an act is a rights infringement, then the legal harm principle may 
prevent it from occurring, i.e. has jurisdiction over it. If it is not a rights infringement, then it is 
not the sort of harm that can be covered by the legal harm principle (though they may be covered 
through the extra-legal domain). Ultimately, the distinction between the legal harm principle and 
a general harm principle is determined based on the sort of harm that occurs, i.e. rights-infringing 
harm.185  
 I will begin by linking Mill’s understanding of harm to invasions of interests and liberties 
of individuals. This will help us later to understand how he views duties and rights. I will then 
analyze what Mill claims is the relationship between duties and rights. This section will begin to 
tie in Mill’s chapter V of Utilitarianism. Understanding this provides clues as to the role that 
Mill thinks rights have in morality and justice because some duties are duties precisely because 
they are rights and obligations of perfect duties correlate with certain kinds of rights. Then in the 
remaining sections I will move back and forth between On Liberty and chapter V of 
Utilitarianism to discuss how Mill’s understanding of rights in the latter helps us to inform how 
rights are related to the legal harm principle which I believe is an essential piece of Mill’s more 
general harm principle in the former. 
 
                                                 
184 Though my final chapter will touch on some of this practical application when discussing speech acts, 
specifically hate speech. 
185 While I have not yet defended this position, in this chapter I will argue that it is the “sort of harm” that 
determines the demarcation of the legal harm principle and the “sort of harm” for Mill is whether it is a “rights-
infringing harm” or not.  
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3.2 Harm as Interference in the Interests and Liberty of Others 
 When Mill describes his general harm principle, he defines it in terms of an idea of “harm 
to others.” This idea of harm is supposed to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable 
interference in the lives and actions of others. However, if we look for a clear definition of harm 
in On Liberty, we find that he does not actually define or describe harm very thoroughly in the 
text and in fact uses the term only about a dozen times. Interestingly, Mill more often relies on 
other terms to express harm, and indeed uses the term “evil” more frequently than “harm.”186 
This failure of definition is one of the most pervasive criticisms of this text and later theorists 
define it to suit their needs. Indeed, while the harm principle “served as a bulwark of liberty and 
a limitation on the scope of government power” in the nineteenth century, more contemporary 
interpretations have turned the principle into “an engine of social control that is said to justify 
major government intervention in all its manifestations … [and] far more content has been 
poured into the exception ‘harm or evil to others’” than is justified by the term.187  
 There are many issues that arise because of Mill’s less-than-ideal description of harm, as 
he sometimes seems to be using the idea of harm pretty widely as any negative effect on others. 
Piers Norris Turner argues that such an “expansive” sense of harm is the only one that is 
consistent with Mill’s utilitarian goals though it may have negative consequences for his “liberal 
commitments.”188 Yet in defining his self-regarding and other-regarding realms Mill makes a 
distinction between harm and offense, which suggests that he does not mean harm to be so 
expansive as to cover all negative consequences, only those that affect others and are in the 
                                                 
186 OL I: 8–9, I: 11, II: 1–2, II: 4, II: 19–20, IV: 4, IV7, among others. 
187 Richard A. Epstein, “The Harm Principle—And How it Grew,” (The University of Toronto Law Journal, 45, no. 
4 (1995): 369–417) 371. 




 Nevertheless, however we come to define Mill’s idea of harm, as narrow or expansive,190 
it need not really impact or have many consequences for how we come to understand a legal 
harm principle. The general harm principle is seeking the jurisdictional line between social 
interference and non-interference. Understanding how harm impacts the legal harm principle 
forces us to focus our attention on those passages that highlight or hint at a division within the 
general harm principle. So, in other words, we already know harm is in fact occurring before we 
turn to the legal harm principle. What we need to get a handle on is when the law is the proper 
domain of interference. To understand this division, then, it is important to find those instances 
where Mill mentions harm—or harm placeholders—in order to determine its specific domain.  
 
3.2.1 Interests 
 Once we assess the passages in which Mill discusses harm, it seems more relevant to a 
legal harm principle, and indeed necessary, to focus attention on what role “invasions of 
interests” play because throughout On Liberty he focuses on how these sorts of invasions are 
harmful, evil, etc. and it is really invasions of interests that begin to formulate and define Mill’s 
understanding of harm that is relevant for deriving a legal harm principle. We first encounter the 
idea that certain “interests” are relevant to Mill’s understanding of harm in Chapter I of On 
                                                 
189 The issue between harm and offense also arises in the final chapter on speech. 
190 For instance, Turner in “Mill’s Harm Principle” criticizes David Brink, Alan Fuchs, Wendy Donner, Daniel 
Jacobson, Joel Feinberg, and John Rawls as utilizing a too-narrow version of harm that he believes is inconsistent 
with Mill’s general harm principle while he defends what he calls an “expansive” understanding of harm which 
covers “any negative consequence” (319). I believe that an expansive reading of harm does not impact my 
interpretation of a legal harm principle because I am not attempting to define harm for the general harm principle but 
rather when harm crosses the domain from extra-legal to legal. Whether harm is limited or expansive is not really 
detrimental to a legal harm principle because it is only concerned with things that we already know to be harmful 
and fall on the more serious side of the scale. Those minor harms that the general harm principle would potentially 
include on an expansive account would not be considered as relevant for a legal harm principle as I will show below.  
100 
 
Liberty when he claims that his argument depends upon “utility in the largest sense, grounded on 
the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the 
subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, 
which concern the interest of other people” (OL I: 11). So, it is not surprising, given Mill’s 
utilitarian commitments, that he believes that harm depends on utility. However, the idea that the 
utility he is referring to in turn depends on the permanent interests of people is interesting. But 
note that it is not all permanent interests that society may interfere with but only those that 
concern others. Interests, then, specifically the “permanent interests” related to the progressive 
nature of humans seem to be key to understanding what Mill intends to count as harm because if 
these interests are encroached, such encroachments are “hurtful” and “If any one does an act 
hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties 
are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation” (OL I: 11). He then states that “in all things 
which regard the external relations of the individual, he is de jure amenable to those whose 
interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector” (OL I: 11). So, one way in 
which agents can harm others is by infringing or violating their permanent interests which are to 
be protected by society.  
 When the “permanent” interests of others are invaded, there is harm to them and such 
harm ought to be prevented. Mill even claims that in instances where the law and even extra-
legal coercion is too invasive of liberty—for instance when it is more harmful than allowing the 
behavior to occur without coercive intervention—that  
the conscience of the agent himself [the individual who is infringing or violating 
the interests of others] should step into the vacant judgment seat, and protect those 
interests of others which have no external protection; judging himself all the more 
rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the 




He repeatedly marks the important or permanent interests of others as being under the domain of 
society via the general harm principle.191 Again, this suggests that Mill believes that “interests” 
are central to the idea of harm which he uses as the benchmark for acceptable and unacceptable 
interference. Interests, then, seem to be intimately connected to understanding the domain of the 
harm principle.192 Indeed, in chapter III of On Liberty Mill claims that regarding individuality 
and the sphere of self-regarding acts, which are outside of the domain of the harm principle, we 
ought to be free to pursue our individuality and well-being so long as these are “within the limits 
imposed by the rights and interests of others” (OL III: 9).193 Interests of others again restrict and 
bind individuals in their actions. 
 Later, in chapter IV of On Liberty when discussing the domain of the harm principle Mill 
asks, “how much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society 
(OL IV: 1–2)?” He responds that “each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more 
particularly concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the 
individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society” (OL IV: 1–2). If, 
then, the interests of society (or others) are invaded, there is harm done because as Mill 
elaborates, “as soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, 
                                                 
191 See Mill, On Liberty, I: 11, II: 37, III: 9, IV: 2–3. 
192 Following Mill who claims citizens ought not “injur[e] the interests of one another,” Feinberg defines harm as an 
interest a person has; however, he thinks ‘interest’ too is vague (OL IV: 3). Interest can be defined as a desire a 
person has or as something that is in an agent’s ‘best interest’ or well-being. However, for the purpose of 
determining an interest in relation to the harm principle, Feinberg turns to legal writing to clarify its meaning. In the 
law, there are different classifications of interest for the degree of harm that is imposed on the victim. The harm 
principle covers those harms that are “humanly inflicted” and Feinberg claims these harms are  
conceived as the violation of one of a person’s interests, an injury to something in which he has a 
genuine stake. … An interest is something a person always possesses in some condition, 
something that can grow and flourish or diminish and decay, but which can rarely be totally lost 
(SP 26).  
This idea of interest allows an analysis of those things that should or should not be regulated by the law. When an 
individual’s interests have been compromised, this person has been harmed.  
193 In this passage Mill is discussing the importance of individuality. While he is not talking in terms of interests in 
this passage, he believes that individuality is an important part of well-being and well-being, is one of the permanent 
interests of mankind.  
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society has jurisdiction over it” (OL IV: 3). This particular passage seems to confirm my point 
that Mill relies on the idea of interests as being a key feature of harm. When Mill claims that 
society has jurisdiction when harm occurs and that harm is the necessary feature, then says that 
when “any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others” he pretty 
clearly seems to be suggesting that harm to others amounts to or is defined as occurring when 
“any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others” (OL IV: 3). Both this 
concept and harm seem to be equivalent. Mill seems to propose this as a placeholder for harm. 
And since Mill is discussing jurisdiction here, he is suggesting a relatively broad understanding 
of harm and perhaps Turner is correct to consider Mill as discussing harm as “any negative 
consequence” to interests. There are a variety of interests that we may have, some minor and 
some major but the general harm principle is discussing all of these. It seems that Mill believes 
that any harm to others puts the action into the domain of the harm principle but he then claims 
that those significant or more important interests place them within the domain of the law.194 
 Mill further argues that society has no jurisdiction in a case “which does not affect the 
interests of others in their relations with him” (OL IV: 6). This suggests a wide range of interests, 
some which cross the boundary between the sphere of individual liberty to the sphere of other-
regarding behavior. While it may be difficult to define the interests that fall on this lower line 
and different theorists determine this harm differently, it is not this lower level that is of interest 
to me but rather those that clearly fall within the domain of society but rest on the line between 
legislatable and non-legislatable.  
 Finally, the importance of interests regarding the legal harm principle is most clearly 
stated in Mill’s maxim 2.195 Here Mill claims that “for such actions as are prejudicial to the 
                                                 
194 More on this in the next section. 
195 See chapter 3.1.2 for a discussion on Maxim 2. 
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interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal 
punishment, if society is of the opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection” 
(OL V: 2).196 Interests, then are an important part of the very definition of the harm principle, as 
he relies on interests in his maxims which are used to define his general harm principle. Interests 
of others do seem to be quite general according to Mill, however, this does not mean that all 
interests of others are relevant to the legal harm principle (more on this below).  
 
3.2.2 A Division of Interests 
 Mill refers to interests both generally and more narrowly when he, in places, discusses 
those that are “permanent” (OL I: 11) or “important” (OL V: 11). This distinction seems to be 
intentional. For instance, when defining harm in terms of invading interests, Mill also suggests 
that invasion of certain liberties are invasions of important interests as well (OL IV: 3). This 
makes sense if one considers that Mill spends a significant amount of time highlighting the 
importance of certain liberties that individuals have. If these liberties are as important to 
individuals as he seems to suggest, then humans have a significant/permanent/important interest 
in maintaining them against encroachment. This also ties the maxims to the general harm 
principle more clearly because if we are talking about individual liberty and freedom of action as 
being a dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable interference in the general statement 
of the harm principle (OL I: 9), then it seems that when the maxim defines this same line in 
                                                 
196 Quote in context: “the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the 
interests of no person but himself … for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is 
accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the 
other is requisite for its protection” (V: 2); He also utilizes talk of interests elsewhere when he claims: “Whoever 
undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of 
society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society” (V: 4); “A person is 
bound to take all these circumstances into account, before resolving on a step which may affect such important 




terms of interests (OL V: 2), we have a link between the two concepts which ties together much 
of his exposition in On Liberty regarding harm.  
 Because Mill believes that his principle is based on “the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being” (OL I: 11) and his principle is one that looks to protecting the private (self-
regarding) sphere of individual liberty, those three divisions of individual liberty he outlines are 
important interests he discusses. Mill seems to be describing the sphere of self-regarding liberties 
as being part of those permanent and significant interests when he claims that “there is a sphere 
of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect 
interest; comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only 
himself, or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and 
participation” (OL I: 12). It seems that Mill argues that certain forms of liberty, certain basic 
liberties, then become permanent interests of humans with which society may no longer interfere 
and “this, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty” (OL I: 12). These basic liberties are 
types of behavior in the private sphere that include “Liberties of conscience and expression,” 
“Liberties of tastes, pursuits, and life-plans,” and “Liberties of association” (OL I: 12).  
 
3.2.3 Liberties and Interests 
 Describing the liberties of conscience and expression is Mill’s concern in chapter II of On 
Liberty and  
it comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of 
conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; 
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or 
speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and 
publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs 
to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, 
being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in 




Chapter III of On Liberty outlines the harm principle’s relationship to the liberties of tastes, 
pursuits, and life plans and this amounts to “framing the plan of our life to suit our own 
character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment 
from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should 
think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong” (OL I: 12). This is a liberty of personal choice or 
autonomy. And finally, liberties of free association in which “each individual, follows the 
liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any 
purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, 
and not forced or deceived” (OL I: 12). The goal of the general harm principle is to protect these 
liberties and interests either through legal or extra-legal means. 
 Part of the reason why Mill believes that certain liberties in the private sphere are 
permanent and inviolable (unless exercise of such liberties threaten harm to others) is that this 
type of liberty or freedom is not only valuable but, in a way, necessary for a happy/good life 
because it is a key component of such a life. Mill claims that “the only freedom which deserves 
the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to 
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it” (OL I: 13). Mill spends chapter III of 
On Liberty defending just this. These liberties that are in the private sphere are some of the 
interests that Mill believes we have a duty to protect against encroachment from others. Indeed, 
early on Mill connects these ideas of liberty, interests, and duties197 when he is discussing the 
history of the tension between authority and liberty and the attempts to curb undue liberty 
invasions. He claims  
The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler 
should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what 
                                                 
197 Duties will be discussed below. 
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they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a 
recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was 
to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did 
infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable (OL I: 
2). 
 
By framing the text in relation to the historical development of liberty he is better able to 
highlight the ways in which these ideas contribute to interpreting the harm principle and its use. 
This shows that the goal of “patriots” was to define a self-regarding realm which defines liberties 
and important interests of humans as rights, and when these rights were infringed, the ruler (or 
those who infringe them) were violating a duty to others and this allows for interference to 
prevent the infraction. We thus begin to see the connections that Mill makes between the law, 
liberties, duties, and rights very early on. These connections help to define the domain of the 
legal harm principle; however, much more needs to be said on the notion of duty because it is 
this idea coupled with the idea of rights, both of which are briefly introduced in On Liberty, 
which helps to bridge the chasm between the general harm principle and chapter V of 
Utilitarianism. This connection, in turn, helps to make the domain of the legal harm principle 
more apparent. 
 
3.3 Duty and Harm 
 In On Liberty Mill argues that agents have a variety of moral duties which they may be 
required to do or be punished/made responsible for not doing. He states that there are some acts, 
“things which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made 
responsible to society for not doing” (OL I: 11).198 While Mill believes that individuals ought to 
be required to fulfill their duties, as he indicated above, there are a variety of ways in which this 
                                                 
198 This specific passage on duty at I: 11 in On Liberty is particularly intriguing and seems to be a bit difficult to 
make consistent with things Mill says about the harm principle. I will examine the full paragraph in chapter 4. 
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may be done. This is significant because it contributes to the explanation Mill has for the 
different ways in which interference may be legitimate for society more generally (extra-legal 
pressures) but not the government (law enforcement) and vice versa. It also allows us to 
understand those instances in which it is not appropriate for either society or the law to interfere 
(i.e. in the private sphere of self-regarding conduct and even some instances of other-regarding 
conduct).  
 
3.3.1 Duty Enforcement and Harm 
 Mill claims that “if anyone does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for 
punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general 
disapprobation” (OL I: 11). This is where public pressure comes into effect as a means of duty 
enforcement. He further states that in some cases there are reasons, such as expediency or 
balancing harm, for not punishing individuals for failing to perform their duty and in many of 
these cases the law is not the proper avenue for enforcement and in other instances neither the 
law nor society are the proper means to enforce a duty or an obligation, and “when such reasons 
… preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step 
into the vacant judgement seat, and protect those interests of others which have not external 
protection” (OL I: 11).199 So even if there are not formal sanctions for duty violations, there is 
always some means of enforcing the duty, even if it rests on the agent to enforce his/her own 
misdeed.  
                                                 
199 Quote in context: “there are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility [his duty]; but these 
reasons must arise from the special expediency of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the 
whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it 
in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than 
those which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience 




 This sentiment can also be found in Utilitarianism V when Mill claims that by stating 
that someone does something wrong “we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in 
some way or other for doing it; if not by the law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by 
opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience” (U V: 14). This links wrongdoing to harm 
because if society has jurisdiction then there is harm occurring that is thought punishable. This is 
further connected to duty because the sentence immediately following the above quote discusses 
how duties are things that we believe others may be compelled to perform and when agents do 
not perform their duties, we believe they ought to be punished for it (i.e. it is wrong). So, harm is 
related to duty because Mill suggests that if one fails to perform his or her duty to others then it 
is wrong and when it is wrong, they ought to be punished because they are causing harm to the 
others. However, by dividing duties into those that may be prevented through the law and those 
that may not, Mill is claiming that there are certain acts with which the government may not 
interfere. 
 So, Mill seems to think that there are different types of duties and these types inform us 
as to the many ways in which agents can be required to discharge them. For Mill, extra-legal 
social pressure—such as shunning or reproaching—is often an effective way in which agents can 
be induced to do their duty.200 For instance, Mill believes education is the best tool to “cultivate” 
the social and self-regarding virtues and “works by conviction and persuasion as well as by 
compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is past, the self-
regarding virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the 
better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter” (OL IV: 4). 
But if education fails, in some cases “the offender may then be justly punished by opinion, 
                                                 
200 See my Chapter 1 section 8 for a discussion on inducement versus coercion. 
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though not by the law” (OL IV: 3). In these cases, while agents are encouraged to fulfill their 
duties through extra-legal social pressures, the general harm principle is applicable though the 
legal harm principle is not (OL IV: 5).201 This seems to introduce either a hierarchy of duties, 
some more important (or perhaps serious) than others, or at least a division among duties. Those 
most important of the duties or duties of a certain kind, it seems, are subject to law enforcement 
while others are left either to extra-legal societal pressures or else the individual him/herself. It 
will be beneficial to examine these duties. 
 
3.3.2 Duty, Interests, and Others 
 While Mill does not always make the connection between duties and harm to others 
explicit in On Liberty, he alludes to the relationship between duties, interests, and other-
regarding acts when criticizing Christian morality. He claims that by stressing the need to obey 
and submit, Christian morality succeeds in “disconnecting each man’s feelings of duty from the 
interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him 
for consulting them” (OL II: 37). This suggests that, for Mill, duties and the interests of others 
are intimately connected through morality. When an agent has duties to assignable individuals it 
fosters and creates an atmosphere of mutual interest. When someone claims that obeying orders 
                                                 
201 Mill claims that “We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to 
the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; 
we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most 
acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or 
conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference 
over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes, a person 
may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers 
these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults 
themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment.” [Emphasis added]. This 
seems to suggest that we can apply pressure to others and this does not yet infringe on their rights or illegitimately 




and submitting to authority are the reasons to perform duties, the connections and interactions 
among individuals is lessened and thus the importance of others in morality is diminished.  
 When we connect duties and others, especially duties to refrain from harming others, we 
highlight the social aspect of morality while at the same time recognizing the liberties that others 
have. Mill states that acts that primarily concern the self  
may be proofs of any amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-
respect; but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a 
breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for 
himself. What are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless 
circumstances render them at the same time duties to others. The term duty to 
oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respect or self-
development; and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow creatures, 
because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable 
to them (OL IV: 6). 
 
Mill argues that whether the acts of an individual are primarily self-regarding or other-regarding 
“makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him, whether he 
displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him, or in things in which we 
know that we have not” (OL IV: 7). And it is the conduct that breaches duties to others in which 
Mill believes we have a right to control others. 
 However, if the individual is not breaching a duty that he has toward others, then he is 
merely “displeasing” us and  
we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as well as 
from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not therefore feel called on to make 
his life uncomfortable. … if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, 
for that reason, desire to spoil it still further: instead of wishing to punish him, we 
shall rather endeavour to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may 
avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be to us an 
object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment; we shall not treat 
him like an enemy of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing 
is leaving him to himself, if we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest 
or concern for him (OL IV: 7).  
 
So, if an individual is only “harming” himself or performing self-regarding or consensual acts, 
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we may show our concern and act benevolently, we can ignore him and separate ourselves from 
him but we may not interfere with his liberty or significant interests because he is not interfering 
with ours and he is not harming or violating a duty to others.  
 However, when discussing acts that cross from self-regarding to other-regarding, Mill 
notes that  
It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his 
fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. The evil consequences of his acts do 
not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its 
members, must retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose 
of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he 
is an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, 
but, in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is 
not our part to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow 
from our using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we 
allow to him in his (OL IV: 7). 
  
So, again the primarily self-regarding acts in the sphere of liberty are outside the domain of 
public coercion. Yet, as soon as an act leaves this sphere and enters the sphere of other-regarding 
conduct, society does indeed have jurisdiction because these are “questions of social morality, of 
duty to others” and “the opinion of the public … though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener 
right; because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests; of the 
manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect themselves” 
(OL IV: 12). In other words, as soon as the interests of others or our “duties to others” are 
invoked, the public not only has a right to interfere, but they are the ones best able to judge the 
act because it is their interests that are impacted.  
 Interestingly, Mill notes that even behavior that generally falls within the self-regarding 
realm that interferes with the individual’s ability to perform an obligation/duty to others leaves 
the self-regarding realm and becomes other-regarding. For instance,  
when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the 
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performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is guilty of 
a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a 
soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in 
short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an 
individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and 
placed in that of morality or law (OL IV: 10).  
 
But, while it is clear that Mill believes that some duties require coercion and some of that 
coercion should come from the law, as this passage suggests, it is not always clear which 
particular duties should be covered through the law and which should not. Here he mentions both 
the law and morality (or the sphere of moral pressures) as being appropriate but he does not lay 
out which is relevant for which case and why.  
 
3.3.3 Utilitarianism V and Duty: Duties of Perfect and Imperfect Obligation 
 It is at this point that chapter V of Utilitarianism provides interpretive assistance. For 
instance, in that chapter Mill claims that “it is a part of the notion of Duty in every one of its 
forms, that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be 
exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it may be exacted from him, we 
do not call it his duty” (U V: 14). However, while duties are things we may be expected to do 
and coerced to perform, there are different manners of duties and, as we know, different manners 
of coercion and punishment.  
 In this chapter of Utilitarianism, he discusses perfect and imperfect obligations which 
provide a clue as to which types of duties Mill believes are relevant for the legal harm principle. 
He claims that “in the more precise language of philosophic jurists, duties of perfect obligation 
are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons; duties of 
imperfect obligation are those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right” (U V: 15). 
However, while duties of imperfect obligation are not correlated with a right in another, they are 
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still obligatory and are still thought to be duties that one has. Mill states that “though the act is 
obligatory, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice, as in the case of 
charity or beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practice, but not towards any definite 
person, nor at any prescribed time” (U V: 15). In other words, morality demands that we observe 
these imperfect duties, but it does not indicate a particular individual to whom our duty is toward 
and we can exercise our own free choice in how we perform our duty. 
 With duties of perfect obligation, on the other hand, we do not have a choice in the 
matter. With these sorts of duties there is a correlative right in another assignable person.202 As I 
will explain below, Mill believes that duties of perfect obligation are connected to morality 
through justice. Duties of imperfect obligations, while within the domain of morality, are not in 
the domain of justice or the law. We may have a moral obligation to perform a particular act but 
it is not a duty that relates to specific assignable others, and thus is not something that justice 
demands, though it is something morality demands. This sentiment is also consistent with views 
expressed in On Liberty, especially when Mill claims 
But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive 
injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any 
specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable 
individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to 
                                                 
202 Mill seems to be relying on a distinction that is found in Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation. When Mill discusses the idea that wrongs and harms that are a matter of justice must 
correspond to an “assignable individual” he is alluding a division of Bentham’s. When discussing the consequences 
of “mischievous acts” Bentham claims that mischief can be divided into a primary and secondary category. The 
primary category affects an assignable person (i.e. an assignable person suffers the ill effects) and the secondary acts 
of mischief do not have an assignable individual but “extends itself either over the whole community, or over some 
other multitude of unassignable individuals” (XII: 3). He further states that  
The primary mischief of an act may again be distinguished into two branches: 1. the original: and, 
2. The derivative. By the original branch, I mean that which alights upon and is confined to any 
person who is a sufferer in the first instance, and on his own account: the person, for instance, who 
is beaten, robbed, or murdered. By the derivative branch, I mean any share of mischief which may 
befall any other assignable persons in consequence of his being a sufferer, and no otherwise. 
These persons must, of course, be persons who in some way or other are connected with him. 
(XII: 4) 




bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom (OL IV: 11 Emphasis 
added). 
 
Thus, while we may be morally bound to do or avoid doing things, justice is not always what 
demands this but it does demand that other-regarding conduct which violates duties to others are 
avoided.  
 
3.3.4 Separation of Morality and Justice 
 By separating justice from morality more generally in chapter V of Utilitarianism, I 
believe Mill is highlighting the distinction between those things that the law can require and 
those things that are a part of morality (and are even other-regarding behavior) but are not within 
the domain of the law. So, it seems that duties of perfect obligation in which others have a claim 
on us are not only relevant for rights but they also—and more centrally—correspond to the legal 
harm principle because there is an assignable person who makes a claim on us that we are duty 
bound by justice to obey (as well as morality more generally since justice is a part of morality).  
 Though Mill allows for other considerations of justice to outweigh such general rules, for 
instance if the harm that would occur because of the legal compulsion to perform a duty would 
be more harmful than allowing the duty infringement to occur, then it may not be the proper 
avenue for enforcing such duties.203 Because duties of imperfect obligation are those that we 
have but because they are not towards any definite person, it seems that a lesser sort of coercive 
interference would be the appropriate avenue for enforcement. It may be that society can apply 
“moral pressures” to ensure that people perform these imperfect obligations. However, it is not 
even clear that Mill would endorse this position because these may be instances in which 
                                                 
203 See for instance, Mill, Utilitarianism, V: 15; Mill, On Liberty, I: 11, V: 11. This is a matter of applying the 
balancing principle and will be discussed further in chapter 6.6. 
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individuals would be better left to their own devices and since there is not a specific “other” that 
is being harmed, it is not clear that Mill would on balance allow for coercive interference though 
these fit within the domain of society. Imperfect duties, then, are things over which we may have 
a moral obligation but it is not to an assignable person204 and thus, because there is not 
assignable harm to others is not a proper domain of the law (and perhaps in certain circumstances 
not through social pressures either). If we cannot point to those who are wronged, it seems Mill 
believes it is not appropriate to prevent the behavior in question through the law.205 
 Mill further argues that while we may be morally bound and have a duty to be charitable, 
for instance, that charity is not assignable to any particular person. These sorts of duties are not 
something over which the law ought to have any say because they are things that we would like 
or prefer that people do and would make people “good” but these duties do not have an 
assignable person to which we are obliged to give. Some, including Alan E. Fuchs, claim that 
Mill here is talking about supererogatory acts, which if he is correct, would not fall within the 
domain of society because they are not causing harm.206 Others, such as Piers Norris Turner, 
would argue that since there are negative consequences of not giving to charity, for instance, and 
it is a part of morality, that they are in fact within the domain of society and any negative 
consequence is harm on Mill’s account.207 Because my focus is not on the general harm principle 
or harm on the lower end of the spectrum, it does not matter for my purposes who is correct in 
this matter—whether violations of imperfect obligations cause harm or fail to benefit. 
Furthermore, in highlighting the difference between duties of beneficence, which we want people 
                                                 
204 Mill seems to borrow this idea from Bentham, Principle of Morals and Legislation, XII: 3–4. 
205 This is perhaps a bit over simple. It is not just that you need to be able to point to an assignable individual but 
rather that the assignable individual has a claim on the agent because of the duty the agent has—there is a causal 
factor not a mere contributing factor in the harm. This will be discussed more below. 
206 Alan E. Fuchs, “Mill’s Theory of Morality,” in The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism, (Hoboken, NJ: 
Blackwell, 2006) 147–50. 
207 Turner, “‘Harm’ and Mill’s Harm Principle,” 300, 319–26.  
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to fulfill and which we ought to attempt to teach others, and duties to not harm, Mill claims that 
“in inculcating on each other the duty of positive beneficence [we all] have an unmistakable 
interest, but far less in degree: a person may possibly not need the benefits of others; but he 
always needs that they should not do him hurt” (U V: 33). This passage of Utilitarianism 
highlights the hierarchy of interests, some more important to the interests of humans than others.  
 
3.3.5 A Hierarchy of Interests 
 This hierarchy also seems to be present in chapter IV of On Liberty. Here Mill makes the 
connection between duties, harm, and others much more directly when he claims that “everyone 
who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in 
society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct 
towards the rest” (OL IV: 3). These duties toward society, for Mill, are two-fold. One involves a 
straightforward duty not to harm others (perfect duties) and the other seems to involve duties of 
beneficence and/or positive aid toward society and individuals within it (imperfect duties). The 
first sort of duty or societal obligation is a statement or summation of the general harm principle 
and is useful for further examining what Mill intends to count as “harm” for the harm principle 
both generally and more specifically as it relates to the law. The second supposed social 
obligation or duty seems (initially) to go against many claims Mill makes in On Liberty, 
specifically regarding the limits of the harm principle. Leaving aside the second for now, I will 
focus on the first.208  
 On the social duty regarding conduct aimed toward harm prevention, Mill says, “this 
conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, 
                                                 




which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as 
rights” (OL IV: 3). This particular line of thought connects much of what Mill says about harm 
and important interests to rights. The connections made here are important in understanding the 
legal harm principle, namely, the relationship between interests (of a specific kind), duty, the 
law, and rights. He introduces the idea that the types of interests he discusses here, which he 
appeals to throughout On Liberty, are or “ought to be considered rights” (OL IV: 3). This 
connection of interests and of rights is noteworthy in that it links the harm principle more 
directly to the law and helps to point more explicitly to what Mill believes the role of the law 
plays in legitimately limiting liberty. As I will discuss in the next chapter, Mill believes that 
when an act interferes with certain duties to others—perfect duties—it is a rights infringement 
and is an unacceptable sort of harm to others that affects a special sort of interest that individuals 
have and the government may interfere to either prevent a violation or punish after the fact.209  
 This is consistent with the general harm principle which states that harm to others 
(especially their permanent and more important interests210) is the only legitimate interference in 
the liberty of others. As mentioned in the previous section, Mill argues that 
Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to 
external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the 
interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima 
facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely 
applicable, by general disapprobation (OL I: 11).  
 
These interests are those that are essential to the liberty of citizens. So, we have perfect duties to 
respect the permanent interests of humans, which Mill frequently defines as liberties. Such 
liberties and interests, when of a certain type are then rights, and when we seriously infringe 
                                                 
209 More on Mill’s incorporation of punishment will be explored below. 
210 See chapter 4. 
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these rights we are failing to fulfill these certain duties (perfect) which causes harm to others. 
Then, it seems, we have duties not to violate rights. And when these rights are violated, Mill here 
suggests that the law is the appropriate domain.211 
  
                                                 
211 While I will have more to say on the matter below, it may seem as though Mill suggests that breaches of duty can 
be punished by social extra-legal means (“general disapprobation”) I will argue that this is only when society is of 
the opinion that while the law is the appropriate domain for these violations, it would not be practical or would cause 
more harm by prohibiting the violation. Because of this, it falls into the domain of extra-legal coercion and ought to 




Rights and the Domain of the Legal Harm Principle 
 
4.1 Rights and the Legal Harm Principle 
 If, as I claim, Mill depends on an idea of rights to inform where the domain of the legal 
harm principle begins, then what does he mean by “rights” and how does this help us to further 
understand the legal harm principle as distinct from Mill’s general harm principle? This 
connection between rights and the harm principle is an important feature because it provides 
another clue into what Mill intends the harm principle to cover regarding the law and 
interference in certain interests of others, which we now know to be “rights” (OL IV: 3). Indeed, 
he says that these rights may come from “express legal provision” (OL IV: 3). This relationship 
is notable because one of the criticisms of Mill is that he lacks a certain depth of explanation 
regarding his understanding of harm in On Liberty that makes what he is doing unhelpful or too 
vague for practical application.212 If we can look to what he says of rights to inform us of what 
he means by liberties, interests, and harm, we can utilize the harm principle more easily to 
interpret the legitimate domain of the penal law. Unfortunately, he does not say much about 
rights as such in On Liberty and what he does say does not seem to be particularly illuminating. 
For instance, Mill states that “as much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger 
specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with” 
(OL IV: 3). He recognizes that preventing agents from encroaching the rights of others interferes 
with these agents’ liberty but claims that  
for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human 
development. The means of development which the individual loses by being 
prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly 
                                                 
212 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 25–6; Richard A. Epstein, “The Harm Principle—And How it Grew,” 371; David O. 




obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself 
there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, 
rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid 
rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which 
have the good of others for their object (OL III: 9). 
 
This passage suggests that compulsion and coercion of individuals is acceptable to prevent harm 
to others where such harm occurs when others’ rights are encroached because it is good for 
everyone, even the agent being restricted yet he still does not say what he means by rights here. 
This ties harm prevention and the protections of rights to morality and justice and highlights that 
the harm principle is based not on individuality but on community. He hints that others are 
injured when rights are infringed and that rights help in the “development of other people,” and 
that they relate to the “good of others.”  
 At times Mill seems to use “rights” interchangeably with “liberties.” Indeed, when he is 
setting the stage for his discussion in On Liberty he claims that when citizens were attempting to 
determine the proper limits of the government, they were detailing “certain immunities, called 
political liberties or rights” (OL I: 2). This suggests that (legal/political) rights and liberties are 
intimately connected and may perhaps be one and the same or perhaps these liberties are a sort of 
right.213 Nevertheless, if Mill understands right infringing harm as that which determines when 
the law may step in (which I will argue below), then we need to get a better handle on what he 
means by rights. And if we can use Mill’s own view and explanation in Utilitarianism to 
understand his view of rights, then we can look to him instead of later theorists who may not use 
the same theory or idea of rights.214  
                                                 
213 For a detailed discussion of rights and liberties and how they differ, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1919). Much of what Hohfeld says may be consistent with Mill though Hohfeld does go to great 
lengths to distinguish claim rights from liberty rights. And his language is very careful whereas Mill frequently uses 
placeholders and alternate terms for his definitions. 
214 This is referring to the current tendency to look to Feinberg for elaboration of harm and rights instead of Mill 
because many believe that Mill does not effectively discuss what he means by these terms and Feinberg’s excellent 
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4.1.1 Right Versus Rights 
 While it is easy to import many things into talk of “rights,” Mill is a Utilitarian and does 
not believe in inherent rights in the way that many theorists describe them. In On Liberty he 
claims “I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract 
right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical 
questions: but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man 
as a progressive being” (OL I: 11). He categorically rejects any interpretation of rights that is not 
based on utility—or “the Expedient” as he sometimes calls it in Utilitarianism (U V: 1). 
However, because the term ‘right’ is not univocal and is used in many ways, the two most 
common being ‘right’ as in a protected interest and ‘right’ as in right and wrong, it is not clear 
which term Mill is using here. Indeed, throughout On Liberty he discusses both. So, it may seem 
that here he is talking of “abstract right” in terms of right and wrong because he does not talk of 
rights (with an s) which is perhaps more common. However, because of the context, i.e. he is 
talking of the principle of liberty and interests that individuals have as well as coercion and later 
he discusses legal penalties, I take him to be discussing rights (with an s). This seems to be 
confirmed when he discusses interests—specifically those that are based on utility grounded in 
permanent interests—as rights (OL I: 11, IV: 3).215 In Utilitarianism chapter V, he also discusses 
rights in terms of justice and interests and there, as I will explain below, he ties the idea of rights 
to utility and justice, which also seems to confirm my interpretation.  
 However, even if he is speaking of ‘right’ in terms of right and wrong, he would provide 
a similar answer to any talk of legal and/or moral rights. He would still demand all talk of such 
                                                 
and thorough work does this much more obviously. While at times this practice is useful and easier, some of what 
Feinberg says is not entirely consistent with Mill.  
215 While Mill connects rights and interests in On Liberty as I argued above, this connection becomes very apparent 
in Utilitarianism V. 
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interests to be strictly in terms of utility and forgo any notion of natural or abstract rights of 
which he was very aware that utilitarian Jeremy Bentham famously and colorfully called 
“nonsense on stilts.”216 So even if I am incorrect in interpreting this particular ambiguous 
passage as discussing “rights” rather than “right,” the overall methodology of Mill in both On 
Liberty and chapter V of Utilitarianism supports use of this passage as evidence or explanation 
for the idea that rights are nothing more than interests that have a very high social utility and are 
not innate or part of natural law.  
 Further evidence for this occurs early in On Liberty when Mill is describing the harm 
principle. He claims that  
The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is 
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign (OL I: 9). 
 
While again, this passage may also be discussing ‘right’ in terms of right/wrong, Mill seems to 
be claiming that individuals have certain rights surrounding self-regarding conduct when he 
states that individuals have “sovereignty” over their own body and mind. Mill could mean 
nothing more than it is proper, correct, right (as opposed to wrong) that individuals have absolute 
power over their mind and body but by invoking sovereignty, he seems to be making the claim 
that individuals have a right to this because sovereignty is frequently coupled with “rightful” or 
“legitimate” or some kind of “authority” all of which seems to refer to a significant interest that 
individuals have that ought to be protected.  
 
 
                                                 
216 Jeremy Bentham, Rights, Representation, and Reform: Nonsense upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French 
Revolution, eds. P. Schofield, C. Pease-Watkin, and C. Blamires (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 330 
[written in 1795]. 
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4.1.2 Interpretations of Rights 
 Some contemporary theorists, Joel Feinberg among them, rely on rights talk that is not 
properly utilitarian, and it is possible to take much of what Mill says about rights and interpret it 
in, for instance, a Kantian manner or in terms of natural rights. While my interpretation of Mill 
does not depend on strict adherence to utilitarianism, it is important to keep in mind that some 
interpretations of rights are a loose—or perhaps directly contrary—way in which to use Mill’s 
understanding of rights. Because Mill believes that there are degrees of pleasures and goods 
which make up those things that provide happiness and that some goods are qualitatively better, 
or have greater utility, than others, he can talk of rights as those things that are a necessary or 
significant part of happiness or a good life while still adhering to the Principle of Utility and his 
utilitarian commitments.217 Rights, then, are things he believes are beneficial in a greater sense 
than many other “goods” as they are “grounded on the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being” (OL I: 11). In chapter II of Utilitarianism Mill defines rights as “legitimate 
and authorized expectations” (U II: 23) which seem to suggest that the permanent interests he is 
discussing are legitimately expected.  
 Many of the things he—and others, such as Feinberg and even Kant—understands to be 
rights would be things that others with different interpretations of rights would also agree 
constituted rights and the benefit of Mill’s method is that even when talking about rights through 
                                                 
217 Mill, Utilitarianism, II: 6, “A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of 
more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these 
liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what 
explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to 
some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable: we may refer it to the 
love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means 
for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and 
contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one 
form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so 
essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, 
otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.” Emphasis added. 
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a utilitarian theory he can allow for the rights that we have to change as society and even 
technology changes. In other words, it is entirely possible and plausible for more rights to be 
acquired (that were in fact not rights before) based on the idea that humans are progressive and 
that the important interests of humans evolve and develop in such a way that the rights that are of 
greatest importance are rights for which we previously had no need (either because they are 
based in a new advance in technology or else the needs and expectations of individuals in society 
change). As long as we can demonstrate that a particular right is highly socially useful, it seems 
Mill would allow them within the theory. This makes many of the things that Mill says regarding 
the general harm principle consistent with a variety of interpretations of rights (even some that 
upon first blush may seem opposed to a utilitarian interpretation—such as those based on duty) 
and it is where the concept of rights—no matter the theory—coincide that we have a relatively 
universal, descriptive, and usable understanding of rights which seems to provide substance for 
the legal harm principle (but this is getting ahead of myself).  
 
4.2 Connecting Rights to Justice, Morality, and the Law 
 For Mill—and most others—the law is inextricably intertwined with morality and justice. 
The harm principle is essentially a principle of justice which upholds certain moral ideas. Mill 
believes that justice is a subspecies of utility and he claims that “justice remains the appropriate 
name for certain social utilities which are vastly more important and therefore more absolute and 
imperative, than any others are as a class” (U V: 38). Mill also connects justice directly to 
morality by claiming it is an attribute of morality (he explicitly says “justice, like many other 
moral attributes …” (U V: 2)). Indeed, it is exactly this point—that justice is a feature of 
morality and that it is best understood as protecting those interests that are more important than 
125 
 
others—that Mill is trying to make in chapter V of Utilitarianism. He claims that “people find it 
difficult to see, in Justice, only a particular kind or branch of general utility, and think that 
[Justice’s] superior binding force requires a totally different origin” (U V: 2). He believes that in 
order to understand why this is the case, we must “attempt to ascertain what is the distinguishing 
character of justice, or of injustice: what is the quality, or whether there is any quality, attributed 
in common to all modes of conduct designated as unjust” to highlight the difference between 
justice and mere disapproval (U V: 3).  
 
4.2.1 Some Common Attributes of Justice 
 In Utilitarianism Mill considers five (possibly six) common aspects of justice that are 
presumably universal, or at the very least common, though none are “regarded as absolute” (U 
V: 4–8). He claims that  
to find the various attributes of a variety of objects, it is necessary to begin by 
surveying the objects themselves in the concrete. Let us therefore advert 
successively to the various modes of action, and arrangements of human affairs, 
which are classed, by universal or widely spread opinion, as Just or as Unjust. The 
things well known to excite the sentiments associated with those names, are of a 
very multifarious character (U V: 4).  
 
His method here may be interpreted in at least two ways. Either Mill is attempting to list all the 
various things that people tend to think about justice, whether they are an actual part or not, or 
else he is listing those things that most people agree to be essential (though perhaps not 
necessary) “common attributes” of justice. I take him to be doing the former because in his 
description and explanation that follows, he seems to be attempting to show that these attributes 
of justice stem from a single thing, namely, social utility but that we may be mistaken in some 
cases because we do not refine our thoughts and feelings appropriately. The commonalities that 
Mill discusses “rapidly in review, without studying any particular arrangement” are 1. It is unjust 
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to violate a legal right, 2. It is unjust to violate a moral right, 3. Individuals should get what they 
deserve, 4. It is unjust to break faith, and 5. It is unjust to show partiality. There is perhaps a 
sixth common attribute that Mill discusses, namely it is just to treat people with equality though 
it may be that this is an explanation of or addition to the attribute of impartiality (U V: 4–9). 
 When people discuss justice, one of the first things that comes up is individual rights to 
certain liberties, which are generally thought to be granted and defined by the law. When 
something that is thought to be a right is not covered by the law, one of the first steps of activists 
is to attempt to change the law to account for such rights. When such a right is violated, it is 
generally considered to be unjust and those who violate such rights may be held criminally 
liable. Thus, it is descriptive legal rights with which Mill begins (and uses to segue into moral 
rights). He claims that “in the first place, it is mostly considered unjust to deprive anyone of his 
personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law. … It is just to 
respect, unjust to violate, the legal rights of anyone” (U V: 5). However, this, in a way, Mill 
admits is too simple. For instance, there are some rights that ought not to belong to individuals 
even if their legal code grants such a legal right to them because the law that grants the right is 
itself unjust, bad, or illegitimate. Mill recognizes that there are different responses to this 
problem and different calls to action (or inaction) which are expressed by the public even now. 
For instance, it may be the case that one believes that no matter how bad the law is, it ought 
never to be violated and violating a law, any law, is unjust. Those who hold this view believe in 
“maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law” (U V: 6).  
 On the other side, it may be the case that individuals believe that it is acceptable to 
violate an unjust or bad law. Mill outlines three cases where some may think it is acceptable in 
certain circumstances to violate certain laws. The first is that some believe that “any law, judged 
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to be bad, may blamelessly be disobeyed, even though it be not judged to be unjust, but only 
inexpedient” (U V: 6). In the second case, those who would allow for the willful disobedience of 
the law “confine the license of disobedience to the case of unjust laws” (U V: 6). Finally, some 
believe that all inexpedient laws are unjust laws because “every law imposes some restriction on 
the natural liberty of mankind, which restriction is an injustice, unless legitimated by tending to 
their good” (U V: 6).  
 However, even in cases in which individuals believe the law, whether good or bad, just or 
unjust, ought to be followed, most agree that the law is not synonymous with justice and when “a 
law is thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same way in which 
a breach of law is unjust, namely by infringing somebody’s right” (U V: 6). However, because 
these rights cannot be considered (descriptive) legal rights, there must be some other kind of 
right that we recognize: moral rights. So, at this point Mill notes that there are two primary 
understandings of rights. These understandings of rights, namely legal rights and moral rights, 
may, and frequently do, overlap. Some moral rights are also (descriptive) legal rights and some 
moral rights are not (descriptive) legal rights. And while it would seem that one could argue that 
all legal rights are moral rights, Mill would not go so far because there are some legal rights that 
ought not to be legal rights (they are descriptive but not normative). As noted above, they are 
derived from a bad law or an immoral law and thus ought not to be a right that one has. If, 
however, all legal rights were derived from legitimate laws, it seems that they would be a 
subspecies of moral rights (they would be prescriptive or normative).  
 The third widely accepted understanding of justice is that each person should get what he 
or she deserves “whether good or evil” (U V: 7). This concept of desert is present in many 
accounts of justice and regulations concerning the criminal law, and in some cases, is believed to 
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be a necessary feature of any criminal law. Mill states that most people believe that those who do 
bad things should be punished and those who do good things should not (and some believe that 
those who do good should get goodness in return, though constructing the criminal law is a bit 
different than understanding justice). Mill believes that in the average person, this understanding 
of justice is the most pervasive and common.  
 The fourth commonly held characteristic of justice deals with the idea that it is unjust to 
go back on your word or to “break faith” with another. He claims that it is unjust “to violate an 
engagement, either express or implied, or disappoint expectations raised by our own conduct, at 
least if we have raised those expectations knowingly and voluntarily” (U V: 8). Lying, cheating, 
breaking contracts, breaking promises all seem to fall under this idea of (in)justice and all are 
thought to be unjust, though we admit in many cases that there may be circumstances in which 
other obligations of justice outweigh or “absolve us from our obligation” (U V: 8). Again, as 
Mill admits, “like the other obligations of justice already spoken of, this one is not regarded as 
absolute” for a variety of reasons (U V: 8).  
 The fifth concept that is common to ideas of justice is the idea of impartiality, which is 
often cached out in terms of equality (perhaps a sixth commonality), though they are not 
synonymous. When you show favoritism to individuals or groups “in matters to which favour 
and preference do not properly apply,” it is generally understood to be unjust (U V: 9). While 
this does not really specify much, Mill recognizes that “impartiality, however, does not seem to 
be regarded as a duty in itself, but rather as instrumental to some other duty” (U V: 9) and in 
some (many?) instances, favoritism is not unwarranted but rather is quite acceptable and in fact 
expected. For instance, in many cases, we expect people to give preference and priority to their 
family over others and would tend to believe they are not behaving as they should if they did not. 
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While it is obviously the case that there are circumstances in which it is wrong to give partiality 
to family—for instance, we generally disapprove of nepotism—in many cases, such as providing 
food, shelter, and affection, we are generally supposed to favor our family over others. However, 
Mill correctly states that “impartiality where rights are concerned is of course obligatory; but this 
is involved in the more general obligation of giving to everyone his right” (U V: 9). I believe this 
rests on the common attribute that each person should get what he/she deserves. And further, it 
may be the case that rights are essential to getting what one deserves because rights are those 
things that are owed to us as Mill claims they are “legitimate and authorized expectations” (U II: 
23) that seem to be grounded on the permanent interests that we have. 
 This idea of impartiality is further connected to the idea that in matters of determining 
claims against one another, one ought to consider only desert (which is a matter of impartiality). 
“In short,” Mill claims, “as an obligation of justice, [impartiality] may be said to mean, being 
exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is supposed ought to influence the 
particular case in hand” (U V: 9). And as Mill recognizes, it is difficult to talk about impartiality 
without also talking about the related concept of equality because, for many, being impartial and 
being just amount to “giving equal protection to the rights of all” (U V: 10). However, Mill 
observes that the ideas of equality and impartiality vary greatly. Indeed, this idea was developed 
by Amartya Sen when he argued that the idea of equality was not really a uniform or consistent 
thing. Indeed, most ideas of equality are based on whatever it is that one is arguing in favor of. If 
one favors equality of choice or of income or of rights or whatever else it is that, as Mill would 
say, one finds most useful or valuable, then that is how the idea of equality is to be interpreted. It 
is important to note that these ideas may differ fundamentally.218  
                                                 
218 Amartya Sen, “Equality of What?” The Tanner Lecture of Human Values, (Stanford University, May 22, 1979); 
Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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 Mill claims that if we are talking of equality of rights, even those who enjoy more rights 
than others, in part due to radically unjust systems, still believe that theoretically even those with 
very little rights ought to have them protected, as meagre as those rights may be. Mill claims that 
even in a society which endorses and enforces slavery, the masters of the slaves would admit that 
the rights of slaves ought to be upheld, even though those rights are few and far between. He 
further states that such slave owning individuals would argue that if these rights are not upheld, 
such systems are “wanting in justice” (U V: 10) though, interestingly, these individuals would 
think the institutions that withhold rights to the slave are not unjust. This is because, as Sen and 
Mill would claim, the equality of upholding the rights is understood as valuable or 
useful/expedient but ridding oneself of the unjust institution is not.  
 Mill recognizes that while pervasive and deemed by most to be fundamental types of 
justice, “it is a matter of some difficulty to seize the mental link which holds them [impartiality 
and equality as well as the other common ideas of justice] together, and on which the moral 
sentiment adhering to the term essentially depends” (U V: 11). To “seize the mental link” 
between the various understandings of justice, Mill turns to the etymology of justice to show that 
it is primarily derived from either “positive law” or “authoritative custom” and is more closely 
connected to the law specifically than morality generally (U V: 12). He claims that “the courts of 
justice, the administration of justice, are the courts of law and administration of law” and “there 
can, … be no doubt that the idee mere, the primitive element, in the formation of the notion of 
justice, was conformity to the law” and it was not until Christianity came about that the 
connection to enforcement of all moral ideals broadly became featured (U V: 12).219  
                                                 
219 Indeed, he claims that conformity to the law “constituted the entire idea [of justice] among the Hebrews, up to the 
birth of Christianity; as might be expected in the case of a people whose laws attempted to embrace all subjects on 
which precepts were required, and who believed those laws to be a direct emanation from the Supreme Being. But 
other nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans, who knew that their laws had been made originally, and still 
131 
 
 It is this attempt or tendency to make all of morality a feature of the law which I believe 
led to the confusion and conflation between morality and justice (which in turn confuses which 
things ought to be considered rights relevant to the law). Because the idea of justice surrounded a 
conformity to the law, justice continued to be connected to the law and most “knew that their 
laws had been made originally, and still continued to be made, by men, [and] were not afraid to 
admit that those men might make bad laws; might do, by law, the same things, and from the 
same motives, which, if done by individuals without the sanction of law, would be called unjust” 
(U V: 12). 
 Because of these two features (connection to the law and realization that humans could 
create bad laws) justice continued to be connected to the law but  
the sentiment of injustice came to be attached, not to all violations of law, but 
only to violations of such laws as ought to exist, including such as ought to exist 
but do not; and to laws themselves, if supposed to be contrary to what ought to be 
law. In this manner the idea of law and of its injunctions was still predominant in 
the notion of justice even when the laws actually in force ceased to be accepted as 
the standard of it (U V: 12). 
 
So, while it is the case that justice and the law are intimately connected, most recognize that they 
are not synonymous in actuality and that it may be the case that a law is unjust or that justice 
demands that certain things not be enforced through the law. This does not mean that the law is 
not a function of justice, only that we as humans may get it wrong. This also does not mean that 
we should not attempt to create principles that govern the law as it ought to function and to 
determine which things ought to be considered rights within the law. Indeed, it seems that the 
purpose of deriving a legal harm principle from Mill’s general one is to create a principled way 
in which to decide which sorts of behavior properly belong within the domain of the criminal 
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law, which are rights, and which are not. Whether we then actually prohibit these actions through 
the law is a different question altogether. 
 Understanding which “rights” ought to be legal rights seems to be the focus of what Mill 
is doing in Utilitarianism chapter V and is key to understanding my account of the legal harm 
principle. In other words, Mill looks at common notions of rights in order to delineate justice and 
morality. In doing so, he refines these ideas of rights in order to pinpoint matters of justice. I 
believe this refinement and the definition of rights provides the division between the general 
harm principle and legal harm principle. This shows the way in which moral duties and 
obligations overlap with and inform rights and obligations of justice but also helps to show how 
they come apart.220  
 
4.2.2 Separating Justice from General Morality 
 To Mill (and most others) it is obvious that we apply the idea of justice to things which 
we believe the law should not interfere, which further supports the idea that the law and justice in 
the real world are not synonymous. It seems that for Mill, the domain or jurisdiction of legal 
enforcement depends on where the line is drawn which separates justice from morality more 
generally. It is at this point in chapter V of Utilitarianism that Mill suggests that there is 
something incorrect about the way we tend to discuss, describe, or understand rights because 
they are derived from obligations and duty and it seems like all obligations, as they have been 
described thus far in Utilitarianism V, can be described in pretty much the same way. By rights 
most people (as indicated by the beginning of Mill’s chapter) think they are things that are due to 
us or things that morality demands we get, but this would not distinguish morality and justice 
                                                 
220 This is my focus in the next section. 
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and he argues (and most of us tend to agree here) that morality and justice are not the same (and 
since they are not the same we need to be clearer on what is meant). That morality and justice are 
different is evident when we study our feelings which indicate that in many cases we do not want 
the law to interfere in “the whole detail of private life” (U V: 13) and that it may be an injustice 
to have the law cover some things to which we may think morality demands.221 Mill claims that 
as he has described it thus far, justice does not appear to differ from an idea of moral obligations 
in general and all of what he has said so far also applies to how we tend to view morality as a 
whole.  
 He believes his account of the commonalities and etymology of justice are accurate and 
are “a true account, as far as it goes, of the origin and progressive growth of the idea of justice. 
But we must observe, that it contains, as yet, nothing to distinguish that obligation from moral 
obligation in general” (U V: 14). He claims that both justice and morality contain the idea that 
each should get what he/she deserves and that when someone does something that goes against 
this (i.e. something wrong), there ought to be repercussions. But there must be something that 
separates them still further because we recognize that they are not always the same and different 
methods of interference are necessary in different cases.  
 When Mill begins to separate the role of justice (those things that may be covered by the 
law) from that of morality, he highlights this disparity and focuses on the idea that morality is 
separated from general utility through duty and our notions of desert/punishment and 
wrongfulness. He claims that though we do not want the law to interfere in many things that we 
consider to be “wrong,” “it would always give us pleasure, and chime in with our feelings of 
                                                 
221 Though he admits that we are generally pleased when those who do things we consider to be unjust are punished, 
we still do not really think it is practical for the courts to interfere and we also accept that there are many instances 
in which minor injustices or inconveniences are not fit for legal regulation. 
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fitness, that acts which we deem unjust should be punished, though we do not always think it 
expedient that this should be done by the tribunals” (U V: 13). This, I believe is where problems 
regarding alternate liberty limiting principles, such as legal moralism and paternalism, occur 
because the overlapping ideas of morality and justice cloud where the proper realm of legitimate 
government intervention falls. Because we often conflate morality as a whole and the specific 
narrow version of morality that is justice, we fail to maintain a clear and principled division.222 
Mill claims that  
the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not 
only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not 
call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in 
some way or other for doing it; if not by the law, by the opinion of his fellow 
creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience (U V: 14).  
 
Yet, it is finding the line between legal punishment and societal/moral pressures that creates a 
tension with rights enforcement.  
 Mill claims that what distinguishes morality in general from utility is 1. We believe the 
act to be wrong and 2. We demand/expect/desire punishment for the act (whereas utility focuses 
on the useful or expedient and withholds any opinion on matters of punishment). While these 
two criteria are also a part of justice, there is something more that distinguishes justice from 
morality more generally. The rest of Utilitarianism chapter V explores this differentiation and 
rests upon a notion and refinement of rights which in turn defines justice and the proper domain 
of the law. 
 
 
                                                 
222 While the legal moralist maintains that some things that morality demands ought not to be covered through the 
law, they have a more difficult time in presenting and maintaining a consistent and principled line to make the 
distinction between those things that ought to be covered and those that ought not. 
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4.2.3 Utilitarianism Chapter V: Rights, Perfect Obligations, and the Law 
 So, Utilitarianism V indicates that Mill believes there are different criteria for those 
moral “rights” that are subject to the law through, what I call, the legal harm principle. Both 
morality and justice require 1. a wrong done and 2. a desire for retribution but justice adds 
another criterion, namely, 3. harm to an assignable person—a claim. This is where Mill brings in 
the notions of perfect and imperfect duties.223 Perfect obligations seem to align with the domain 
of the legal harm principle and notions of justice. Mill claims that “in our survey of the popular 
acceptations of justice, the term appeared generally to involve the idea of a personal right—a 
claim on the part of one or more individuals, like that which the law gives when it confers a 
proprietary or other legal right” (U V: 15).224 So, while morality generally covers a broader class 
of things, justice (as a narrow part of morality) covers something more specific in demanding a 
claim-right. Morality covers all wrongs, such as a failure to be generous or beneficent, justice 
covers those wrongs to which others have a claim against us. This claim is that some other has 
violated something which is due to the victim. 
 Mill’s idea of justice, then, relies on a wrong done to some assignable person (i.e. a harm 
done to an assignable person). This contrasts with morality more generally which also includes 
imperfect duties and obligations (which morality demands of us) which do not violate or infringe 
right-claims when we fail to fulfill these obligations. Mill claims that with those things that ought 
to be rights/comprise justice 
Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a possession, or in 
breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or worse than 
other people who have no greater claims, in each case the supposition implies two 
things—a wrong done, and some assignable person who is wronged. … It seems 
to me that this feature in the case—a right in some person, correlative to the moral 
                                                 
223 I discuss perfect and imperfect duties in chapter 3.3.3. 
224 This highlights the idea that Mill is attempting to define rights in terms of what ought to be in the domain of the 
law and separate it from actual descriptive legal rights that “most people” discuss.  
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obligation—constitutes the specific difference between justice, and [moral 
obligations in general such as] generosity or beneficence. Justice implies 
something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some 
individual person can claim from us as his moral right (U V: 15). 
 
So, it seems that (moral) rights are those that we can claim as our due from another. While we 
may have a variety of moral duties, not all are toward specific individuals and if specific 
individuals cannot claim it as their due, there is not a correlative rights-claim that is being 
infringed or violated. So, Mill refines what he means by rights here. All moral obligations and 
duties then, are not “rights” in this same sense because there is not a claim by an assignable 
person in some cases, such as Mill’s examples of beneficence and generosity. Mill claims that 
“wherever there is a right, the case is one of justice, and not of the virtue of beneficence: and 
whoever does not place the distinction between justice and morality in general where we have 
now placed it, will be found to make no distinction between them at all, but to merge all morality 
into justice” (U V: 15). This, of course, is a critique of legal moralism and paternalism which 
attempt to overextend the idea of justice to incorporate more wrongs into the domain of the law 
that are not rights violations or infringements (where an assignable individual has a claim on 
another) but rather are issues of moral obligations more generally.225 
 This helps to make a distinction between harm that is within the domain of the law and 
harm that is not. In both morality and justice there is a likelihood of a violation if harm is done. 
However, the key distinction rests on whether there is a claim or not. Mill states that “the two 
essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice [which is conceptually related to the law] are, the 
desire to punish a person who has done harm [i.e. done wrong], and the knowledge or belief that 
                                                 
225 This applies to legal moralism when it attempts to include “harmless wrongs” or wrongs/harms for which others 
do not have a claim on the one doing the supposed wrong. This applies to paternalism which attempts to include 
things like self-inflicted harm, which cannot be a rights violation because there is not another person who has a 
claim on the individual. 
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there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done [i.e. infringed or 
violated a right]” (U V: 18). If an individual causes a rights-infringing harm (harm to an 
important and significant interest as progressive beings), the law may be invoked. If an 
individual fails to prevent harm or contributes to harm (but does not cause it), then it is not a 
rights violation or infringement but is still harm and can still be covered by the general harm 
principle, though not the legal harm principle.  
 For instance, in “bad Samaritan” cases where individuals fail to prevent already occurring 
harm but do not cause it, they could be censured by social/moral pressures but not by the law. 
We may have a “right to life” which means we have a right not to be (unjustly) killed by another 
but this does not mean that others must give us things that are not ours in order to keep us alive, 
i.e. no one owes us things that would save us such as food or water—they only owe us not to 
harm us. We may have a “right to food” but this is just a right to that which we already have but 
we do not have a right that anyone give this to us, only that they not take it from us. Others have 
moral obligations to help others but others do not have this as their due. We do not owe specific 
individuals food or assistance (unless there is a special relationship such as parental or familial 
obligations, etc.) but if we give it to them, we are doing a morally good thing. We have this 
extra-legal (imperfect) moral obligation but it is not a legislatable moral right that can be 
demanded of us through the law. 
 In the case of the general harm principle’s use of moral pressures, it seems that one can 
argue that any time harm to others occurs, whether there is a duty toward the specific individual 
or not, society may step in in the form of moral pressures. So, when someone is being harmed, 
even if the other agent did not cause the harm or the individual being censured by moral 
pressures contributed to the harm though did not violate or infringe another’s rights, society can 
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legitimately step in to prevent the harm using moral pressures. So, if I have the means to give to 
charity and do not and harm occurs that could have been prevented, society may criticize and 
ostracize me for the harm but may not create a law demanding that I give charitably. If I offend 
someone else’s moral sensibilities or say something shocking, I may be causing harm but I am 
not violating or infringing their rights (there is not a significant interest not to be offended and 
indeed Mill would likely argue that offense does not even count here) and so may be subject to 
social controls but not legal.  
 
4.2.4 But What of Retribution? 
 One potential issue that arises when discussing the division between justice and morality 
generally is that we often talk of a desire for punishment even when there is not a rights-
infringing harm. However, this retributive element is still consistent with a division between 
morality and justice. When we talk of a desire that we have that those who do a wrong be 
punished, sometimes we may mean nothing more than wrongdoers getting what they deserve and 
that may mean nothing more than being called out for doing something wrong (i.e. application of 
moral pressures, extra-legal social pressures). Mill even says that we may be obligated to help 
people and inform them when they are doing something we think to be wrong. But this does not 
mean they are infringing or violating a right. Furthermore, Mill claims “that the desire to punish 
a person who has done harm to some individual, is a spontaneous outgrowth from two 
sentiments, … the impulse of self-defense, and the feeling of sympathy” (U V: 19). These two 
sentiments, according to Mill, are natural and “it is natural to resent, and to repel or retaliate, any 
harm done or attempted against ourselves, or against those with whom we sympathize” (U: V: 
20). This sympathy, extends not only to ourselves and our offspring or family, but to any other 
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that we see as similar to ourselves, which is all of humanity because “a human being is capable 
of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he 
forms a part, such that any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally, is 
threatening to his own” (U V: 20). This social element is what makes us consider the way in 
which our actions affect others and fosters a feeling of community which makes the important 
interests we have of a high utility. This creates a “rule of conduct, and a sentiment which 
sanctions the rule” which is “common to all mankind, and intended for their good” (U V: 23). 
Thus, when someone violates or infringes on a claim-right of another, this sense of community is 
threatened and the desire for retribution is a natural result.  
 
4.2.5 Defining Rights and Their Domain 
 As Mill explains it, this rule of conduct is invoked when someone’s “rights (to use the 
expression appropriated to the case) are violated” (U V: 23). Here Mill defines what exactly he 
means by “rights.” He claims that “all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right … 
When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect 
him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion” (U V: 
24). While I will come back to the latter part of this definition momentarily, it is helpful to look 
further at what Mill means by this definition. He states that  
to have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to 
defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can 
give him no other reason than general utility. … [which is derived] from the 
extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned (U V: 
25).  
 
This links rights more clearly to the harm principle that is found in On Liberty and more 
specifically to the legal harm principle because Mill is claiming that society ought to protect 
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against infringements on rights because they are “extraordinarily important and impressive” 
interests. If they are these sorts of interests, when they are infringed harm is being caused. So, to 
infringe or violate another’s rights, one is causing harm (it seems any amount of harm) to 
significant interests and the more important the interest/claim, the more society must protect it. 
 Mill continues his analysis of rights by looking at what he sees as the single most 
important and significant of the social utilities to which we have a right. This key interest he is 
describing is security. Security of self and one’s possessions is a common feature that is 
presented as an essential claim that individuals have on one another. Mill states that  
The interest involved [in rights] is that of security, to everyone’s feelings the most 
vital of all interests. Nearly all other earthly benefits are needed by one person, 
not needed by another; and many of them can, if necessary be cheerfully 
foregone, or replaced by something else; but security no human being can 
possibly do without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the 
whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing but 
the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived 
of everything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than 
ourselves. Now this most indispensable of all necessaries, after physical 
nutriment, cannot be had, unless the machinery for providing it is kept 
unintermittedly in active play. Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our 
fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our 
existence, gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those concerned 
in any of the more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree (as is 
often the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in kind (U V: 25 
Emphasis added). 
 
Here Mill makes clear that when it comes to those vital human interests, security is generally that 
which is considered the most important social utility and while it resides at the top of our list of 
goods, it also seems to change in kind in proportion to the degree of importance. This is in part 
because if we do not have security in our person and property, we are unable to flourish and be 
happy because we are in constant fear. If we have security, then we have the ability to strive for 
happiness without worrying that our lives or our liberty will be taken.  
 He claims that “the feelings concerned are so powerful, and we count so positively on 
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finding a responsive feeling in others (all being alike interested), that ought and should grow into 
must, and recognised indispensability becomes a moral necessity, analogous to physical, and 
often not inferior to it in binding force exhorted” (U V: 25). In other words, while it is the case 
that we must have food, shelter, and clothing to survive (we have physical necessities) without 
security, even these necessary features are in peril. So, justice and the legal harm principle focus 
on security—which focuses on protecting rights, or really protecting from certain harms which 
others have a claim on us to prevent—which is of utmost social importance, i.e. socially useful.  
 As Mill states it, justice is  
incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality. Justice is a name 
for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-
being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other 
rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the 
essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual implies and 
testifies to this more binding obligation (U V: 32). 
 
Because it is so important, this changes it to a kind of obligation toward others or right that we 
have to claim against others which is so binding that the use of legal force becomes the domain 
for enforcement and “the moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we 
must never forget to include wrongful interference with each other’s freedom) are more vital to 
human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only point out the best mode of 
managing some department of human affairs” (U V: 33 Emphasis added). It seems then, that this 
lends support not only for a separate legal criteria for the harm principle but also for the reason 
why we need a division, i.e. these sorts of harm become a difference in kind. 
 More evidence for a separate legal harm principle also seems to be suggested when Mill 
claims that as far as enforcement of interference goes, we have the highest interest in preventing 
these significant kinds of interference. He says that  
in inculcating on each other the duty of positive beneficence [we] have an 
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unmistakable interest, but far less in degree: a person may possibly not need the 
benefits of others; but he always needs that they should not do him hurt. Thus the 
moralities which protect every individual from being harmed by others, either 
directly or by being hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own good, are at once 
those which he himself has most at heart, and those which he has the strongest 
interest in publishing and enforcing by word and deed (U V: 33 Emphasis added). 
 
To me, the latter part of this quote suggests that since we have the “strongest interest” in 
preventing harm by others, which includes the self-regarding freedoms to pursue happiness, we 
have more of a reason to enforce, i.e. use legal recourse, these than any others and thus, they 
would fall into the jurisdiction of the legal principle.  
 He then seems to provide more explanation of the sorts of rights which fall within the 
legal harm principle. He says 
Now it is these moralities primarily which compose the obligations of justice. The 
most marked cases of injustice, and those which give the tone to the feeling of 
repugnance which characterises the sentiment, are acts of wrongful aggression, or 
wrongful exercise of power over some one; the next are those which consist in 
wrongfully withholding from him something which is his due; in both cases, 
inflicting on him a positive hurt, either in the form of direct suffering, or of the 
privation of some good which he had reasonable ground, either of a physical or 
of a social kind, for counting upon (U V: 33 Emphasis added). 
 
These cases of injustice echo those that are explored in On Liberty and seem to reinforce the idea 
that the legal harm principle protects individuals from certain liberty encroachments which cause 
rights-infringing harm. 
 
4.3 Is Mill’s Understanding of Rights Consistent with Other Theories? 
 Interestingly, oftentimes when Mill speaks of rights he seems to talk as if there are things 
that ought to be treated as if they are rights and lays aside whether or not there are actually things 
that are in fact rights. He even uses this language in On Liberty when he discusses “certain 
interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be 
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considered as rights” (OL IV: 3 Emphasis added). Whether or not they are rights as a real and 
independent thing does not seem to matter for Mill because his purpose is to look to those things 
that are treated as rights. There are things that Mill classes as having more or less utility and 
justice amounts to protecting the rights that people have because they are grounded in the most 
useful and permanent social interests of people. So, Mill does not claim or purport to claim that 
Justice, rights, and interest are independent of utility. This is a useful thing to understand because 
it seems that those with differing interpretations of rights, i.e. the Kantian, could agree that rights 
are useful and important, indeed more important than other sorts of interest that humans have. 
Thus, it seems that (my understanding of) Mill’s explanation of legal rights as being the most 
useful and important interests we have (as progressive beings) is consistent with a myriad of 
moral and ethical views and as a legal principle can be maintained by most theorists no matter 
their personal morality.  
 Mill makes the claim that certain things he says are not inconsistent with Kantianism, 
specifically regarding rights and justice (U V: 22). Mill claims that justice is a social feeling that 
is derived from sympathy and self-defense. We do not wish to be harmed or have our rights 
violated, i.e. we seek security for ourselves and those like us (all of society). And while in 
particular cases we may not be thinking of the general good when we condemn an act that 
violated or infringed our rights, this does not mean that the principle or the general points Mill 
makes are wrong. Rather, he allows that “it is common enough certainly, though the reverse of 
commendable, to feel resentment merely because we have suffered pain” (U V: 22). However, 
this does not mean that the social feeling he describes is not a dictate of justice. Indeed, he claims 
that  
a person whose resentment is really a moral feeling, that is, who considers 
whether an act is blamable before he allows himself to resent it—such a person, 
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though he may not say expressly to himself that he is standing up for the interest 
of society, certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule which is for the benefit of 
others as well as for his own. If he is not feeling this—if he is regarding the act 
solely as it affects him individually—he is not consciously just; he is not 
concerning himself about the justice of his actions. This is admitted even by anti-
utilitarian moralists. When Kant … propounds as the fundamental principle of 
morals, ‘So act, that thy rule of conduct might be adopted as a law by all rational 
beings,’ he virtually acknowledges that the interest of mankind collectively, or at 
least of mankind indiscriminately, must be in the mind of the agent when 
conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act. Otherwise he uses words 
without a meaning: for, that a rule even of utter selfishness could not possibly be 
adopted by all rational beings—that there is any insuperable obstacle in the nature 
of things to its adoption—cannot be even plausibly maintained. To give any 
meaning to Kant’s principle, the sense put upon it must be, that we ought to shape 
our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their 
collective interest (U V: 22).226 
 
Mill creates a concept of rights that he carefully delineates, but there may be other people who 
bring up other ideas of rights and they are often completely consistent with Mill. And thus, what 
he says about justice and harm is not inconsistent with other theories. It may be derived from 
utilitarianism but that does not mean it is inconsistent with other theories and it seems that no 
matter a person’s personal morality, most would agree that in matters of social interaction and 
justice, the harm principle is necessary. Many specific rights that people claim to have fall under 
many of the rights that Mill talks about. We think that there is some special feature of justice that 
transcends utility but it really does not. It is merely a special form of utility. Especially when we 
consider the role of the law and what is typically demanded of it. It must consider the practical 
aspects of regulation, provide clear rules of conduct, and protect the interests of society and the 
individual. When we consider these aspects of the law, we can see that most of the rights that we 
consider to be in our significant interest are protected or outlined under the harm principle and 
                                                 
226 It is not clear here that Mill’s interpretation of Kant is actually Kantian. However, for my purposes it does not 
matter if Mill is relaying Kant correctly or misinterpreting Kant. 
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are consistent with a wide range of rights theories, most of which, like Mill’s, center around the 
idea of security. There is a kind of communal and practical aspect of what is going on with the 
law that Mill can defend using his concept of rights. If it is useful, practical, and easy to 
implement, then it is more likely to be enacted through the penal law. One advantage is that it 
makes the notion of rights dependent on the needs and interests of society. As the times change, 
it allows a fluidity and alteration when situations change. For instance, you may have a right to 
protection or a “right to bear arms,” but this does not mean (and should not mean) that we have a 
right to every means of protection at our disposal. Different forms of protection are, at different 
times, more and less useful and some forms of protection directly endanger the general safety 
and rights of others. If one form infringes on the rights or the liberties of others, then it may be 
the case that it is not a right which ought to be protected through the criminal law. 
 Interestingly, it seems that the harm principle and Mill’s views on rights as related to a 
legal harm principle are not inconsistent with other moral views. Mill relies on Utilitarianism to 
justify when an act is or is not prohibited. But remember, the harm principle is not really 
answering a question of justification but rather one of domain. When addressing the balancing 
principle and attempting to decide if a particular act ought to be regulated, this is a matter of 
justification. Mill believes that Utilitarianism is the way to determine this justification. Other 
theories may be used to justify prohibition while adhering to the domain division Mill makes 
with the jurisdiction principle and adhering to what he says about rights in general. I even think 
that most theorists would agree with the claim (or maybe they would at least not dispute the 
claim) that rights are those things that are most socially useful and often focus on the security of 




4.4 Inconsistencies? Mill on Benefitting Others 
 It is now useful to stop and examine two passages in On Liberty that may seem on first 
read to present difficulties for the view I present. In chapter IV Mill presents the second of what 
he calls social obligations that individuals have toward one another. The other passage related to 
this idea of social obligations is in chapter I of On Liberty and is a section in which Mill makes 
some similar claims about duties that citizens have toward each other. These two passages are 
interesting because they tie into Mill’s view of duties and obligations from Utilitarianism chapter 
V. They are also of note because upon first read they seem problematic and potentially 
inconsistent with the view of interests and rights of individuals that I present as well as the harm 
principle more generally. However, these conflicts are superficial and the claims Mill makes in 
these passages are consistent with his general harm principle as well as the legal harm principle I 
propose. 
 In chapter IV of On Liberty Mill claims that there are two social obligations that 
individuals have toward one another. The first social obligation covers conduct regarding rights 
infringements and “this conduct consists first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or 
rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought 
to be considered as rights” (OL IV: 3). This social obligation is not only consistent with my 
classification of the general harm principle but helps to construct my legal harm principle. 
However, the second required social duty toward others consists  
in each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the 
labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from 
injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing at all 
costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society 
may do (OL IV: 3). 
 
This second social obligation still discusses the security and safety of others but also seems to 
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require quite a lot of citizens. This makes not only refraining from harming others an obligation 
but also protecting them from harm from others. In other words, it makes it a duty to prevent 
harm to others and by doing so, seems to require us to benefit others as well. Even if these are 
legitimate expectations of citizens, the government seems to be given quite a lot of enforcement 
power, i.e. “enforcing at all costs.”  
 Along a similar vein, in the earlier passage (I: 11) Mill claims that in addition to 
refraining from harming others and their interests,  
There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may 
rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; 
to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary 
to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform 
certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature’s life, or 
interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it 
is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society 
for not doing (OL I: 11 Emphasis added). 
 
So, in these passages, Mill seems to suggest that it is not only the case that the state may coerce 
individuals when they cause harm to others but it may also interfere in the liberty of its citizens 
to require them to benefit others, to benefit the state, and to aid others.  
 In some cases, it actually seems as though Mill is allowing for legal moralism to sneak in 
and take over. However, I think that much of this apparent inconsistency in Mill can be 
explained away in one of two ways. First, it is important to remember that Mill is not only (or 
even primarily) discussing state coercion or interference in liberty, as noted throughout, he is 
also discussing societal pressures and pressures that one puts on oneself when other options are 
too invasive. Second, while some of these duties may seem to be overly invasive of the state, 
most (if not all) of them are in fact consistent with the harm principle.  
 Regarding interference in liberty, in both passages (at I: 11 and IV: 3), Mill is still 
speaking relatively generally and it is important to keep in mind that throughout On Liberty he 
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does not always distinguish between those acts that fall into the domain of moral/social pressures 
and those that the law may enforce. Furthermore, he does not distinguish between types of laws, 
such as tort and penal or administrative. It may very well be the case that the tort law may be 
called upon to remedy a supposed grievance against another, but this does not entail that the 
penal law is the proper avenue for restraint. Rather it seems to me that Mill is consistently 
providing examples that fit all the situations he discusses, whether the domain of the law, social 
coercion, or self-discipline. It is also useful to recognize that all the instances Mill lists as 
required of citizens in passage I: 11 are those in which harm is very likely to occur to others, so 
while the agent may not be causing the harm, the general harm principle applies to all duties that 
individuals have, including imperfect duties which oblige us to prevent harm, even if you are not 
the one to cause it. And while there are many ways to enforce moral duties, Mill does not 
indicate that the law is the domain of these duties. 
 That these acts are not intended to be within the domain of the law for Mill also appears 
to be the case because he is very reluctant to apply compulsion to acts that force an agent to 
prevent evil to others while he readily accepts the fact that preventing someone from “doing” an 
act that harms another is “the rule” and admits that “preventing” harm is “the exception.” Mill 
claims that  
A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and 
in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is 
true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To 
make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him 
answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet 
there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception. In 
all things which regard the external relations of the individual, he is de jure 
amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as 
their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the 
responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the 
case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act 
better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which 
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society have it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise 
control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent. 
When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the 
conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment seat, and 
protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judging 
himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made 
accountable to the judgment of his fellow-creatures (OL I: 11). 
 
This highlights Mill’s general way of speaking about harm in On Liberty. When he claims that 
inaction can cause harm he is highlighting instances of actually causing harm, though not all acts 
of inaction will cause harm (though many may contribute to the harm). He also recognizes that 
preventing evil to others is, generally speaking, morally required but this does not mean that 
others have a claim to this aid and that it should be covered by the law. However, he suggests 
that requiring (say through moral pressures) aid to others in some situations would actually cause 
more harm than good, so while it may be in the domain (the jurisdiction principle) of social 
pressures, there may be good reason not to punish (the balancing principle). 
 Similarly, when discussing those social obligations that individual have (at IV: 3) Mill 
claims that  
The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration 
for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted 
rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. 
As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of 
others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general 
welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to 
discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a 
person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not 
affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the 
ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there should be perfect 
freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences (OL IV: 3). 
 
And while he claims that certain situations in which an agent’s inaction or failure to prevent 
harm are grave enough to justify coercion, he is careful to note that this is an exception and he 
does not claim the law as the appropriate domain. However, again this is not clear and I think it 
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would be inconsistent if Mill believes that the penal law is the proper domain for this sort of 
harm prevention. Especially because he cautions on the exercise of compulsion in these cases it 
would seem that public pressure or moral education is the relevant answer to such inaction or 
failure. Another reason to think Mill would not apply the penal law in these cases is that he 
makes the claim that even acts that are specifically harmful to others are not always properly 
regulated through the criminal law because such penalties are not always “safely applicable” (OL 
I: 11). Even if one were to make the case that the harms that are not safely applicable are those 
that are too minor or would cause more harm if regulated, it seems that even a severe instance of 
harm that is allowed to occur or that is not prevented would not fit Mill’s criteria for legal 
penalties of the strictness that the penal law enacts for the same reasons.  
 Mill claims that because coercing someone because they failed to prevent evil is the 
exception to the coercive rule and I would argue that since it is an exception to the rule, it seems 
that even if Mill believes that “in all things which regard the external relations if the individual, 
he is de jure amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their 
protector” (OL I: 11) it does not necessarily follow that the part of the law responsible is penal 
law. It would seem that since it is an exception, tort law, a less serious form of coercion, would 
be a more appropriate avenue for compensation. If it is the exception, it seems the burden of 
proof would be to show that the case fits the exception and deserves a legal response. If it does 
not, then it seems that the social pressures become the relevant method of punishment.  
 It is in these two places above all others where it seems that Mill introduces an 
inconsistency into his discussion of the harm principle—1. we may be required to do things 
which benefit others and 2. We may be required to prevent harm (which we have not caused 
directly) from occurring to others. In the first case, one could argue that the “benefits” that Mill 
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provides as examples here would actually lead to or significantly risk harm to others. For 
instance, Mill claims that we may be required to 
give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, 
or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he 
enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such 
as saving a fellow-creature’s life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against 
ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may 
rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil 
to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly 
accountable to them for the injury (OL I: 11). 
 
These things seem to be instances in which there is harm to others but the agent in question is 
not the cause of the harm. In these cases, we may have a moral obligation to help but the victims 
in these cases do not have a right that we aid them.  
 Regarding Mill’s claim that we may be required to prevent harm from occurring, not 
merely avoid causing harm, I believe that this is a non-issue for not only Mill but also for the 
legal harm principle I am suggesting. Essentially, we have a right that agents not harm us but we 
do not have a right that harm not befall us. This addresses the distinction between when social 
coercion can occur and when legal coercion can occur. If there is harm befalling us, we may 
(rightly or wrongly) expect that agents ought to aid us but we do not have a right to this. We 
have a right that agents not harm us but we do not have a right that agents aid us when we are in 
harm. If this were the case, then justice would demand all manner of things that would likely 
lead to more harm than good and to greater risk of danger for those who did not do anything 
wrong. We do however, expect that agents aid us in many situations where there is harm 
befalling another and we may think society may have jurisdiction over it since it affects others 
but we would not allow for the law to prevent it but rather, since there is not rights-infringing 




4.4.1 Why Certain Things are not Rights Infringements 
 This may lead to the question of why some things that we have a substantial and 
important interest in are not considered to be rights that we have a claim to. For instance, what 
about things like food, water, and shelter? These are necessary parts of the good life and 
arguably security, i.e. you must have these in order to have anything approaching a good life, but 
are these things rights in the sense that Mill is talking about? It seems that they are not because 
while food, water, shelter, etc. are necessary and it may seem that everyone has a right to these 
things, we do not have a specific duty to an assignable individual to clothe and feed the 
individual (other than those toward whom we have a special relationship, such as children or 
those for whom we have accepted responsibility). We may, one could argue, have an imperfect 
duty toward individuals in these situations but we do not owe specific individuals these 
“benefits” and it is a sort of charitable giving when we do give them. These “rights” (food, 
shelter, etc.) are things which we have a duty, but not to assignable individuals and they more 
closely align with what Mill says about imperfect duties or duties surrounding special 
relationships.227  
 So, while we have a significant and important interest in these things, indeed we cannot 
live without them, we do not have a right that others provide them for us. Of course, while we 
have a right to them once we already have them and they cannot be taken away from us by force, 
we do not have proper rights claims on others that they give us food, shelter, etc. if they have it 
(or have extra of it). Do they have a moral obligation to give it to us? Yes, I believe they do and 
                                                 
227 This view admittedly seems to have certain problems, such as accounting for the injustices that are present in 
society that creates imbalances of goods for certain groups. However, I do not believe that this is a matter for the 
criminal law but rather for administrative laws or even education and civic engagement. There may even be social 
programs or laws that are implemented to remedy these imbalances that are incentives or social welfare programs 
which are entirely consistent with the legal harm principle and the general harm principle. 
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morality would dictate that if they have more than they need, they should share but this does not 
mean we have a right to the food nor does it mean that we can take it from them. Should we 
chastise and criticize and ostracize (apply moral pressures to) those who do not help others who 
are in need, yes. And the general harm principle rightly allows for this; however, we do not have 
the right to forcibly take it away from them or enact laws that require such “donation.” So, while 
it is clear that harm is occurring when individuals are starving or homeless and while I also 
believe that it is clear that, morally speaking, we ought to do something, I do not believe that, nor 




 Some may think that this sort of a legal harm principle seems to open up legal 
punishment for a lot more than people generally expect228 and lend credence to the view that 
such a legal harm principle is not useful because it includes even very minor harms as rights-
infringing harms. While the domain of the legal harm principle is indeed quite wide on this 
account, I am addressing what acts may be considered for coercion. I am asking a domain 
question. And on this account any harm to a right is within the domain of the law. So, if we have 
a right to X and even a very minor harm to X occurs, it falls within the domain of the law. 
Importantly, there is no obligation to actually enforce these rights-infringing harms and indeed it 
seems that most infringements will either be judged to be too minor to fall within the law, or if it 
does fall within the law will require a much smaller censure than criminal legislation—which 
would only be reserved for the most egregious rights violations when the balancing principle is 
                                                 
228 And some may argue it covers too little. 
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applied. However, I think that Mill, in discussing a jurisdiction question, recognizes from the 
start that the harm principle and more specifically a legal harm principle must also take all those 
practical considerations (such as cost, balance of harm, etc.) into account and so it may be 
imprudent to cover many actions through the law, in which case, the social realm steps in and 
take care of the wrongdoing. Mill claims that “all that we mean when we speak of violation of a 
right … when we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to 
protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and 
opinion” (U V: 24 Emphasis added). This, I believe, shows that even if the infringement is one of 
justice (or a rights-infringing harm) which would fall within the domain of the law, it may be 
judged to be even more harmful to regulate through the law, so it would instead be better 
regulated through the extra-legal domain. So, while a great many actions may in fact fall within 
the domain of the legal harm principle (or general harm principle), this does not mean that it 
must be covered by the law (or extra-legal means) only that it may be covered. It is a question of 
the jurisdiction principle—determining if the law or social pressures are the appropriate 
domain.229 If it is deemed too harmful to cover through the law, which many of the things that 
fall within the domain may, it will be covered by the harm principle in some fashion (i.e. through 
the social pressures or individual reproach). Mill requires a separate justificatory question which 
falls to the balancing principle—if it is in the domain of the law (or society) should it be covered 
and to what degree (i.e. how steep should the penalty be)?230 This means that those things toward 
                                                 
229 See Chapter 3.1.2 for a discussion of Mill’s 2 maxims and the jurisdiction principle and the balancing principle. 
The second maxim states “that for such actions as are prejudicial [harmful] to the interests of others, the individual 
is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or 
the other is requisite for its protection” (OL V: 2 Emphasis added). The jurisdiction principle is that individuals 
“may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment” and the balancing principle is that either social or legal 
punishment can be applied “if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.” 
230 Again, because the question of the balancing principle involves application of balancing principles, the “should” 
here always implies “should on balance” or “should, all things considered.” 
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the top or middle of the harm scale, more specifically those acts that are rights-infringing harm, 
will always be covered or punished in some way. So, if in applying the jurisdiction principle the 
state/society decides that it is within the domain of the law but in applying the balancing 
principle they decide that it causes more harm to cover the act through the law, it will still be 
covered just not through the criminal law or even civil law. It will just fall to social pressures to 
prevent the act (or if it falls within the extra-legal domain, it may still be deemed too harmful to 
be covered by social/moral pressures and would thus be subject to individual reproach or 
conscience).  
 So, Mill’s general harm principle may prevent all harm to others, potentially even those 
acts that the individual did not cause but failed to prevent, while the domain of the legal harm 
principle covers rights-infringing harms (of which there may be many more than people are 
comfortable with). However, if we decide that there is more harm caused by legislating the 
rights-infringing harm than not, it will fall to the general harm principle to prevent and the social 
pressures to punish those wrongdoers. Mill claims that justice is the social aspect of utility in 
which the law is called upon to protect those most useful of social utilities. If it becomes worse 
(more harmful) or less socially useful to cover something, then Mill allows that it should not in 
actuality be covered by the law but could then be covered through the realm of social 
pressures—though it is still within the domain of the law. Similarly, if the harms on the lower 
end of the scale (extra-legal) are deemed more harmful to discipline through social means, it is 
then left to the individual him/herself to rebuke.  
 All the harms to others on a higher scale (rights-infringing harms), on my view, can also 
be covered by those on the lower end of the scale. If something can be prevented or punished 
through a more invasive domain, it can also be covered by those that are less invasive. All harms 
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to others may be punished through individual reproach (i.e. the individual can punish 
him/herself), those more serious may be punished by both individual reproach and social/moral 
extra-legal pressures, and those most serious (i.e. rights-infringing harm) may be prevented 
through the law, social/moral pressures, or individual reproach. This process is not reversed—
those on the lower end cannot be prevented through the level above because doing so would 





Liberties of Conscience and Expression: Mill on the Limits of Speech 
 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Speech and Harm  
 In the spirit of Mill, I want to “offer, not so much applications, as specimens of 
application” to “illustrate the principle” I described (OL V: 1). In the next two chapters, I will 
attempt to apply my legal harm principle to a particularly tricky—yet important—area of other-
regarding behavior that Mill spends a good deal of time on in On Liberty: expression of speech. 
Mill argues that we have a right to the expression and publication of speech because of its utility 
in our well-being and significant interests as progressive beings. So any infringement231 (harm) 
to our right to free speech would violate our rights and place that action in the legal domain.  
 There is an important point to make regarding rights-infringing harm and rights-violating 
harm. Rights-infringing harm is any harm to a right.232 Rights-infringing harm, I have argued, 
defines the domain of the law.233 If it is a rights-infringing harm it falls within the domain of the 
law. If, when we apply our balancing tests, the infringement is judged to be serious or significant 
enough on balance to outweigh all other normative considerations, then it is a rights-violating 
harm and should be prevented through the law. Rights-infringing harm puts the act in the domain 
of the law (the jurisdiction principle), rights-violating harm justifies regulation (the balancing 
principle).234 
                                                 
231 I will show that he utilizes a seemingly absolutist interpretation of liberties to speech that is not actually 
consistent and that he does not actually hold. He frequently overstates his position. 
232 By this I do not mean there is harm or threat to actual “rights” but rather that there is harm to individuals that 
implicate rights. The harm is always to the individual and while I will utilize language that suggests the harm is to 
the rights but this is never the case. Such as protection of rights, violating rights, infringing rights, harm to rights, 
etc. In this instance I mean something like any harm to us that implicates our rights. 
233 See chapters 3–4. 
234 For my discussion on domain versus justification, see chapter 2.2.3. For my discussion on the jurisdiction 
principle and the balancing principle, see chapter 3.1.2–6. The second maxim states “that for such actions as are 
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 But if, as I will argue, Mill’s argument really rests on the idea that speech enhances our 
deliberative faculties235 and that is why it is so valuable, then it seems that some speech does not 
do this and may be prevented. In some cases of speech, deliberative faculties may actually be 
enhanced by some speech being censored through the law. Mill, I believe, is not concerned in 
chapter II with a domain determination, he is concerned with whether or not we should restrict 
speech. He thinks we should not restrict speech generally because it is ultimately more useful to 
allow expansive speech rights than to restrict them but it is not clear that he does not think that 
they may fall within the domain of the law, only that they are more valuable or there is a higher 
utility in allowing speech to be expressed undeterred. This is not to say that expression of speech, 
especially published speech, is not in the legal domain, it is merely to say that most should not be 
regulated (or if it is, it may be better regulated through the extra-legal domain). This does not 
deny that some should fall within the domain of the law. There are some instances, instances in 
which Mill agrees, that expressions of speech themselves cause or are likely to cause rights-
infringing harm. But when such expressions infringe on other rights, how do we determine 
whether we should prevent them through the law or leave it to less restrictive extra-legal or legal 
methods? In understanding Mill’s position, I will focus specifically on hate speech in the next 
chapter. In applying the legal harm principle to hate speech I will need to go beyond my question 
of domain and attempt to apply the balancing principles Mill suggests are needed. 
                                                 
prejudicial [harmful] to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or 
to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection” (OL V: 2 
Emphasis added). The jurisdiction principle is that individuals “may be subjected either to social or to legal 
punishment” and the balancing principle is that either social or legal punishment can be applied “if society is of 
opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.” 
235 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 152; Brink, “Millian Principles,” 122–3. Chapter 7 of Mill’s Progressive 
Principles is comprised of much of his article “Millian Principles, Freedom Expression, and Hate Speech” (Legal 
Theory 7 (2001): 119–57) though it was heavily edited and some of the points he makes in the article are not in the 
text. I will utilize Brink’s terminology in what follows. His use of “deliberative faculties,” “deliberative values,” and 
“deliberative capacities” are useful classifications and reflect the core ideas of Mill’s argument in favor of free 




 In this chapter I will first examine what Mill says about speech and why causing or 
risking harm to our liberty of speech expression may violate our rights, i.e. see why he thinks 
speech and expression of speech is an important interest in which we have a claim on others to 
respect us in performing. Next I need to show that Mill allows at least some limitations on 
speech. I will look to the corn dealer example (OL III: 1) to discuss a limit that Mill places on 
speech; where he thinks some speech causes rights-infringing harm and in principle actually falls 
within the legal domain.  
 Once I have determined that Mill, in principle, allows that speech may be limited, in the 
subsequent chapter I will then discuss Jeremy Waldron and Mari J. Matsuda’s suggestions on the 
proper limitations to hate speech. Waldron and Matsuda propose that the dignity and equal status 
of individuals under the law are threatened by certain types of hate speech, specifically the 
publication of such speech. I believe that using their analysis of the harms that hate speech 
causes I can turn to Mill to show that Mill allows that we have a right that would correspond to 
such harms. I will look at two proposed rights that Mill suggests we have, namely equality or 
impartiality under the law (U V: 36) and the highly valuable interest we have in personal choice 
which involves individuality and diversity—as he puts it, liberties of “tastes, pursuits, and life 
plans.”236 If it is the case that hate speech seems to infringe one of these rights (or both), then it 
seems that we may have a claim against others not to express hate speech in the form of 
publications and we can then proceed to the sorts of questions and balancing tests Mill may 
utilize to determine if legislation would be acceptable or not. I am not attempting to argue that 
we should enact legislation, but I want to explore ways in which such suppression may be 
                                                 
236 I will refer to this right as the right of personal choice as opposed to “tastes, pursuits, and life plans” because I 
feel it captures the nature of the right better. 
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acceptable to Mill. 
 Because my goal in constructing a legal harm principle was to maintain consistency with 
Mill as much as possible, I aim to do the same in applying the legal harm principle to hate 
speech. I will look to the various interests and rights Mill thinks are of most use in contributing 
to our well-being in order to evaluate hate speech. I will rely as much as possible on insights that 
Mill provides in On Liberty as well as sections of Utilitarianism and my attempts to fill in any 
gaps will rely on interpretations that I believe are consistent with Mill or if they are not, I will 
show why they may fit within the legal harm principle despite his reservations.  
 There are many suggested reasons for why some types of hate speech ought to be 
restricted. My question is not whether we should237 adopt speech restrictions, but rather to 
determine 1. if some types of hate speech infringe rights and thus may fall within the domain of 
the legal harm principle, and 2. what sorts of Millian decision making procedures can we use to 
justify legislation (even if we ultimately judge such laws to be inappropriate). So the question is: 
what is the significant interest that such speech is infringing and would Mill support such 
restrictions? The arguments I present are not meant to be conclusive but are meant as an attempt 
to reevaluate some of the arguments against speech regulation that Mill presents in On Liberty as 
well as to apply them to a kind of speech to which he did not give adequate consideration—hate 
speech. 
 
5.2 Rights and the Domain of the Law 
5.2.1 Rights-Infringing Harm 
 The domain of the legal harm principle falls where a person causes or threatens harm 
                                                 
237 Again, because the question of the balancing principle involves application of balancing principles, the “should” 
here always implies “should on balance” or “should, all things considered.” 
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(any harm) to the rights of another—this is what I call rights-infringing harm. In the previous 
chapter I noted that once someone performs an act that harms or threatens harm to a right—even 
minimally—it falls within the domain of the law and may be considered for regulation.238 Other 
sorts of harm, such as contributing to harm but not causing harm, allowing harm to befall an 
agent but not causing it, or failing to benefit an agent are all harmful and may be imperfect duties 
that we have toward others, but they do not infringe or violate the rights that we have toward 
others because they cannot claim these as their due. These latter harms would fall under the 
general harm principle though not the legal harm principle. So, the legal harm principle then, is a 
very broad category and is only helpful in narrowing the discussion of regulations so far.  
 We can see how general Mill’s understanding of a rights-infringing harm is once we 
understand what he means by a right that one has. A right is 1. something that when encroached 
we consider to be a wrong, 2. Something that when encroached we demand the violator to be 
punished (in some way)239, and 3. Something we can claim against others as our due (U V: 14–5, 
V: 23–5). Mill argues that these correlate with perfect duties (U V:15). For instance, we have 
claims against others not to cause or unjustifiably risk causing hurt or harm to us. These have to 
do with safety and security and for Mill are the most significant sorts of claims we have against 
others because they are (the most) significant interests we have. So the risk of virtually any 
wrongful act done by another that physically or psychologically harms us or risks harm to us 
counts as a rights infringement and may violate rights—even minor ones. The job of determining 
if something fits within the domain of the law, then may seem relatively simple. Was a 
                                                 
238 A reminder that the harm is always to individuals and not to rights as such. Harm to a right roughly translates to 
harm to an individual that implicates a right that that individual has. 
239 These first two criteria are also criteria for imperfect duties which fall within the general harm principle. Adding 
the criterion of a claim is unique to the legal harm principle. So, demanding that one be punished does not require 
that the law be used, it only allows for the law to be considered. 
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significant interest that I have, one that contributes to my well-being, infringed by someone that 
has a duty to not interfere in my exercise of it (even minimally)? If the answer is yes, then it is in 
the domain of the law.  
 Now should we enforce these is a different question. Mill provides many different 
balancing principles that one can use in determining if regulation would be justified—if a rights 
violation occurs—but this is different than the question of domain. In most cases we should not 
regulate because the harm of regulating (as well as other normative considerations) would 
outweigh the harm of allowing it. Even being pinched for no good reason infringes my rights in 
bodily integrity because someone is unjustifiably, or without good cause interfering with a 
socially useful and significant interest I have (right). The mediating maxims240 or the balancing 
principles must be brought in to evaluate the harm that is occurring. So it is a matter of applying 
the balancing principle which then weighs the relative strength of the claims against the harm 
that regulation would cause (as well as other relevant considerations). In an attempt to explain 
what Mill meant by rights, I assessed his discussion in On Liberty and chapter V of 
Utilitarianism.241 However, even after analyzing what Mill says about rights and deriving a legal 
harm principle that depends on this endeavor, this principle is still admittedly vague. There is a 
question as to which sorts of values or interests are most socially useful and significant. And 
while Mill depends on these as an integral feature of the harm principle, he does not provide a 
method for determining this. Presumably because it is an empirical matter as to whether 
something is or is not in our interests and Mill would call for us to provide our best argument in 
defense of why such things are or are not significantly socially useful. 
 Again, while Mill seems to set out the criteria for rights-infringing harm, he does not 
                                                 
240 Feinberg’s term in the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. 
241 See chapter 4. 
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indicate a very clear method for determining what precisely we have a right to or which interests 
are more socially useful than others or contribute to our well-being as thinking beings. And while 
he mentions that it is rights-infringing harm to encroach on those liberties/values that are most 
socially useful and that we have the most significant interests in as progressive beings, the legal 
harm principle, as such, gives little help in either determining how to decide this or on 
application of these considerations to formulate legislation. Mill seems to provide some help 
when he lays out those self-regarding liberties which we have the strongest interests in because 
they are primarily in the self-regarding realm and most contribute to our well-being and 
individuality as deliberative beings. Yet, even looking to these three categories of liberty—
“Liberties of conscience and expression,” “Liberties of tastes, pursuits, and life-plans,” and 
“Liberties of association” (OL I: 12)—offers little help. He also provides some insight in 
Utilitarianism when he highlights the significance of the claim right to safety and security. 
Because he focuses on the idea of claims as being significant in determining a rights-infringing 
harm, and he says that we also have liberty rights, it may be useful to pause and consider the 
difference. 
 
5.2.2 Claim Rights and Liberty Rights  
 If it is the case that an act that results in a rights-infringing harm is what determines the 
domain, and a rights-infringing harm is defined as 1. any harm that encroaches on one of our 
significant interests as progressive beings; 2. a wrong thought to be applicable for punishment; 3. 
having a claim against another; and 4. the actor does not have just cause to perform such an act, 
then it seems that a great many acts fall within the domain of the law.242 
                                                 
242 These criteria are set out by Mill in Utilitarianism. He claims “Whether the injustice consists in depriving a 
person of a possession, or in breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or worse than other 
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 Because Mill discusses both our rights to certain liberties and claims that we have on 
others, it is important to make a distinction that Mill does not make clear between different kinds 
of rights. We have two general types of rights: claim rights and liberty rights. 243 Claim rights are 
rights “to have done (by someone else)” and liberty rights are rights “to do (yourself).”244 All 
claim rights have three components: a subject, an object, and content. The subject is the person 
who has the right, the object is the person (or group) the person can claim the right from, and the 
content outlines that to which I have a right (our important interests as progressive beings 
according to Mill). These types of rights are called “claim rights.” The object of my claim right 
may be one person, it may be a group of people or it may be all of society. For instance, I have a 
claim right against everyone not to be (unjustly) killed. I also have that claim against a particular 
person in a given situation. In some cases, circumstances dictate a claim right I have against a 
particular person. I may have a claim right against my plumber to fix my pipes because he agreed 
to fix my pipes. I do not have this claim right against everyone.245 Claims are correlated with 
duties and “in general, A’s claim against B that B do X is equivalent to B’s duty toward A to do 
X.”246 The claim right that Mill discusses as being most vital to our well-being and deliberative 
faculties is our claim right to safety and security. Which is a claim that others not cause or risk 
causing us unjustified harm. Rights can only be violated or infringed by a person. We have 
                                                 
people who have no greater claims, in each case the supposition implies two things—a wrong done, and some 
assignable person who is wronged. … It seems to me that this feature in the case—a right in some person, 
correlative to the moral obligation” (U V: 15), “When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid 
claim on society to protect him in the possession of it” (U V: 24); “…to have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have 
something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can 
give him no other reason than general utility. … [which is derived] from the extraordinarily important and 
impressive kind of utility which is concerned (U V: 25). See my chapters 3–4 for a discussion of rights. 
243 For a discussion of claim rights and liberty rights, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions” (W. Cook (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919); Feinberg, Social Philosophy, chapter 4; 
and L.W. Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene: Studies in the Limits of Free Expression (Toronto, Canada: 
University of Toronto Press, 2004). 
244 Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene, 6. 
245 Ibid., 4–5. 
246 Ibid., 5. 
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claims against people. 
 On Mill’s account it is enough that someone do something that causes or risks causing a 
rights-infringing harm even if that person is not the person that actually violates the right. If my 
action (including speech acts) is such that it will likely cause another to violate your rights (even 
if I am not the one who violates the actual right), then I am doing something that may be 
considered for legislation. Your right was violated by X but X would not have done it if Y did 
not cause or increase the likelihood of X infringing your right. So both X and Y’s action can be 
restricted because both lead to a rights-infringing harm that results in a rights violation.  
 Liberty rights on the other hand are liberties that you, the individual, have to do (or not 
do) something. For instance, you have a liberty right to use your property as you see fit. This 
may not appear to correspond to an obligation or duty on the part of you or anyone else but it in 
fact does. In general, these liberty rights are typically protected by a duty of non-interference on 
the part of others.247 I have a liberty right to use my toothbrush and you have a duty not to 
prevent me from doing so. So, liberty rights also have a subject (the rights holder), and object 
(everyone has a duty of non-interference) and content (the use of the toothbrush in this case). 
Again, Mill claims that the three kinds of basic liberties that are necessary for well-being are 
“Liberties of conscience and expression,” “Liberties of tastes, pursuits, and life-plans,” and 
“Liberties of association” (OL I: 12).  
 All rights have restrictions or limits. Mill’s restrictions are outlined by the harm principle 
but it is the balancing factors that actually determine whether a right is violated or not. These 
limits may result “from conflict between the right and some other normative consideration (such 
as a competing right) of equal or greater strength. In that case, the rival consideration can be said 
                                                 
247 Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene, 6–7. 
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to override or trump the expressive right.” 248 Some rights are stronger than others. So the 
strength of the right may factor in on considerations of the limits of rights, “the strength of a 
right is its level of resistance to rival normative considerations, such as competing rights or the 
promotion of worthwhile goals.”249 Rights protect individuals but they also have “a threshold.” 
And while “rights raise thresholds against considerations of social utility, … these thresholds are 
seldom insurmountable.”250 So what sorts of limits would Mill accept regarding our liberty right 
to speech? Where we seem to get the most help from Mill in determining the limits of speech is 
when he is talking generally about balancing and justifying the restrictions we have (applying the 
balancing principle). 
 
5.2.3 The Necessity of Balancing Principles  
 The justificatory questions provide much needed information because the legal harm 
principle, and really any harm principle, is a general principle of justice and needs supplementary 
balancing principles to help in giving it any practical use in decision making. As Feinberg 
claims, these general principles often provide insufficient information for practical consideration 
because 
genuinely problematic cases … have a common form: a certain kind of activity 
has a tendency to cause [in my case, rights-infringing] harm to people who are 
affected by it, but effective prohibition of that activity would tend to cause [rights-
infringing] harm to those who have an interest in engaging in it, and not merely in 
the often trivial respect in which all restrictions of liberty … are pro tanto harmful 
to the persons whose alternatives are narrowed, but rather because other 
substantial interests [rights] of these persons are totally thwarted. In all such 
cases, to prevent A from harming B’s interest in Y would be to harm A’s interest 
in X. … So the legislator must decide whether B’s interest in Y is more or less 
important—more or less worth protecting—in itself … than A’s interest in X. … 
The [legal] harm principle, as so far clarified, tells him that protecting B’s interest 
                                                 
248 Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene, 12. 




from [rights-infringing] harm is a good and relevant reason for restraining A [i.e. 
placing it in the legal domain] but that is all it tells him.”251 
 
This highlights a problem with the legal harm principle, it only considers whether something is a 
rights-infringing harm and if it is, it is a sufficient reason to consider it for prohibition. But it 
does not consider 1. how likely the rights-infringing harm is to cause or risk harm, 2. whether 
there is a competing right that would be infringed or violated were it to be restricted, 3. how 
harmful the act is that infringes the right, nor 4. how to balance these things.  
 The legal harm principle tells us how to put things into the legal domain. So, the question 
becomes, now what? In Mill’s argument in favor of free speech he relies on many of these 
balancing factors to show that it is, on the whole, more harmful to infringe one’s speech rights 
than to allow censorship of almost any kind. He focuses on showing the manner in which our 
rights are infringed when speech is subject to censorship. 
 
5.3 Mill’s General Argument in Favor of Free Speech 
 While Mill begins his general argument in Chapter II of On Liberty defending freedom of 
speech and thought as well as freedom of the Press (which he believes to be an extension of free 
speech), he begins laying the groundwork for his argument in Chapter I by outlining those areas 
of liberty to which we have a right. He claims that 
the appropriate region of human liberty … comprises … the inward domain of 
consciousness; … liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and 
sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. 
The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a 
different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual 
which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the 
liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is 
practically inseparable from it (OL I: 12; Emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
251 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 203. 
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Mill acknowledges that expressing and publishing ideas does indeed fall into the other-regarding 
realm but believes that it is so intimately connected to freedom of opinion that many of the 
reasons why freedom of opinion are essential to human well-being also apply to expression of 
such speech and its publication. Additionally, just because it falls into the other-regarding realm, 
does not automatically include it in the harm principle. It must also be likely to cause harm. Most 
speech does not do this.  
 
5.3.1 “Absolute and Unqualified” Liberty of Speech? 
 On the whole Mill believes these liberties need to exist as “absolute and unqualified” 
freedoms (OL I: 12) which would mean they do not fall within the domain of the law. However, 
he then immediately claims that “the only freedom which deserves that name, is that of pursuing 
our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or 
impede their efforts to obtain it” (OL I: 12; emphasis added). Despite the fact that immediately 
prior to this Mill claimed that these freedoms needed to be absolute, it seems that he allows for 
these liberties, specifically freedom of expression, to be restricted (not absolute) if they prevent 
or interfere with others in the others pursuing their own good. This seems to (rightly) open the 
door for some restrictions on the free expression of speech if it causes or threatens rights-
infringing harm to others which would allow for it to (in some cases) fall within the domain of 
the law. So, if absolute, the right to free speech seems to include the clause: “unless such rights 
deprive others of their well-being or impede their efforts to obtain well-being,” in which case, it 
is not so absolute after all and open for consideration for legislation. As I will discuss below, 
Mill frequently overstates this position as an absolute position and I do not think he really means 
it to be. 
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 However, in chapter II Mill again takes a seemingly absolutist position on freedom of 
thought and the press—despite his qualification that most liberties can be prevented if they cause 
harm or threaten harm to others. Mill begins his argument that free speech is necessary for our 
well-being by citing the great benefit of free speech (its utility). He claims that speech aims 
toward truth and when speech is silenced, it harms not only the individual silenced, but everyone 
else as well. The harm is a result of the suppression of truth—an important and significant 
good/interest. Speech is one of the most useful tools in getting at the truth and so suppression or 
interference in speech is generally unacceptable for Mill.252 He claims that people are 
capable of rectifying … mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by 
experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be 
interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: 
but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought 
before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to 
bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, 
depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance 
can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at 
hand (OL II: 7). 
 
Mill argues that censorship can prevent us from learning the truth because if the opinion is true 
and/or contains a part of the truth, censorship could prohibit us from getting at the truth, in which 
case, he believes we all lose.  
 When one silences opinion, according to Mill, it both prevents individuals from learning 
and implies that those who silence are infallible (OL II: 3).253 It is only through discourse and 
dialogue, Mill’s argument goes, that we can fully express our individuality (autonomy) and 
diversity, better understand the truth, and have a fully robust liberty. Indeed, Mill believes that 
“truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for 
                                                 
252 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 152. 
253 Brink argues that this assumption of infallibility is an overstatement on Mill’s part. It could be the case that the 
censor acknowledges that he/she may be wrong but believes that the arguments for censorship are stronger on the 
one side rather than the other. Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 153. 
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himself than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer to think 
for themselves” (OL II: 20). Thus, a robust liberty of speech is instrumentally valuable in that it 
allows one to aim toward true beliefs and use the “deliberative faculties” (to borrow the term 
from Brink), which Mill (and almost everyone else) believes is valuable, in order to fully utilize 
their liberty.254 So he is showing that speech and a generally permissive attitude toward speech is 
an important interest we have. He is not in fact claiming that it does not in some cases fall within 
the domain of the law, only that it should not be regulated. 
 
5.3.2 The Two Horns of the Argument 
 Mill’s argument for speech has two main points. First, he claims that if we censor speech 
that is true or partially true, we are causing significant harm to those censored as well as society 
generally because getting at the truth is of fundamental importance and is not only a socially 
useful interest that we have but is also a necessary tool to craft our character as “progressive 
beings” (OL I: 11) and to “assert our mental freedom” (OL II: 20).255 The second point is that 
even if speech is false, it is still harmful and wrong to censor because by hearing false views and 
opinions we are able to better understand the truth because we are utilizing and exercising our 
deliberative faculties in order to improve ourselves and make choices that increase our autonomy 
and individuality.256 He claims that “the fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a 
thing when it is no longer doubtful is the cause of half of their errors” (OL II: 30). It is the 
exposure to error that prevents dogma, according to Mill. He states that “we can never be sure 
that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it 
                                                 
254 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 152; Brink, “Millian Principles,” 122–3.  
255 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 152, 154. Brink refers to this as the “truth-tracking defense.” 
256 Ibid., 152. Brink refers to this as the “deliberative rationale.” 
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would be an evil still” (OL II: 2) because 
the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the 
human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from 
the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are 
deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, 
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of 
truth, produced by its collision with error (OL II: 1). 
 
The main point that Mill is making about free speech is that we can never really know if what we 
are doing is silencing the truth or partial truths. And even if we know that the view is false, any 
such silencing is harmful if our goal is to exercise our deliberative faculties in order to get at the 
truth which is essential to enhancing our well-being.  
 
5.3.3 Deliberative Faculties as Progressive Beings 
 Mill’s free speech argument relies on the premise that we are “thinking beings” that seek 
the truth in order to be happy and that such happiness rests on our nature as “progressive beings” 
(OL I: 11). So the interest we have in progressing as thinking beings depends on the exercise of 
what Brink calls our “deliberative capacities, especially our capacities for practical deliberation 
… [which] involves reflective decision-making.”257 This deliberation allows us to choose how 
we will live our lives and what “experiments in living” (OL III: 1) we will adopt, how we will 
utilize our liberties (of not only speech but life plan/individuality and assembly as well), and as 
Mill says “he who chooses his plan for himself employs all of his faculties. … and when he has 
decided, [he uses] firmness and self-control to hold his deliberate decision” (OL III: 4). So, 
again, freedom of speech is an important value because of its indispensability in coming to 
understand the truth and because we need to interact with others in order to fully develop our 
deliberative capacities (OL II: 39) which, in turn, allow us to act in those ways that we believe 
                                                 
257 Brink, “Millian Principles,” 123. 
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are most conducive to our well-being.258  
 
5.3.4 Limits to Speech? 
 Mill goes so far as to claim that his argument in On Liberty shows the “necessity” of the 
freedom of opinion “on the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being 
depends)” (OL II: 40 Emphasis added). If all of our well-being depends on our mental well-being 
(utilizing our deliberative faculties), and truth enhances our mental well-being, then a robust 
freedom of speech does indeed seem essential to our overall well-being. Free speech then, seems 
to be the cornerstone not only of getting to the truth, as Mill argues, but also of self-expression, 
autonomy, and liberty. This focus highlights why censorship is problematic. Though, as Brink 
notes, “Mill’s appeal to deliberative values explains why it is often wrong to censor even false 
beliefs without implying that censorship is always wrong”259 because in some cases, it may be 
that certain sorts of censorship actually do more to promote and enhance deliberative values than 
allowing such speech. Some censorship does so by recognizing that other liberties or rights than 
the liberty of speech may be necessary for the mental well-being of agents (and some liberties 
more so than others).260 For instance, Mill suggests that his argument for speech also applies to 
the liberties of choosing our life plan. The liberty of acting on our choices is an additional way to 
exercise our deliberative faculties because thinking alone does not exercise our progressive 
nature; action and experience are also necessary to exercising our deliberative faculties. Our 
mental and deliberative faculties that are exercised are exercised so that we may act on them and 
express our individuality. So if speech interferes with our ability to put our choices into action, 
                                                 
258 Brink, “Millian Principles,” 125. 
259 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
260 Ibid., 127. 
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there may be a conflict. In which case, restricting the speech may increase our ability to act on 
our liberty to express and seek our life plans which is another essential aspect of exercising our 
nature as progressive beings.261 
 Like Mill, Kent Greenawalt claims that “freedom of thought and expression promote 
individual autonomy.”262 He further argues that even if free speech does not “actually [promote] 
autonomy and rational decision, granting liberty of speech may itself constitute a recognition of 
people, both speakers and listeners, as autonomous and rational. … [and] free speech for all may 
constitute public recognition that people have dignity and are equal.”263 A state that has 
expansive and (nearly) absolute speech rights may seem like a victory for truth, liberty, and 
autonomy as Greenawalt (and Mill) claims; yet, there are some controversial areas of free 
speech, more specifically “hate speech,” that many argue actually cause significant harm to vital 
interests we have (rights) and their arguments highlight instances in which deliberation and the 
utilization of our deliberative faculties are hindered (or even stopped) by certain types of speech 
by others because they prevent us from being able to seek our happiness or well-being as we see 
fit.264  
 
5.4 The Limits of Free Speech 
 I hinted at a potential reason for limited free speech, namely, to enhance our deliberative 
faculties which, in turn, best promote our well-being as progressive beings. This limit may be 
                                                 
261 Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 159–60. 
262 Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996) 5. 
263Ibid., 5 (italics in original). 
264 Mari J. Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story,” (in Michigan Law Review 
vol 87, no 8 (1989): 2320–2381); Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2012); David O. Brink, “Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech.”; David O. Brink, 
Mill’s Progressive Principles. 
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approached when two or more of the liberties Mill argues for come into conflict. However, I 
want to look to Mill to see if and where he would begin to place the limits of speech. I will 
examine areas where Mill seems to suggest a limit. 
 
5.4.1 An Important Distinction: Harm and Offense  
 As noted, some expressions of speech fall within the other-regarding realm but that does 
not necessarily mean that they may be prevented through even the general harm principle 
because they are not harmful. One widely held belief is that when people wish to prevent certain 
sorts of speech through the law, it is because such speech is merely offensive (and the 
assumption is that it is not harmful). This, I believe, is generally a misconception. The speech 
that is generally considered for legislation causes some kind of harm. The issue that such critics 
are alluding to is that certain sorts of speech are known to be offensive but what they fail to 
recognize is that they are also harmful. It is not the offense that is actionable. What is actionable 
about them is the oftentimes-unrecognized harm that they may cause. And if such speech acts are 
not merely offensive, but are also harmful, the question about prevention is really a matter of the 
harm not the offense. This is not to say that there is not speech that is in fact merely offensive 
(though some would argue that offense is at least minimally harmful to our interests265), but that 
when certain speech acts are to be considered for legal prohibition, it must be because the harm 
is such that it is rights-infringing. 
 Part of the reason that people confuse harmful speech with merely offensive speech is 
because of the focus we tend to have on physical harm. This is captured in the popular children’s 
adage, “sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me.” This is, strictly 
                                                 
265 Feinberg suggests this in Social Philosophy and Turner relies on this idea in “Harm and Mill’s Harm Principle.” 
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speaking, false. The focus that we have on harms that are physical ignores a large portion of 
harms, significant harms, which are not necessarily directly harmful to the body. But over time, 
the harms that are caused may be worse than physical harm. It used to be the case that verbal 
abuse was not thought to be a harm at all and especially not one that should be prevented. It even 
seems that Mill does not recognize certain forms of abuse as harmful in this way, in part because 
of the time in which he lived and ideas about mental abuse. Though I believe his empiricism 
would allow him to admit that these sorts of harms are indeed significant and ought to be 
regarded when considering harm. We now recognize the significant harm that verbal abuse can 
cause. If we only focus on those physical threats and ignore the verbal, we are doing not only a 
disservice to those whose rights are significantly impacted, but we are also violating the harm 
principle and doing more harm than good. 
 Another reason that confusion may arise regarding offense is that harm may be defined in 
many ways. One understanding of harm is that harm is any negative consequence that someone 
faces. This broad understanding of harm would also include harm befalling you such as dying a 
natural death, falling and breaking your own arm, getting pricked by a thorn, or being annoyed 
by a flying insect. This is how Piers Norris Turner believes Mill must understand the harm 
principle because, as a utilitarian, Mill ought to focus on harm as any negative consequence.266 
This, however, is not the typical understanding of harm that people use when understanding 
Mill’s principle. And Mill himself makes an effort to separate harm and offense as I noted 
previously.267  
 However, even if offense is considered “harmful” there are two other important 
distinctions to make. The first is that we must have a claim against others not to offend us. Mill 
                                                 
266 Turner, “‘Harm’ and Mill’s Harm Principle,” 300–1. 
267 See my chapter 1, section 2.2 
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does not believe this is the case. Second and relatedly, there is a range of harms from less serious 
to more serious. And Mill would argue that we do not have a significant interest (right) not to be 
offended because it does not have any lasting effects on our ability to lead our lives and we do 
not have a claim on others that they not merely hurt our feelings or shock us. It is also important 
to keep in mind that Mill has a range of methods for interference from less invasive to more 
invasive or less coercive to more coercive, so even if one could argue that we have a right not to 
be offended and that offense is harmful, it would never be the case that mere offense would 
outweigh the value of expressing such views. We can see how the “punishment can fit the crime” 
so to speak, on Mill’s account. Those instances of harm—even to our significant interests—that 
are very minor Mill would argue ought to only be prevented through the extra-legal domain or if 
they should not be covered by extra-legal means, they will be restricted by the individual 
him/herself.  
 Again, it seems however, that Mill would not even class offense as harm. But if we 
understand harm as any negative effect then offense surely fits here. As Feinberg claimed, while 
states of offense are technically also harms (i.e. everyone has an interest in not being offended) it 
seems necessary to treat them as a separate category.268 The reason for this, I believe is that if 
offense could be considered a harm (which I do not think we have any indication that Mill thinks 
it is), it falls toward the lower end of the scale and we do not have a significant interest in not 
being offended so it would not come close to the legal domain. However, the issue that arises is 
that there is a general overlap that occurs between those things that are offensive and those things 
that are harmful. In the case of speech, these two realms frequently overlap and when individuals 
claim that others are reacting to mere offense, it is often the case that the offense is not what 
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people are objecting to but rather they are objecting to the harmful aspect of such offensive (and 
harmful) speech. This seems to frequently be the objection to regulating hate speech. 
 If such speech acts are harmful, then they fall within the domain of the general harm 
principle. Many speech acts that fall within the domain of the general harm principle may be 
legitimately prevented or discouraged through the extra-legal domain and, in fact, in many places 
in chapter II of On Liberty Mill seems to suggest that this is the appropriate domain for 
preventing most of these harms caused by speech. But the question I want to address is, when 
they are harmful and fall within the domain of the general harm principle, when and why can 
such speech acts be classified as rights-infringing harms and fall within the legal domain?  
 
5.4.2 Censorship and Preventing Rights Violations 
 If Mill is serious both about preventing rights violations and enhancing well-being 
through the utilization of our deliberative faculties, then it seems that certain sorts of speech 
should be/may be prevented because they may cause or risk causing rights-infringing harm. As 
indicated above, it is implausible to claim that Mill would allow for absolute rights to speech, 
though it seems in some passages that he calls for exactly this. To revisit and expand on this 
problem, he notably claims  
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the 
inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most 
comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion 
and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or 
theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall 
under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an 
individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance 
as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is 
practically inseparable from it” (I: 12 Emphasis added).  
 
This passage suggests that at least the liberty of thought is absolute. That we may not be 
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restricted in our opinions whatsoever. This, perhaps is not very controversial—we can indeed 
think whatever we want to think without much interference from others. But he links expression 
and publication to this absolute right because it is almost as important and is practically 
inseparable from it. The right to expression, though crosses into the other-regarding realm and 
has the potential to cause rights-infringing harm as a result. He then states that  
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan 
of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such 
consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so 
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our 
conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, 
follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; 
freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others (OL I: 12). 
 
These other liberties, of framing our life to suit our needs (autonomy) and liberty of assembly, 
are also listed alongside the liberty of speech. He does not suggest that they are any less 
significant than that of speech and actually claims that the argument for speech that he presents 
in chapter II of On Liberty may be applied in a similar manner to these other liberties. These are 
very strong claims.  
 Mill also boldly claims that  
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, 
whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which 
they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the 
name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not 
attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the 
proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. 
Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to 
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest (OL I: 13 
Emphasis added). 
 
Much of On Liberty chapter II reflects this apparently absolutist sentiment. And Chapter III of 
On Liberty, which discusses the liberty to choose how one shall live one’s life is similarly robust. 
 Importantly though, he notes throughout On Liberty and in the passage above that any 
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liberty right may be restricted if it causes or threatens harm to the significant interests (rights) of 
others. Mill, it seems, would allow us to legally prevent speech that is designed to “deprive 
others of [the pursuit of their own good], or impede their efforts to obtain it” (OL I: 12), that 
impede their efforts to live their life as they see fit (as progressive beings utilizing their 
deliberative faculties), or that prevent them from exercising their liberties (so long as they do not 
interfere with the liberty of others). This suggests that he recognizes the liberties of speech and 
of life pursuits may, at times, conflict. But because he frames the argument in terms of speech, it 
seems that he sets strict limitations on its interference that does not apply to the other liberties.  
 This interpretation would be a mistake because he claims that he is going to defend the 
idea that all the liberties he enumerates ought to be as robust as possible and  
It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the 
general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it, 
on which the principle here stated is … recognised by the current opinions. This 
one branch is the Liberty of Thought: from which it is impossible to separate the 
cognate liberty of speaking and of writing. Although these liberties, to some 
considerable amount, form part of the political morality of all countries … the 
grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they rest, are perhaps not so 
familiar … Those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much wider 
application than to only one division of the subject, and a thorough consideration 
of this part of the question will be found the best introduction to the remainder 
(OL I: 16 Emphasis added). 
 
So, while he provides a strong defense of speech, the argument is meant to apply to all three 
areas of liberty. Because this is sometimes overlooked, his argument in favor of free speech has 
been used to defend certain types of speech that, I would say, Mill should want to prohibit either 
because they interfere with one of the other liberties or else they have the effect of reducing our 
deliberative faculties. This is to say, that while Mill provides a very strong defense of free 
speech, he recognizes its limits as well. To this end, Mill rather boldly overstates his position and 
later suggests when we may in fact limit speech. 
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5.4.3 Incitement and the Corn Dealer Example 
 After his strong defense of the (absolute?) liberty of speech and expression in chapter II, 
Mill himself provides what he sees as a reasonable limit to free speech when he says 
let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be 
free to act upon their opinions—to carry these out in their lives, without 
hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their 
own risk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one pretends 
that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose 
their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as 
to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act (OL 
III: 1 Emphasis added). 
 
Here he is making a distinction between freedom of opinion and freedom of expressing that 
opinion through acts which increase the risk of others’ rights being infringed or violated. He is 
obviously setting at least one limit on the expression of free speech, so it is not absolute.  
 The example that Mill uses to highlight when “even opinions lose their immunity” is the 
corn dealer example where “the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to 
constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act” (OL III: 1 Emphasis 
added). Mill claims 
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is 
robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but 
may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled 
before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in 
the form of a placard. Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do 
harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, 
controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active 
interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he 
must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from 
molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own 
inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons 
which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, 
without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost (OL III: 1). 
 
In this example he is making a distinction between the harmless expression of an opinion and the 
expression of an opinion that causes what has been called an immediate breach of the peace or 
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imminent harm/violence/lawlessness.269 At first glance it may appear that he is comparing verbal 
speech and published speech, but this is not the case because while he allows that the (written) 
opinion can be “simply circulated through the press,” the (written) opinion cannot be “handed 
about among the same mob in the form of a placard” and the verbal opinion is equally 
problematic in this case.  
 Speech that leads to an instigation of some physically harmful act, then, may be 
prevented because he believes we have a significant interest in not being physically harmed. 
Here he does not yet say how it may be prevented but if we read this as instigating an act of 
violence against another then it would be an instance of rights-infringing harm or a harm to the 
safety and security of others, because it “unjustifiably” (to use Mill’s term) increases the risk of 
rights-infringing harm. This type of act is commonly called “incitement” and is generally 
admitted as providing legitimate grounds for discussing legal interference.270 However, his claim 
(OL III:1) seems to be much more general than discussing only physical harm as he claims “a 
positive instigation to some mischievous act” is enough.  
 What Mill seems to be doing here is looking to the situational context to determine the 
permissibility of the act and whether it is competing with other rights that we have. When an 
opinion is stated in a paper or other publication, Mill seems to suggest the risk of rights-
infringing harm to another is low and perhaps there is not a duty that we have to refrain from 
expressing the opinion, we only have a duty not to express an opinion in a situation that is likely 
to cause rights-infringing harm. The expression of the opinion itself is a criticism of the way in 
which corn dealers conduct their business/participate in their occupation. On the other hand, if an 
                                                 
269 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), https: //www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/315/568; Brandenburg v. 
Ohio (1969), http: //caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/395/444.html 
270 Again, it puts it in the domain but may not justify actual interference. Though in most cases where it leads to an 
act of violence, it is seen as justifiably prevented. 
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angry group of people are exposed to the same speech expression and are likely to hear it as 
encouragement to a rights-infringing act, Mill allows that this is at least one case in which it may 
be prevented or punished. And it may be prevented because it unjustifiably causes or risks a 
rights-infringing harm. Mill claims that when a person performs something that is generally in 
the self-regarding realm in such a way that it crosses over into the other-regarding realm in 
which we have duties to others, then “whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite 
risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of 
liberty, and placed in that of morality or law (OL IV: 10).” If it risks damage to a significant 
interest we have—“if any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a primâ facie case for 
punishing him by law” (OL I: 11)—then it is a rights-infringing harm and is placed in the 
domain of the law. 
 
5.4.4 Incitement and Clear and Present Danger  
 As Brink notes, Mill seems to hold something like the “clear and present danger” test 
represented in the now famous example of falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre. This act 
and those like them are seen to be not merely harmful but a rights-infringing harm because it is 
likely to cause a panic (in the case of shouting “Fire!”) or violent action (in the corn dealer case) 
which would, in turn, risk wrongful and unjustifiable harm to those present which could violate 
their rights.271 This “clear and present danger” test was suggested by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in 1919. Holmes states that  
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from 
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force [as in the 
                                                 
271 In these cases they would violate our rights because we have claims against others to not physically hurt us 
unjustifiably because we have a significant interest in not being assaulted. When they do this without just cause, 
then we think it is wrong and they deserve punishment. 
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corn dealer case]. …The question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that … [the law] has 
a right to prevent.272  
 
The substantive evils that are rightfully prevented by government, Mill argues, would include 
causing wrongful acts of aggression (U V: 32)—it does not seem to matter whether the speaker is 
the one who does the actual assault, only that the speech is such that it caused the violation by 
the other—and the speech in this case does just that. It is wrongful in that it is knowingly false 
and done in a situation that is likely to escalate and an aggression in that it is inciting violence 
which is harmful to our interest in not being accosted. Because of the high risk of danger in the 
“Fire!” and corn dealer cases, most people correctly assess that such speech infringes the right to 
safety and security that individuals have because it is unjustly creating a dangerous situation.  
 This assessment is also supported by the criteria that Mill set out when discussing 
tyrannicide.273 Mill claims in this case that advocating for tyrannicide is not enough. But rather, 
“the instigation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject of punishment, but only if an 
overt act has followed, and at least a probable connexion can be established between the act and 
the instigation” (OL II: 1 FN1). This “probable connexion” is looking for the causal relationship 
between the two. If the act could be said to cause it or likely cause it (be probable) then it may be 
prevented. So is seems that Mill allows for restrictions in cases in which there is a likelihood of 
the event causing the rights-infringing harm. Feinberg describes it by claiming that the act in 
question “must have been a genuine causal factor (condition, element) in the production of the 
harm, and it must be an especially substantial (important, direct, crucial) causal contributor.”274 
 So, speech that is dangerous—read likely to cause harm to personal security (in this case 
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bodily) which is a significant interest of individuals—may not be protected. In this case, the 
context and circumstances in which the speech is uttered becomes important. Additionally, I 
think that the context is important because in many cases they are uttered in situations which 
result in our deliberative faculties being overridden. In other words, such speech acts actually 
prevent us from deliberating and force us to react without thinking. They are relying on fear, 
intimidation, and threat, all of which impede our deliberative abilities. 
 If the situation in which the speech act is uttered unjustifiably increases the risk or causes 
rights-infringing harm, it is within the domain of the law. The central idea is that the crime 
would not have occurred or is less likely to have occurred if not for the encouragement. And in 
this case Mill would judge that it falls within the domain of the law and likely that such 
legislation is acceptable. This latter determination is exceeding the legal harm principle’s domain 
question and is entering the determinations required by the balancing principle. If we are 
comparing the right to the liberty of expression of speech and a right to be free from violence 
(which would be a result of both our liberty right of life pursuits and our claim right of security 
and safety), Mill weighs our interest in avoiding harm as higher than the harm to our speech 
liberty.  
 However, according to Mill, this balancing test does not weigh in favor of restriction 
when an individual writes an opinion piece in a newspaper that merely argues that, for instance 
“corn dealers are starvers of the poor.” In the one case the context of the incident results in a 
harm that is a direct result of the opinion. In the latter the expression of opinion is worth more on 
balance than whatever harm may befall the corn dealers if this opinion is circulated in the papers 
(and I would assume did not cause another to assault the corn dealers as a direct result). This 
conclusion, I think is in part based on the idea that circulating the idea in the papers has a 
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tendency not to negate but engage our deliberative faculties.  
 I want to revisit my parenthetical assumption. This situation—where the opinion 
circulated directly led to some individual attacking the corn dealer—is interesting because if Mill 
would argue that such an opinion could be circulated in the paper even when it would directly 
cause another to violate the rights of the corn dealers, then it seems the difference may be how 
such speech would contribute to our ability to rely on our deliberative faculties or not. Perhaps 
the distinction is that in the incitement case our deliberative faculties are interfered with and 
overridden and so the cause of the harm is a direct result of the shouting “Fire!” or exclaiming 
that corn dealers starve the poor when we are already impaired, it is perhaps equivalent to a 
mental attack or “psychic assault.”275 When such an opinion is circulated in the press on the 
other hand, our deliberative faculties are more likely to be engaged rather than overridden. This 
may also explain why we may think that the latter case, if it did result in harm to the corn dealer, 
say, the author would not be found at fault because rather than contributing to a rights violation, 
they would, on the whole, be doing us a favor by aiding us in getting to the truth. If this is an 
accurate account of what Mill would say, then would this analysis also hold for something like 
hate speech? 
                                                 
275 Greenawalt, Fighting Words, 49. Greenawalt uses the term “psychic assault” and I think it is a good description 
of what occurs, though in the context he is using it he claims it is does “not differ much from physical assaults, like 
slaps or pinches, that cause no serious physical pain.” I think that some psychic assaults may be this minor but in 







 In the previous chapter I showed that, in principle, Mill allows limitations on at least one 
kind of speech—incitement or speech that risks or causes violence to occur (whether the speaker 
is the one who performs the violent act or another does). I think that he would allow such 
limitation not only through the extra-legal domain, but would also allow for such speech to be 
considered for regulation through the legal domain because it can cause or risk causing a rights-
infringing harm. And in some cases, for instance the corn dealer incitement case, Mill would 
likely claim that legislation should be enacted because the liberty right of speech is outweighed 
by our claim right of protection from physical assault (right to safety and security, right not to be 
wrongly assaulted, liberty of personal choice) when he applies his balancing principle and thus a 
rights violation would occur.276 My next goal is to determine whether there is a right that could 
be infringed that would place so-called “hate speech” in the domain of the legal harm principle 
and eligible to be considered for legislation. 
 In this chapter I will first briefly outline types of speech expression that fall within the 
category of speech before giving a definition and general description of hate speech. I will then 
turn to Jeremy Waldron and Mari J. Matsuda’s attempts to narrow the definition of legislatable 
hate speech and show that such hate speech risks or causes infringement of rights to dignity, 
safety, and equality. Using Waldron and Matsuda’s analysis, and considering Brink’s suggestion 
                                                 
276 Mill does not separate the domain and the justification questions so he addresses both simultaneously. He 
discusses the domain and justification questions together, which often causes them to bleed together. In this case he 
judges that these acts would be not only rights-infringing harm, which puts it into the domain of the law, but would 
be an actual rights violation once weighed against other balancing considerations—it is justified by the balancing 
principle as well. 
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that Mill’s goal is to first and foremost enhance and utilize deliberative faculties, I will look to 
what Mill says about equality, dignity, and safety in Utilitarianism chapter V to see if he could 
make the claim that hate speech causes rights-infringing harm and falls within the domain of the 
legal harm principle. I will then attempt to gauge how Mill would apply the balancing principle. 
 
6.2 What Constitutes Speech? 
6.2.1 Opinion and Verbal Utterances 
 Liberty of opinion/thought is that which is most free. These are personal thoughts, ideas, 
views, and/or beliefs. These are purely within the self-regarding realm. Liberty of expressing that 
opinion falls within the other-regarding realm but, as Mill argues, expression of opinion is almost 
as important as merely having opinion that the same reasons in favor of freedom of opinion hold 
for expression. Some expressions of speech clearly fall within the (primarily) self-regarding 
realm which may not be violated, and others that fall within the other-regarding realm such as 
expressing the opinion that “caramel apples with nuts are the best desserts” or “School should be 
held year-round” do not really interfere with the significant and socially useful interests of others 
and thus, really ought to be considered as part of the self-regarding realm. In other words, those 
expressing opinions that do not have any negative impact on the significant interests of others 
and thus cause them no harm cannot be prevented or infringed by any means—legal or extra-
legal.277 Arguably, the majority of speech acts fit within this category. When we hear the term 
‘freedom of speech’ we often only think of verbal utterances. But such freedom of expressing 
opinion in the form of private conversations and the consensual freedom to unite to express such 
opinions are not necessarily what is problematic and are generally protected under the same 
                                                 
277 This does not mean that people cannot express their disapproval or attempt to persuade. These types of 
interference are legitimate and may be characterized as “inducements.” See chapter 2.4.1. 
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argument Mill provides in chapter II of On Liberty. 
 Some categories of verbal utterances, though, clearly fall within the other-regarding 
realm, are harmful, and are not protected. For example, incitement, threat, and harassment 
increase the likelihood of danger to safety and security or other rights and thus constitute rights-
infringing harm and are generally regarded as being acceptably prevented through the legal harm 
principle. When Mill is discussing fair competitions, such as two people competing for the same 
job, he claims these sorts of speech acts are illegitimate. He says that the only reason for 
interference in the case of legitimate competitions is when “means of success have been 
employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit—namely, fraud or treachery, and 
force” (OL V: 3). So, Mill allows for interference in activities that employ fraud, treachery, and 
force. Force need not be physical. Threats are a way of forcing which Mill would find 
illegitimate. 
 In all of these cases, it seems that Mill would allow for interference because they all 
involve methods of interfering with deliberative capacities which are necessary for improvement 
as a progressive being. Merely saying something false (in good faith) or providing a bad 
argument is not generally meant to interfere with deliberative capacities but to commit fraud or 
treachery is to undermine our deliberation and decision-making which makes it more likely that 
we would act in manners that we do not truly choose.278 It is directing it at specific agents or 
groups in a way that attempts to interfere with our rights to personal choice. Similarly, force is a 
way to prevent actors from doing what they legitimately want to do by forcing a choice that is 
                                                 
278 One of the considerations that Mill takes into account when using the balancing principle of maxim 2 is intention. 
In many cases someone’s intentions impact whether the act ought to be restricted or not. This is not the focus here 
but I will touch on intention in section 6.6 when discussing the balancing principle. However, there is a difference in 
considering the domain question and the balancing principle. The domain question only worries about the tendency 
or likelihood or risk of harm that an action may produce. It is only in the balancing principle that questions of 
intention come in. 
189 
 
not freely made. In cases where one’s deliberative capacities are purposely undermined by 
another, Mill would allow for interference to prevent such illegitimate means of interference. 
 Remember any harm to a right279 puts the action within the domain of the law and Mill 
claims that our right to safety and security is one of the most vital interests we have. The 
increased danger in these situations places them in the legal domain for discussion of legislation. 
Mill acknowledges this limitation when he claims that opinions can lose their protected status 
when without justifiable cause they are used to cause harm to others (OL III: 1). 
 
6.2.2 Publishing Opinions 
 Speech encompasses much more than merely verbal utterances and “calling something 
speech is perfectly compatible with also calling it an action that may be harmful in itself or that 
may have harmful consequences.”280 Waldron notes that this dual understanding of speech 
introduces complications in addressing speech regulations. He claims that “if we say we are 
interested in restrictions on … speech, we convey the idea that the state is proposing to interfere 
with the spoken word, with conversation, and perhaps with vocabulary (interference that will 
result in our use of epithets being controlled by political correctness).”281 But while restrictions 
on this sort of speech may be called for (and some is legitimately regulated, such as those that 
violate the clear and present danger test and those that incite violence282), there are other 
categories of speech acts that are frequently of concern. 
 There are acts, such as publication and display of language, that are also considered to be 
speech and fall within the other-regarding realm. Many of these sorts of speech, though, Mill 
                                                 
279 Reminder that I do not mean harm to the right itself but harm to the individual that implicates his/her rights. 
280 Waldron, Hate Speech, 38. 
281 Ibid., 37. 
282 See Chapter 5.4.4. 
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thinks ought to be left as free as possible because of the benefits of them. But it is these other 
sorts of “speech” or expression that may interfere in the rights of others or cause rights-
infringing harm in ways that verbal speech does not. 
 These are what Mill calls the “liberty of expressing and publishing opinions” that may 
encroach upon rights or harm others more so than the spoken word. Things such as publications, 
public speeches, billboards or placards, among others, represent this sort of speech and amount 
to “published” word and are thought to be a more “fixed” expression of speech and this fixity 
may increase the likelihood of harm in ways that verbal speech in the moment cannot. Waldron 
includes in this category those that are “printed, published, pasted up, or posted on the internet—
expressions that become a permanent or semi-permanent part of the visible environment in 
which our lives … have to be lived.”283 But, of course, not all or even most of these kinds of 
speech are eligible for restriction. Though, as I will discuss below, Waldron believes these types 
of speech when directed as hate speech toward certain groups may constitute one of the more 
harmful sorts of speech (other than those that are generally accepted and protected through the 
law). 
 
6.2.3 Non-Verbal Speech and Expression of Opinion 
 In addition to expressing and publishing opinions, there are other things that have been 
categorized as “speech acts” that express opinion without any kind of actual speech or language 
use at all. Examples of this category are the use of certain symbols, flags, images, and other 
regalia that are known to represent an idea, view, or historical moment. This category represents 
“signs … that have no meaning on their own, but that convey a powerful message to both user 
                                                 
283 Waldron, Hate Speech, 37. 
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and the recipient of the sign in context. Here we must look to the history of these signs to 
understand what they mean.”284 
 For instance, the swastika, Nazi flag, or Nazi uniform in many contexts represents 
support for, acceptance of, or endorsement of the views of Nazi Germany during its historical 
period.285 Though, of course a Buddhist’s or a Hindu’s use of the swastika has a very different 
meaning and would not indicate support of Nazi Germany. Similarly, a flag in a museum would 
not necessarily be endorsing a position and may be attempting to educate about a historical event 
rather than take a position in favor of it. Other examples of not-necessarily-verbal or non-verbal 
speech acts would be cross-burning, marching, voting, or a variety of forms of protesting. Some 
of the acts or use of these non-verbal speech acts are often seen as harmful in the same way that 
other forms of speech are harmful and thus, eligible for legislation (as Matsuda and Waldron 
argue). 
 
6.3 Defining Hate Speech 
6.3.1 A General Understanding of Hate Speech 
 Hate speech is most commonly understood to be a form of “targeted vilification” and 
may amount to “extremely harsh personal insults and epithets directed against one’s race, 
religion, ethnic origin, gender, or sexual preference [/orientation].”286 In all of these cases 
(except religion287) these are things that individuals in the groups have no choice over288 and 
                                                 
284 Matsuda, “Public Response,” 2365–6. 
285 Ibid., 2365. 
286 Greenawalt, Fighting Words, 47. 
287 Which has its own, I think, separate reasons for being included here. It is included in part because of a historical 
development that brought about its necessity (i.e. people were being killed for believing and acting on those beliefs 
despite the fact that they do not cause harm to others). 
288 Some may argue that sexual preference is a choice, though it is not in my opinion. In which case, similar reasons 
for including religion in this group apply for sexual preference—acting on one’s sexual preferences or even just 
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targeting people as members of the group is not the same as attacking beliefs of people, which it 
seems, Mill would generally consider to be protected because of the deliberative value that we 
get from comparing a variety of opinions.289 Greenawalt notes that hate speech also “aims to 
make the other feel degraded and hated, and [the speaker] chooses words to achieve that 
effect.”290 
 Waldron notes that the term ‘hate speech’ is problematic because it is ambiguous and 
unclear in part because of the term ‘hate’ and in part because of ‘speech.’ A focus on ‘hate,’ he 
argues, is distracting to the point that is being made about the legitimacy of legislation on this 
kind of speech. A general restriction of all speech that is hateful—expressive of hate—is not 
what is being called for. Hate speech, unlike hate crimes, need not focus on the motivations of 
the individual expressing them and indeed the term “makes it sound as though their primary 
function is expressive.”291 Hate speech legislation is not necessarily concerned with the 
emotions, passions, attitudes, or thoughts of the individuals expressing such speech, but rather on 
the effects and the results of the speech. As Waldron notes, “in most hate speech legislation, 
hatred is relevant not as the motivation of certain acts, but as a possible effect of certain forms of 
speech. … the element of ‘hatred’ [is] relevant as an aim or purpose, something that people are 
trying to bring about or incite.”292 As such, hatred is still misleading because an emphasis on 
hate ignores what hate speech legislation is really aiming at, namely protecting groups from 
                                                 
having sexual preferences do not harm others (unless it is without their consent, then it does and would not be 
protected). 
289 Attacking the beliefs of a religion is acceptable and does not constitute hate speech. Attacking or vilifying the 
people because they belong to the group is constitutive of hate speech. Similarly, attacking the beliefs of the 
members of the group is not hate speech but legitimately protected speech. 
290 Greenawalt, Fighting Words, 49. 
291 Waldron, Harm in Hate Speech, 2. 
292 Ibid., 35. 
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harm. Matsuda calls for the same thing—“the focus on effects.”293 
 So, it seems that an essential feature of hate speech involves an aim or goal to target an 
ascriptive group of people in order to intentionally or recklessly incite hatred of that group.294 
And while one may be able to argue that the users of hate speech are expressing opinion, most of 
the speech is targeted and has an additional purpose—namely, bringing about a specific negative 
consequence as a result of the speech. The harmful consequences of these encounters are various 
and the effects, such as “emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral,” are similar to those experienced 
by victims of sexual abuse and violence.295 The indirect effects are also significant and include 
the changes to the social and systemic environment such as heightened discrimination and 
inequality against target groups as well as an increase in violence against them. As their goal, 
people who use hate speech seek a “subtle and pervasive attitudinal change”296 in the general 
public which contributes to the inequality experienced by the victims of such speech. Greenawalt 
notes that “in what they accomplish, insults of this sort are a form of psychic assault; they do not 
differ much from physical assaults, like slaps or pinches, that cause no serious physical pain.”297 
While I think Greenawalt’s analysis that the psychic assault is akin to physical assault is correct, 
I disagree that the psychic assault is always as minor as he suggests and there is a broad range of 
hate speech that may indeed enter a more serious realm of psychic assault that would amount to 
the equivalent of serious physical pain (for instance certain sorts of abuse of this nature may lead 
to a mental breakdown). 
                                                 
293 Matsuda, “Public Responses,” 2325. The focus on the effects or “what it does” is also the focus of Catherine 
McKinnon’s argument against pornography in Only Words, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
294 Ascriptive groups are groups that are assigned based on something other than achievement. So race, gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, etc. are not achievement based categories and are thus ascriptive. See 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/ascriptive and http://www.yourdictionary.com/ascriptive as 
well as Waldron, Hate Speech, 5. 
295 Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene, 160. 
296 Ibid., 161. 
297 Greenawalt, Fighting Words, 49. 
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 There are cases in which psychological trauma, post-traumatic stress, or verbal abuse lead 
to extreme mental harm. There are cases of bullying in which children who are constantly told 
that they are worthless or that they ought to kill themselves, do just that. There are also cases in 
which an individual may be constantly told that people in group X are worthless, animals, 
rapists, murderers, child molesters, etc. and the individual belongs to that group and internalizes 
the message. Some parents who are religious conservatives with gay children often inflict this 
sort of psychic harm when they tell the children that they are unworthy, that they are going to 
hell, that they are damaged in some way, or sending them to gay conversion therapy. There are 
cases in which posters and placards are posted that denigrate groups and individuals or that make 
claims that make their lives and safety feel threatened.  
 The Skokie case in 1977 is an example of such extreme psychic assault. In this case the 
American Nazi Party attempted to march through a predominantly Jewish neighborhood in 
Skokie, Illinois. It “was a rare pure case of symbolic conduct” being used to express race 
hatred.298 The use of “speech” in this case was intended to terrorize, threaten, or intimidate—
undermine deliberative capacities—and whether it was meant to express a legitimate political 
position would not undo the harm. As Feinberg notes in his assessment of the case,  
their avowed purpose was to march in the Village parks without giving speeches 
and without distributing literature, but dressed in authentic stormtroopers’ 
uniforms, wearing swastikas, and carrying taunting signs. Free expression of 
opinion, a preemptive constitutional value, was not obviously involved. … [the 
predominantly Jewish] village was to be a scene of a celebration of Hitler’s 
birthday by jackbooted youths in the same Nazi uniforms. The American Nazis 
had deliberately sought them out; their ‘message’ was not primarily for non-
Jews.299 
 
                                                 
298 Feinberg, Offense to Others, 86. While it may not be as “rare” anymore, most instances of such speech acts are 





In this case, they were relying on non-verbal speech to support a particular historical position, 
which was that of the Nazis who killed those of Jewish descent. While they may be expressing a 
political view, calling for the death of a group of people and attempting to represent the horrors 
of the Holocaust is a psychic assault. As one Skokie resident recalled 
To traumatized survivors [of the Holocaust who lived] in Skokie, this was not the 
First Amendment debate that would be litigated all the way up to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. To them, the issue was much simpler than that: The Nazis were 
back and promising to continue their quest. 
 As then-village counsel Harvey Schwartz [said] … ‘When someone wants 
to come marching into your town, with the announced intention to kill you, there 
was hardly anything left to discuss.’300 
 
 As Greenawalt notes, these sorts of speech “pose a serious problem for democratic theory 
and practice. Should such comments be forbidden because they lead to violence, because they 
hurt, or because they contribute to domination and hostility? Or should they be part of a person’s 
freedom to speak his or her mind? Any liberal democracy faces this dilemma.”301 
 
6.3.2 Narrowing the Focus and Definition of Hate Speech: Publication 
 In order to target the most serious kinds of hate speech that produce the most harm—and 
that may be thought to be protected by arguments that limit the infringement of free speech—
Waldron proposes to limit his discussion (and discussions over the legislation) of “hate speech” 
to “publications which express profound disrespect, hatred, and vilification for the members of 
minority groups.”302 This limitation does two things. First it focuses on publications and the 
printed word (and other non-verbal expressive symbols). He does this because these are a more 
permanent expression that tend to maximize exposure in order to reach a wider audience which 
                                                 
300 Howard Reich, “Reawakening the Ghosts of Skokie,” (Chicago Tribune, January 16, 2013) http: 
//www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/movies/chi-perspec-skokie-movie-20130116-column.html.  
301 Greenawalt, Fighting Words, 47. 
302 Jeremy Waldron, Hate Speech, 27. 
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may, in turn, produce more harm. He includes many things under publication, as noted above, 
such as those that are “printed, published, pasted up, or posted on the internet—expressions that 
become a permanent or semi-permanent part of the visible environment in which our lives … 
have to be lived.”303 These would also include non-verbal symbols such as flags that are 
connected to a specific meaning. Matsuda suggests that “formal criminal and administrative 
sanction—public as opposed to private prosecution—is also an appropriate response to racist 
[and other forms of hate] speech.”304  
 I think that a strong case can be made that Mill may accept limitations to hate speech 
publication that Matsuda and Waldron propose based on Mill’s objection to the public display of 
certain things that are in themselves harmless when done privately—though I am not arguing that 
hate speech is in itself harmless. He claims that  
 Again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents 
themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a 
violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences 
against others, may rightfully be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against 
decency; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only 
connected indirectly with our subject, the objection to publicity being equally 
strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed 
to be so (OL V: 7 Emphasis added). 
 
So Waldron’s argument that narrows the sort of prohibitable hate speech to public displays 
seems to be in line with Mill’s assessment especially if we consider that Mill here is allowing 
things that are entirely within the self-regarding realm to be covered through the law and hate 
speech publication is not entirely within the self-regarding realm but rather is in the other-
regarding realm. He uses the example of decency but one could argue that the harm that is 
caused by hate speech propaganda is much more harmful than issues of indecency and Mill also 
                                                 
303 Waldron, Hate Speech, 37. 
304 Matsuda, “Public Response,” 2321. 
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argues that this objection applies to many things that he does not explicitly mention.305 
Furthermore, Mill’s argument in favor of restricting incitement shows this same sentiment, that 
stating an opinion and stating an opinion publicly in certain contexts changes the permissibility 
or at least the domain in which it may fall. 
 
6.3.3 Narrowing the Focus and Definition of Hate Speech: Historically Oppressed Groups 
 The second way this definition narrows the scope of hate speech is by singling out speech 
directed toward minority groups. This seems to be based on a distinction Matsuda (and others306) 
make between the harm that dominant groups experience when confronted with hate speech 
versus the harm that the dominated groups experience. Matsuda refers to these groups as 
“historically oppressed groups” who have been neglected members of the state.307 This limitation 
in scope to focus on the harm that occurs to historically oppressed groups seems to be a common 
contemporary strategy when analyzing hate speech and fits with Mill’s focus on the situational 
context to determine when speech crosses the threshold of limitation and may be prohibited. The 
historical situation contributes to the sort of harm that is perpetuated and done to the victims of 
hate speech. 
 Like Waldron’s narrow definition, Matsuda’s suggested definition of hate speech eligible 
for legislative interference focuses very narrowly on a subset of such speech. While Matsuda 
focuses on racist speech308 and defines the sort of speech that she believes should (I would say 
                                                 
305 I am not entirely sure that Mill’s argument here would stand in the case of indecency (see Feinberg’s Bus 
examples in Offense to Others), but I do think it would hold for hate speech propaganda. In the case of indecency, it 
is not entirely clear what harm is being done. Though I suppose that Catherine McKinnon in Only Words may argue 
that in some cases of indecency women are harmed. Though I am not committed to this view. 
306 For instance, Catherine McKinnon, Only Words. 
307 Matsuda, “Public Response,” 2357–8. 
308 By racist speech Matsuda means “the ideology of racial supremacy and the mechanisms for keeping selected 
victim groups in subordinated positions. The implements of racism include:  
 1. Violence and genocide;  
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‘may’) legitimately be restricted in such a light, I believe that these restrictions would also stand 
for any member of a historically oppressed group or those toward whom domination or 
subjugation was common, such as those in the LGBT+ community, women, and members of 
religious groups. She claims that  
In order to distinguish the worst, paradigm example of … hate messages from 
other forms of … speech, three identifying characteristics are suggested here:  
 1. The message is of … inferiority;309  
 2. The message is directed against a historically oppressed group; and 
 3. The message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading. 
Making each element a prerequisite to prosecution prevents opening of the 
dreaded floodgates of censorship.310 
 
These three requirements for limiting certain kinds of speech prevent some of the more insidious 
and harmful types of speech while still allowing for a robust commitment to free speech. What 
both Matsuda and Waldron are doing is focusing on the most extreme cases in order to highlight 
the limits of speech expression that Mill suggests. I will refer to this as “displays of extreme hate 
speech.” 
 
6.3.4 The Effects of Hate Speech  
 These focused definitions of hate speech are not without their critics. For instance, 
Greenawalt claims  
Professor Matsuda actually includes as part of the definition of racist speech that 
it be directed against a historically oppressed group. Whatever virtue that 
approach may have for legal categorization, common usage, which I follow, 
assumes that blacks may make racist remarks about whites and that women may 
                                                 
 2. Racial hate messages, disparagement, and threats;  
 3. Overt disparate treatment; and  
 4. Covert disparate treatment and sanitized racist comments.  
In addition to physical violence, there is the violence of the word. Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and 
disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group” (Matsuda, 2332). 
I think that hate speech for any oppressed group must fit these requirements as well. 
309 She uses racial here but I would argue that gender, religious affiliation, sexual preference, among others also fit 
within this context. 
310 Matsuda, “Public Response,” 2357–8. 
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make sexist remarks against men. Given the heavy condemnatory tones of the 
words ‘racist’ and ‘sexist’ in our culture, it strikes me as unfair to stipulate by 
definition that racism and sexism are a ‘one-way street.’ The argument over what 
the law should do should be carried on in terms different from a one-way 
definition of racism.311 
 
However, I believe that Matsuda’s and Waldron’s definition of hate speech gets closer to the 
issue than the overly general categories Greenawalt and other legal scholars discuss precisely 
because it is an attempt to aid in “legal categorization.” Part of the limitations of some legal 
scholars, Greenawalt included, is first amendment jurisprudential considerations. However, these 
are not necessarily relevant to this discussion because we need not be bound by what the U. S. 
courts can and cannot allow. What I am concerned with is applying the legal harm principle to 
prevent acts of harm that infringe on rights that we have. If the actual criterion for speech to be 
regulated through the law is a rights-infringing harm, then it may be the case that the “common” 
understanding of racism is not what we are addressing.  
 That a black person can make a racist remark against a white person, for instance, does 
not fulfill the requirement for legislation because there is not the same kind of a threat to the 
safety and security of the white person. Matsuda acknowledges this common criticism to her 
view claiming  
Expressions of hatred, revulsion, and anger directed against dominant-group 
members by subordinated-group members are not criminalized by the definition 
of racist hate messages used here. Malcolm X’s “white devil” statements—which 
he later retracted—are an example. Some would find this troublesome, arguing 
that any attack on any person’s ethnicity is harmful. The harm and hurt is there, 
but it is of a different degree. Because the attack is not tied to the perpetuation of 
racist vertical relationships, it is not the paradigm worst example of hate 
propaganda. The dominant-group member hurt by conflict with the angry 
nationalist is more likely to have access to a safe harbor of exclusive dominant-
group interactions. Retreat and reaffirmation of personhood are more easily 
attained for historically non-subjugated-group members.312 
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312 Matsuda, “Public Response,” 2361. 
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Importantly, though, neither Waldron nor Matsuda actually claim that the oppressed groups 
cannot be racist or sexist or that their working definitions are the common definitions of racism 
or hate speech. What they claim is that any regulation that focuses on harm needs to recognize 
the disparity between the harm that occurs for the dominant groups versus the oppressed groups, 
the latter being the more serious and lasting sort of infringement because of the cultural context 
in which it exists. In part, what they are arguing is that hate speech regulation may fail so often 
to be implemented precisely because the general open definition includes too much, which, on 
balance would not be prohibitable—yes, there is harm, but it is relatively minor and on balance 
would not be serious enough to consider for regulations.  
 Certain dominant groups that fall within the general definition of such speech are not 
(usually) significantly harmed by the sorts of speech that “expresses profound disrespect, hatred 
and vilification” or that “attacks, threatens, or insults”313 because they are members of a 
privileged group and the speech does not have the same psychological and tangible effects. They 
are better able to escape the consequences or effects of the speech precisely because they have a 
safe place to return to that oppressed groups do not. Interestingly, Greenawalt makes note of this 
very point when he claims “Differences in harm may concern kind as well as amount. Epithets 
used against minority members of oppressed groups may reinforce feelings of inferiority and fear 
of violence in a way not characteristic of epithets used against groups that have been dominant 
historically.”314 Additionally, he states that “those who are in a secure and favored status can 
accept denigrating terms that apply to their privileged position with less distress that can those 
who know the terms reflect a wide dislike of their group.”315 
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 An overly general account of hate speech legislation fails to take into account the real 
differences that exist between groups and that disadvantaged groups are affected and harmed by 
speech that advantaged groups are not. There is real and tangible harm that occurs to victims of 
racist (and other similar forms of) speech that the law has a tendency to ignore or underestimate. 
Matsuda claims that  
The kinds of injuries and harms historically left to private individuals to absorb 
and resist through private means is no accident. The places where the law does 
not go to redress harm have tended to be the places where women, children, 
people of color, and poor people live. This absence of law is itself another story 
with a message, perhaps unintended, about the relative value of different human 
lives. A legal response to racist [and hate speech] speech is a statement that 
victims of [hate speech] are valued members of our polity.316 
 
The fact that such groups have not historically had a place at the legal table suggests that the 
harms they experience—that those who generally craft the law do not—have not been adequately 
taken into account. Matsuda notes that  
racist speech is so common that it is seen as part of the ordinary jostling and 
conflict people are expected to tolerate, rather than as fighting words. Another 
problem is that the effect of dehumanizing racist language is often flight rather 
than fight. Targets choose to avoid racist encounters whenever possible, 
internalizing the harm rather than escalating the conflict. Lack of a fight and 
admirable self-restraint then defines the words as nonactionable.317 
 
Because of the lack of violent response—which those in vulnerable positions do not tend to rely 
upon—and the saturation of such speech in everyday life, the resultant harm is generally 
underestimated. Historically oppressed groups are thus more affected because hate speech helps 
to perpetuate and institutionalize behaviors, ideas318, and prejudices that impact their physical 
well-being, things like mental health, job security, securing things such as loans, and protection 
under the law, etc.  
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 To make a distinction is not “unfair,” as Greenawalt claims, and does not encroach on 
justice, but actually helps to secure fairness and justice—it is redressing an imbalance. These 
groups are in positions where they lack power and such speech impacts them directly and the 
likelihood of consequential rights-infringing harm occurring rises as a result. Matsuda argues “If 
the harm of racist [or other] hate messages is significant, and the truth value marginal, the 
doctrinal space for regulation of such speech is a possibility.”319 Lynne Tirrell describes such 
speech as “toxic” and argues that “toxic speech, like any toxin, is a threat to the well-being and 
even the very lives of those against whom it is deployed”320 and “toxic effects vary depending on 
one’s epistemic position, access, and authority.”321 These are category differences and important 
distinctions. The restrictions that Matsuda outlines prevent the sorts of speech that have a 
tendency to become entrenched in society and institutions and “the definitive elements are 
discrimination, connection to violence, and messages of inferiority, hatred, or persecution. Thus 
the entire spectrum of what could be called racist speech is not prohibited.”322 Matsuda and 
Waldron are thus attempting to respect the balance between the benefits of free speech and the 
harm that vulnerable members of society may experience as a result of free speech. 
 If, as Mill states (U V: 25) and I concur, the harm to significant interests in safety are 
what matter, a more specific definition may be needed to actually get at the crux of the issue. It is 
not those in a position of power or dominance that need protection because this sort of speech 
does not significantly harm their interests in safety and security. Previously oppressed groups, 
minorities, and those with precarious positions in society have a higher risk of harm to their 
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rights by such speech than those whose position is unlikely to be affected by such speech. 
Matsuda claims that the “presence and the active dissemination of racist propaganda [and other 
sorts of harmful speech] means that citizens are denied personal security and liberty as they go 
about their daily lives”323 because “victims are restricted in their personal freedom. In order to 
avoid receiving hate messages, victims have had to quit jobs, forgo education, leave their homes, 
avoid certain public places, curtail their own exercise of speech rights, and otherwise modify 
their behavior and demeanor.”324 These effects are persistent and inescapable in a society that 
protects such hate speech. 
 The distinctions between the sorts of harm to the victimized groups and other more 
privileged groups that Matsuda and Waldron propose are not always recognized and Matsuda 
notes that in part this is because in analyzing the harm of hate speech  
The identity of the person doing the analysis often seems to make the difference 
… in responding to racist speech. In advocating legal restriction of hate speech, I 
have found my most sympathetic audience in people who identify with target 
groups, while I have encountered incredulity, skepticism, and even hostility from 
others.325 
 
And while we could interpret Mill as being sympathetic to the position, he also expresses 
skepticism that it is the law’s business to prevent what he calls “vituperative language” (OL II: 
44). I think this is in part because he is not considering hate speech as such. In assessing 
“hateful” language he is not addressing it as an attempt to stir up hatred of groups but rather as a 
distasteful or unfortunate instance of emotions getting the better of people—as a way of speaking 
not a message with an effect which incites hatred. The instances he notes are those of expressing 
frustration or anger and are not targeted vilification. This is not the same as the sort of speech 
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that I, following Matsuda and Waldron, am addressing. 
 
6.3.5 Mill on Vituperative Language 
 It may be useful to discuss Mill’s analysis of vituperative language at more length since 
he seems to recognize the need to protect historically oppressed groups from harmful speech but 
then seems to reject it as being justifiably prohibited or within the domain of the law. I think this 
is because of a key difference in the cases that I wish to bring out. Mill begins his discussion of 
“intemperate” or “vituperative” speech by stating that 
Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, 
may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure. … The gravest of 
them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the 
elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion. But all this, even to the 
most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by persons 
who are not considered, and in many other respects may not deserve to be 
considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds 
conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable; and still less 
could law presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct (OL II: 
44 Emphasis added).  
 
The sort of speech Mill is discussing in this passage is more like a misrepresentation of the facts 
or utilizing bad methods of argumentation than engaging in anything like hate speech (though 
this may be a feature of some sorts of hate speech). This is sometimes done on purpose, but 
frequently such methods are the result of honest mistakes which can be corrected or pointed out 
in discussion and one could argue on Millian lines that the harm of censoring such speech would 
be worse than allowing it. And while Mill is discussing true opinion, even expressing false 
information, while harmful, is less harmful than allowing the suppression of it for Mill. 
However, one thing that is important to note about the selection above is that Mill says that there 
are “rarely” grounds good enough to prohibit it and that if the grounds are found, that the law has 
even less reason to interfere—but he does not discount it altogether. He seems to allow that there 
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may be some instances of such speech that may be either prevented through the law or else that 
may be considered for prevention. 
 The next set of considerations Mill discusses has to do not with misstatements or 
misrepresentations but with ways of speaking—what he calls “intemperate discussion.” Mill 
states that 
With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely 
invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons 
would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally 
to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the 
prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without 
general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise 
of honest zeal and righteous indignation (OL II: 44).  
 
The use of these methods in discussion has many purposes and some of them may be 
inappropriate in some instances and some of them may be offensive and hurtful (to feelings, etc.) 
but sometimes it is a matter of emotions, anger, or frustration getting the better of people and 
while it would be better if everyone spoke civilly and calmly, this is not always possible and 
some methods of “intemperate discussion” may encourage discussion. But, he notes that there is 
an instance where the use of such vituperative language is most problematic—when it is used 
against those vulnerable members of society in order to silence them.  
 Interestingly, here Mill is again alluding to the tendency of the majority to assert power 
over the minority (or really the powerful over the oppressed). He claims that part of the problem 
with preventing intemperate discussion is that it is not applied equally to all interlocutors and it 
will actually lead to those we wish to help (vulnerable members of society) being silenced more 
often than the dominant speakers. He claims that  
whatever mischief arises from their use [vituperative language], is greatest when 
they are employed against the comparatively defenceless; and whatever unfair 
advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it, accrues 
almost exclusively to received opinions. The worst offence of this kind which can 
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be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion 
as bad and immoral men. To calumny of this sort, those who hold any unpopular 
opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential, 
and nobody but themselves feels much interested in seeing justice done them; but 
this weapon is, from the nature of the case, denied to those who attack a 
prevailing opinion: they can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor, if they 
could, would it do anything but recoil on their own cause (OL II:44).  
 
The benefit of using this sort of language and method of communication is almost exclusively on 
the side of those in a privileged position.  
 If those who are expressing contrary or unpopular views use this language, it tends to 
only further delegitimize their position because the majority will choose not to listen when it is 
spoken in a way that is aggressive. Mill defends this point by claiming that  
In general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a 
hearing by studied moderation of language, and the most cautious avoidance of 
unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate even in a slight degree 
without losing ground: while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the 
prevailing opinion, really does deter people from professing contrary opinions, 
and from listening to those who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth 
and justice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative 
language than the other; and, for example, if it were necessary to choose, there 
would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on 
religion (OL II: 44).  
 
Mill recognizes the effects of such intemperate language on those who are in positions of relative 
powerlessness and distinguishes between an opinion of vulnerable groups of people who must be 
careful in their statements not to cause listeners to react negatively and those of the majority or 
“received” opinion who can mostly say what they wish (no matter who they offend, harm, etc.).  
 In the first case, there are groups of people who are not really at liberty to discuss their 
opinions or views because of the backlash that may occur. They are, in a sense, silenced. In the 
other case, because such language is spoken by the majority (or more powerful groups), it “really 
does deter people from professing contrary opinions and from listening to those who profess 
them. For the interest, therefore, of truth and justice it is far more important to restrain this 
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employment of vituperative language than the other ... . (OL II: 44).” This seems to concur with 
the analysis of hate speech above pretty clearly. In the case where the powerful may say what it 
wishes without impunity, the negative language that is spoken is much more harmful than similar 
language spoken by those who do not have the power or authority of the dominant group.  
 The opinions of one group, then, are actually given more weight and are believed more 
readily and thus contribute to the infringement of the liberty right to speech of the oppressed 
groups. As Catherine McKinnon says it “understanding that there is a relationship between these 
two issues—the less speech you have, the more the speech of those who have it keeps you 
unequal; the more the speech of the dominant is protected, the more dominant they become and 
the less the subordinated are heard from—is virtually nonexistent.”326 The point that Mill seems 
to be making is that the minority or historically oppressed and subjugated groups are more 
vulnerable and their opinions are often silenced whereas the majority can, in large part, say what 
it wants without fear of the negative repercussions that the minorities face when voicing their 
opinions. As Brink says, “Mill recognizes the disparate impact of intemperate speech when 
employed by a majority and by a minority. If intemperate speech by the majority excludes and 
marginalizes minority opinions on issues that affect their interests, this looks like a harm that 
might justify intervention.”327 It is, at the very minimum, a clash of speech rights between the 
two groups. 
 However, despite this apparent agreement with Matsuda and Waldron’s position 
restricting certain forms of hate speech, Mill goes on to claim that  
It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining 
either, while opinion ought, in every instance, to determine its verdict by the 
circumstances of the individual case; condemning every one, on whichever side of 
the argument he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy either want of 
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candour, or malignity, bigotry or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves; but 
not inferring these vices from the side which a person takes, though it be the 
contrary side of the question to our own: and giving merited honour to every one, 
whatever opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what 
his opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their 
discredit, keeping nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their 
favour. This is the real morality of public discussion: and if often violated, I am 
happy to think that there are many controversialists who to a great extent observe 
it, and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it (OL II: 44). 
 
This assessment seems to state outright that Mill would say the law has no business legislating 
against hate speech. I am not so sure this is the case. Because again, Mill is considering here not 
hate speech but intemperate language that is used to express an opinion that may be bigoted or 
angry but that is expressing an opinion. In the sorts of hate speech that Matsuda and Waldron are 
appealing to, displays of extreme hate speech, it is not the case that the goal is the statement of 
opinion but rather the incitement of hatred of a group of people not an idea or belief that the 
group holds, but rather they are attempting to do something much closer to incitement of 
violence. 
 In addition to this, it is not merely the mode of advocacy, the “intemperance” of the 
speech that is problematic, but the consequences of the speech on the groups—the harm. Mill 
himself admits that the consequences of such methods often result in the vulnerable groups being 
unable to participate on an equal footing in the discussion. The vulnerable groups must not only 
forward their opinions in ways that are least likely to evoke a negative and excessive response in 
their opponents, but they are also subjected to more rigorous standards than their opponents. This 
results in an imbalance and inequality in the ability to exercise their rights to free speech. And 
while it seems that we have a rights-infringing harm occurring, Mill seems to suggest that, when 
the balancing principle is applied, the infringement is not enough to allow for prohibition. 
 However, again, Mill does concede that this rights-infringing harm happens more 
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frequently to those who are already vulnerable and thus the harm to the rights of the vulnerable 
groups is much steeper than that of the dominant group. If a member of the dominant group 
expresses hate speech, it has a tendency to silence or impair the oppressed individual’s right to 
speech. It limits how the oppressed groups are able to express their rights to speech. They need 
to temper their emotions, speak in moderate tones, be sure not to offend the sensibilities of those 
who are in the position of power, and modify their behavior generally. This is interfering with 
the right to free expression. Yet, if it is the case that Mill believes that we have claims on society 
to protect us regarding certain liberties, then it seems that we ought to have our right to liberty 
protected against others who are utilizing their liberty of free speech in order to disrupt ours. In 
other words, if someone else’s speech rights are in competition with my rights and the 
consequences of the speech are harmful, it does not make sense to privilege the aggressor’s 
rights over the victim’s. We ought to protect the victim in the case where two individuals’ rights 
are in competition.  
 In addition to this, it is important to remember that in the cases I am discussing, displays 
of extreme hate speech, the groups being attacked are not merely defending their opinions and it 
is not a mere difference of opinion that is at issue, but rather the vulnerable members of society 
are either defending their very position in society or, in cases where there is not dialogue, their 
position in society is being threatened or undermined. As Matsuda notes, “what the emerging 
global standard [against hate speech] prohibits is the kind of expression that most interferes with 
the rights of subordinated-group members to participate equally in society, maintaining their 
basic sense of security and worth as human beings.”328 So it seems that hate speech, at minimum, 
causes harm that infringes on the free expression of speech which would place it within the 
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domain of the law. However, while the rights to speech are in conflict in this manner, it seems 
that much more than the competing rights to free speech are at issue which would place it on an 
even firmer footing in the legal domain.  
 
6.4 Does Hate Speech Implicate Other Millian Rights? 
6.4.1 Dignity, Equality, Personal Choice, and Diversity 
 Both Waldron and Matsuda rely on the idea of human dignity as a protected area for 
individuals because of the impact it has on an individual’s well-being. Indeed, Mill even notes in 
Utilitarianism that “a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or another, 
and in some … proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the 
happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise 
than momentarily, an object of desire to them” (U II: 6). Waldron defines dignity as “basic social 
standing” which recognizes that all people “are members of society in good standing … [and are] 
proper objects of society’s protection and concern.”329 Furthermore, he claims it is not just a 
“Kantian aura. It is their social standing, the fundamentals of basic reputation that entitle them to 
be treated as equals in the ordinary operations of society” and as such fosters the value of 
inclusiveness330 and diversity which Mill frequently cited as important to individuality or 
autonomy and the liberty of personal choice.  
 Waldron believes that this harm to a person’s personal dignity is a harm to the liberty of 
personal choice and the importance of diversity as well.331 He claims that   
there is something socially and legally significant at stake. … there is a sort of 
public good of inclusiveness that our society sponsors and that it is committed to. 
We are diverse in our ethnicity, our race, our appearance, and our religions. And 
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we embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together despite these 
sorts of differences. … Hate speech undermines this public good.332  
 
These considerations mimic the language of Mill in On Liberty who calls for diversity, 
individuality, and experiments in living. Waldron argues that hate speech 
aims to compromise the dignity of those at whom it is targeted, both in their eyes 
and in the eyes of other members of the society. … it aims to besmirch the basics 
of their reputation, by associating ascriptive characteristics like ethnicity, or race, 
or religion with conduct or attributes that should disqualify someone from being 
treated as a member of society in good standing.333 
 
Thus, when members are attacked in such a way it contributes not only to the harm to one’s 
liberty of personal choice, but also to one’s claim right to safety and security because there is, 
among other things, a perpetuation of inequality which results in a higher likelihood of rights-
infringing harm. This tendency of hate speech to risk rights-infringing harm would seem to take 
the speech out of the protected realm and place it into the domain of the law. When an agent 
exhibits this sort of behavior, Mill claims 
he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow-creatures, 
individually or collectively. The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on 
himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must 
retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, 
and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he is an offender 
at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one 
shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part 
to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from our 
using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him 
in his (OL IV: 7). 
 
However, while I argued above that Mill would recognize some kinds of hate speech as a 
competition between both party’s rights to free speech, I have not shown that Mill could appeal 
to other sorts of rights that such displays of extreme hate speech would infringe. I believe there 
are two other sorts of rights that such speech would infringe: the right to equality and the right to 
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6.4.2 Mill on the Right to Equality 
 In Utilitarianism when Mill is looking to legislation specifically, he claims that the courts 
(law) have elaborated maxims in an attempt to “fulfil their double function, of inflicting 
punishment when due, and of awarding to each person his right” (U V: 35). In doing so they 
have enacted specifically legal maxims to determine when a rights violation ought to be 
prevented through the penal law. Two duties that he believes we ought to rely on when 
considering legislation are impartiality and equality. He claims 
That first of judicial virtues, impartiality, is an obligation of justice, partly … as 
being a necessary condition of the fulfilment of the other obligations of justice. 
But this is not the only source of the exalted rank, among human obligations, of 
those maxims of equality and impartiality, which, both in popular estimation and 
in that of the most enlightened, are included among the precepts of justice. In one 
point of view, they may be considered as corollaries from the principles already 
laid down. If it is a duty to do to each according to his deserts, returning good for 
good as well as repressing evil by evil, it necessarily follows that we should treat 
all equally well (when no higher duty forbids) who have deserved equally well of 
us, and that society should treat all equally well who have deserved equally well 
of it, that is, who have deserved equally well absolutely. This is the highest 
abstract standard of social and distributive justice; towards which all institutions, 
and the efforts of all virtuous citizens, should be made in the utmost possible 
degree to converge (U V: 36).  
 
So, not only does Mill believe that impartiality and equality are obligations that the state 
has toward citizens but he says that they are the highest standards of justice to which we 
ought to strive. This suggests not only that we have a right to such treatment but that this 
right is to be considered one of the most socially useful. In part he believes impartiality 
and equal treatment are important because they are a logical extension of the principle of 
utility itself (upon which all of his talk of rights depend). He states that 
But this great moral duty [to treat all equally well] rests upon a still deeper 
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foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, and not a 
mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines. It is involved in the 
very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle. That principle is a 
mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person’s happiness, 
supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted 
for exactly as much as another’s. Those conditions being supplied, Bentham’s 
dictum, ‘everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,’ might be written 
under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary. The equal claim of 
everybody to happiness in the estimation of the moralist and the legislator, 
involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness, except in so far as the 
inevitable conditions of human life, and the general interest, in which that of 
every individual is included, set limits to the maxim; and those limits ought to be 
strictly construed. As every other maxim of justice, so this is by no means applied 
or held applicable universally; on the contrary, as I have already remarked, it 
bends to every person’s ideas of social expediency. But in whatever case it is 
deemed applicable at all, it is held to be the dictate of justice. All persons are 
deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except when some recognised 
social expediency requires the reverse (U V: 36).  
 
But again, even equality of treatment is limited if social utility calls for inequality. This may 
happen in the case of a conflict of rights, such as that of speech and equality of treatment. So 
while we have a right to equal treatment, it may be the case that another right we have comes 
into conflict with it and forces a weighing or balancing of the rights against one another to 
determine which is most socially useful. But this shows us that it is at least plausible that Mill 
would allow for considerations of our liberty to free speech to be balanced against our right to 
equal treatment. 
 Interestingly and in line with his argument in chapter II of On Liberty, Mill continues his 
line of thought by claiming that allowing inequalities based on an idea of social utility or 
expediency is what has led to marked injustices. And perhaps allowing for this is problematic. 
He claims that  
all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the 
character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical, 
that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful 
that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken 
notion of expediency, the correction of which would make that which they 
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approve seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The 
entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions, by which one 
custom or institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity of 
social existence, has passed into the rank of a universally stigmatised injustice and 
tyranny. So it has been with the distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and 
serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the 
aristocracies of colour, race, and sex (U V: 36 emphasis added). 
 
So here he adopts the idea that the interests of each person should count equally (making 
allowances for the importance of each interest) and protecting everyone’s interest is essential to 
their well-being. So the speaker’s right to speech is only more important than the victim’s right 
to safety, security, speech, autonomy, dignity, etc. if the benefit of the speech outweighs the 
harm to the victim. Considering Waldron and Matsuda’s arguments on the real and significant 
harm to those exposed to hate speech, I do not believe it does. 
 It seems that Mill would support fostering equality or pluralism and a corresponding right 
in individuals in its protection. In Utilitarianism he outlines the commonly held ideas of justice 
and in doing so briefly discusses impartiality and equality. While he admits these are vague and 
such values/interests are not always so obvious, in applying rights he claims that impartiality is 
commonly understood as useful and indeed is instrumental in fulfilling our duties. He claims that 
“impartiality where rights are concerned is of course obligatory; but this is involved in the more 
general obligation of giving to everyone his right” (U V: 9). And while Mill admits that the 
concepts of equality and impartiality may be understood in different ways, he admits that for 
many, being impartial and being just amount to “giving equal protection to the rights of all” (U 
V: 10).  
 He also claims in On Liberty that citizens have duties to “observe a certain line of 
conduct toward the rest” which not only involves not violating others’ rights but also amounts to 
“each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and 
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sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation” (OL 
IV: 3). And if it is the case that minorities and socially vulnerable groups are not having their 
rights protected by some equitable principle and are bearing more than their share of the 
sacrifices of defending themselves and others, the situation that contributes to this would be 
violating their rights. So hate speech would be infringing on their right to have their rights 
protected equally and “as soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests 
of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or 
will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion” (OL IV: 3). 
 
6.4.3 Mill on the Value and Interests of Individuality and Diversity for Well-being 
 While I think that there is an argument that can be made that hate speech against 
vulnerable groups may be considered for legislation on the basis of Mill’s right to equality, I 
think a better argument can be made that Mill would consider displays of extreme hate speech to 
risk or cause rights-infringing harm regarding our liberty of personal choice. In discussing 
autonomy and the liberties of choice and action, in chapter III of On Liberty, Mill spends a good 
deal of time both defending individuality, diversity, and choosing one’s own path in life as 
necessary features of progressing humanity and well-being and lamenting the yoke of custom, 
the tendency toward mediocrity, and the attempt to foist assimilation on those who express 
individuality. Being able to choose for oneself how to live and what sort of life one will have 
without undue interference by others is something that Mill argues is of the utmost importance.  
 Mill generally understood this interference to involve government overreach and was 
particularly worried about the government’s use of censorship but I do not think he adequately 
considers the role the government can play in censoring in order to foster an atmosphere that is 
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conducive not only to a broader sense of free speech but individuality and autonomy. Just like 
we restrict actions that harm others, speech (as an action) also causes harm to others especially 
their individuality and autonomy, their abilities to go about their lives and choose how they shall 
live, so restricting some speech has the same effect as restricting some liberty (as he is calling for 
in On Liberty), namely: more liberty overall. 
 In chapter II he claims that there is  
so great a mass of influences hostile to Individuality, that it is not easy to see how 
it can stand its ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty, unless the 
intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value—to see that it is good 
there should be differences, even though not for the better, even though, as it may 
appear to them, some should be for the worse. If the claims of Individuality are 
ever to be asserted, the time is now, while much is still wanting to complete the 
enforced assimilation. It is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be 
successfully made against the encroachment. The demand that all other people 
shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is 
reduced nearly to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be 
considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. Mankind 
speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time 
unaccustomed to see it (OL III: 19). 
 
It seems then that while Mill calls for tolerance, he has in mind those vulnerable members of 
society who express diversity, individuality, and progress. He seems to recognize that custom has 
a tendency to erase ideas that are contrary to received opinion and that free speech protects this. 
However, what happens when “resistance waits” and is silenced? It seems that in protecting 
diversity, he would want to protect the speech rights of those most vulnerable groups and if it is 
by restraining the speech rights of the oppressors that we can protect the vulnerable, it seems 
Mill would be favorable to it. He claims that  
Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but 
in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow. 
Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. Persons of genius 
are, ex vi termini, more individual than any other people—less capable, 
consequently, of fitting themselves, without hurtful compression, into any of the 
small number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the 
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trouble of forming their own character. If from timidity they consent to be forced 
into one of these moulds, and to let all that part of themselves which cannot 
expand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be little the better for 
their genius (OL III: 11). 
 
If our goal is to foster the use of deliberative faculties, then it seems fostering an atmosphere of 
freedom would be key. It seems unlikely that allowing speech that interferes with both the 
deliberative faculties and those who best express individuality fosters individuality and if these 
aspects of well-being are prevented, then restricting this speech seems consistent with enacting 
legislation that protects such rights-infringing harm.  
 Mill claims that “but indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is 
one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into 
commonplaces, but which all experience refutes” (OL II: 17). He further states that  
if either of the two opinions [for or against a particular position] has a better claim 
than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, 
it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. 
That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests, 
the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share 
(OL II: 36). 
 
The final clause seems problematic. It is not the case that preventing certain harmful speech will 
reduce the significant and socially useful interests or well-being of the speaker but it very well 
may be the case that those in danger of getting less than their fair share are those toward whom 
such “vitriol” is spewed. In these two places Mill is speaking against legislating free speech but 
the problem is, in some cases it is not the purveyors of these harmful views that are being 
persecuted but their victims. Our goal should not be free speech at whatever cost, it should be 
free speech until such speech is a rights-infringing harm and interferes with the right to safety 
and security. And such speech must fit Mill’s criteria for rights-infringing harm which would be 
“acts of wrongful aggression, or wrongful exercise of power over some one; [or] … those which 
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consist in wrongfully withholding from him something which is his due” (U V: 33). And it is 
indeed preventing persecution of innocent groups/individuals from these wrongful acts that is the 
goal of certain speech laws. Mill sees the freedom of speech as the bulwark against persecution 
and the views and examples he discusses tend to be the intolerant preventing the freedom and 
liberty of others to go about their life and he sees free speech as the protector of those groups 
who lack power and are persecuted (see God, Socrates, and Marcus Aurelius examples OL II: 
11–17 and English court cases II: 18–19). However, I think that in some cases extending the 
freedom of speech to encompass and allow for these intolerant views—those that are harmful-to-
others which he is arguing ought not be allowed to enact legislation and which he refers to as 
bigoted views (OL II: 19)—is actually opening the floodgates for persecution and harm. It seems 
that it would be consistent and plausible to prevent these harms through the general harm 
principle, which is consistent with Mill, and that it is also plausible that these types of harm may 
be rights-infringing harm and fall within the domain of the law. 
 Mill discusses the usefulness of a variety of characters and types of people and 
“experiments of living” but he qualifies that this has a limit: “short of injury to others” (OL III: 
1). And further that these opinions, acts, and ideas are those that “do not primarily concern 
others” (OL III: 1) is a requirement that some speech does not seem to fulfill. Mill believes that 
free speech enhances and tends toward the well-being, flourishing, and individuality of people 
but he seems to ignore questions that ask whether certain kinds of speech, such as false or racist 
or sexist speech, even if valuable in the ways that Mill claims they are, are really more valuable 
than the interest we have in things like dignity and security. Brink claims that  
It must certainly be an empirical claim that it is harder to draw principled and 
salient lines here than elsewhere. Absent empirical support for this claim, it seems 
irresponsible to give up regulating hate speech without seriously trying. If it 
should turn out that our best efforts at a principled and salient conception of hate 
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speech and its regulation not only have an unavoidably chilling effect on high-
value speech but actually harm the legitimate speech interests of the very groups 
hate speech regulations are designed to protect, then that would be a good 
pragmatic objection to hate speech regulation. Hate speech regulation would then 
be a failed experiment. But the experiment has not even begun yet; claims that it 
fails are, therefore, premature.334 
 
Part of Mill’s motivation is to protect individuality or autonomy, and aiming for our own well-
being in a way that we see fit and historically, legislation on speech had lots of negative 
repercussions because the speech was overly restrictive and impacted those most likely to 
express diversity an individuality. It was disproportionately shouldered by those who were most 
likely to contribute to the well-being and progressive nature of humans. The minority positions 
tended to be overregulated and regulated into silence.  
 But if what Mill wants is to protect such opinions, then it seems not regulating the speech 
of others may actually increase instances of this occurring. Protecting the opinions that highlight 
alternate ways of life and opinion which enhance our deliberative faculties would actually 
require censorship of others who impinge on this valuable social utility/interest. The display of 
extreme hate speech is minimally valuable and does not contribute to enhancing our deliberative 
faculties and if considering regulation over these speech acts does enhance our well-being and 
deliberative faculties, then Mill is ignoring the overall enhancement of well-being and 
deliberation that would occur if such speech is restricted. Speech absolutely contributes to our 
overall well-being and our deliberative faculties but it is not the only thing that contributes and 
other values may weigh more on the scales. This is where Matsuda and Waldron come in when 
they bring in other considerations that add value to the deliberative faculties. There is an 
overstatement of the value of speech and I think that Mill could say that preventing displays of 
extreme hate speech would be beneficial for those who are censored as well because 
                                                 
334 Brink, “Millian Principles,” 148–9. 
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for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human 
development. The means of development which the individual loses by being 
prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly 
obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself 
there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, 
rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid 
rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which 
have the good of others for their object (OL III: 9). 
 
So, perhaps in restricting the liberties of speech, the overall benefit to liberties as a whole is 
increased. 
 
6.5 Hate Speech and the Legal Harm Principle 
6.5.1 The Extra Legal-Domain 
 What then, would Mill, using the method I propose, say about displays of extreme hate 
speech? If we recall that Mill’s general harm principle is a multi-step process that first considers 
whether there is harm—any harm—occurring, then we should begin with the general harm 
principle which distinguishes between primarily self-regarding acts and other-regarding acts. The 
general harm principle places actions within its domain—extra-legal—if there is harm to 
others.335 This is what Mill’s first maxim discusses.336 In the case of displays of extreme hate 
speech it seems that the general harm principle would place such speech acts within its domain 
because of the clearly harmful effects of such speech that were outlined in 6.3.4. These effects 
harm individuals. Once we determine that there is harm, we need to apply maxim 2 in order to 
figure out the domain question, i.e. apply the jurisdiction principle (which is separate from the 
balancing principle).337 
 
                                                 
335 See chapters2-3. 
336 See chapter 2.2-2.3. 
337 See Chapter 2-3 and 6.6. 
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6.5.2 Causing or Contributing to Rights-Infringing Harm? 
 So, the next question is whether such harms would fit within the legal domain.338 Harm 
that would be placed within the legal domain would be rights-infringing harms. Rights-infringing 
harm is harm in the other-regarding domain that we have a claim against society to protect us in, 
that impacts our significant interests, and that is thought to be wrong and subject to 
punishment.339 In many cases of extreme displays of hate speech we can see that they are no 
longer within the self-regarding domain and fall within the other-regarding domain. There is also 
harm, so it is harmful other-regarding behavior. This harm is also caused by the others and there 
is, in many cases, a tangible link from the hate speech to the rights implicated in such speech. 
This is in keeping with what Mill claims about an agent calling for tyrannicide (OL II: 1 FN1). If 
it is the case that a probable causal link can be established between the expression of the idea and 
the harm, it is firmly within the domain of the law because it is a rights-infringement. We do not 
yet know if it is a rights violation—rights violations are not a determination of the jurisdiction 
principle. We can only determine rights violations once the balancing principle is applied.  
 In the previous chapter I claim that if an individual fails to prevent harm or contributes to 
harm (but does not cause it),340 then it is not rights-infringing harm but is still harm and can still 
be covered by the general harm principle, though not the legal harm principle.341 The question is, 
                                                 
338 See chapters 2.2-3.2 for this discussion. 
339 See Chapters 3.3.4 and 4.2.3. 
340 For instance in “bad Samaritan” cases where individuals fail to prevent already occurring harm but do not cause 
it, they could be censured by social/moral pressures but not by the law. 
341 We may have a “right to life” which means we have a right not to be (unjustly) killed by another but this does not 
mean that others must give us things that were not ours in order to keep us alive, i.e. no one owes us things that 
would save us such as food or water—they only owe us not to harm us. We may have a “right to food” but this is 
just a right to that which we already have but we do not have a right that anyone give this to us, only that they not 
take it from us. Others have moral obligations to help others but others do not have this as their due. We do not owe 
specific individuals food or assistance (unless there is a special relationship such as parental or familial obligations, 
etc.) but if we give it to them, we are doing a morally good thing. We have this extra-legal moral obligation but it is 
not a legislatable moral right that can be demanded of us through the law. 
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when an agent uses free speech in the form of displays of extreme hate speech and this speech is 
then used—by the agent or another—as an impetus for a rights violation or rights-infringing 
harm, are they causing or contributing to the rights-infringing/violating harm? On the one hand, 
we may argue that it is the sum total of the displays of extreme hate speech that adds up to 
contribute to the rights-infringing harm and that it is not any one piece of literature that causes 
the rights-infringing harm. On the other hand we may claim that it does not make sense to think 
of it in these terms because the literature increases the likelihood of the rights-infringing harm 
occurring. To draw an analogy, in the case of pollution while it may be the case that a particular 
tailpipe does not cause any more pollution than anyone else’s, it does not then make sense to say 
that that tailpipe is not causing pollution. Reducing that tailpipe’s emissions will reduce 
pollution. Similarly, preventing an individual’s expression of hate speech reduces the likelihood 
of rights-infringing harm. Yes, the expression of hate speech contributes to the harm but can also 
be said to cause the rights-infringing harm. 
 There is a difference between actively engaging in hate speech which increases the 
likelihood of rights-infringing harm (causing harm) and for instance, failing to assist someone 
who is drowning (contributing but not causing harm). While the drowning individual is in a 
harmful situation—drowning—and there is a risk to safety and security, the bystander did not 
cause the individual to be in that situation. This is not the case with someone engaged in hate 
speech. They were a causal factor in the harmful situation, they did not merely refuse to 
interfere. So it is the difference between someone engaging in hate speech (causing/increasing 
the likelihood of rights-infringing harm) and a bystander not interfering when someone is 
engaging in hate speech (contributing to the rights-infringing harm but not causing the rights-
infringing harm). As a bystander witnessing the hate speech, he/she should intervene but if that 
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person does not, the bystander is not violating or infringing a right, the bystander is contributing 
to the harmful situation but not causing it. The bystander’s failure to act would be contributing to 
the harm and thus could be morally or extra-legally censured but not censured through the law. 
 
6.5.3 Competing Rights: Infringing the Right to Free Speech 
 As I claimed above using Mill’s section on vituperative language, it seems that, at the 
very least, this hate speech is at odds with the oppressed person’s right to speech.342 So we have 
an instance of rights-infringing harm occurring when both the speaker and the victim’s right to 
speech come into conflict. This would place hate speech in the domain of the law because the 
speaker is silencing or making it much more difficult for the victim of the hate speech to utilize 
his/her own right to speech—thus, infringing this right. However, it seems that if the rights-
infringing harm is just a matter of the two rights coming into conflict, then Mill would almost 
never allow for such speech to be prevented because the harm of legislating such speech would 
far outweigh the balancing harm of allowing it to continue unfettered by legal means—though he 
would call for it to be prevented or at least discouraged through the extra-legal domain. 
However, because such displays of extreme hate speech are much worse than other sorts of 
vituperative language or bigoted ideas, a further question arises, namely, are there other rights 
that are implicated in displays of extreme hate speech that would aid in the balancing test that 
may tip the scales in favor of legislation? In other words, while displays of extreme hate speech 
are in the legal domain and eligible for consideration for legislation, is it the case that there are 
additional rights that are infringed that would provide a better defense for legislation when the 
balancing principle is applied? 
                                                 
342 See chapter 6.3.5. 
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6.5.4 Other Millian Rights Implicated in Displays of Extreme Hate Speech 
 It seems that there are several other rights and interests that are implicated in displays of 
extreme hate speech. First, Mill claims that most people, including those whose deliberative 
faculties are excellent, have shown that a right to equality under the law is in everyone’s interests 
and is socially useful. In many cases displays of extreme hate speech cause rights-infringing 
harm and implicate our right to such equality. Matsuda and Waldron base this right on the 
concept of dignity.343 Our dignity is our social standing and if we are all supposed to have an 
equal social standing then actions that infringe on this right are within the domain of the law. 
There are many instances in which displays of extreme hate speech cause or significantly risk 
unequal protection under the law, unequal circumstances in fair competitions, as well as 
undermining the victim’s legitimate position in society. Our dignity and equal social standing are 
significant interests that we have and if displays of extreme hate speech cause harm to this right, 
it seems that there is an additional factor that places it in the legal domain and another sort of 
harm to consider when applying the balancing principle. 
 In addition to the right to equality, it seems that our liberty right to personal choice and 
our interests in individuality, diversity, and autonomy are implicated through displays of extreme 
hate speech. Mill claims that the strength of his argument for free speech applies equally to our 
liberty rights to personal choice and the freedom to unite (OL I: 16). These three areas of liberty, 
he believes, are necessary for our well-being and the use of our deliberative faculties. If a 
person’s right to speech interferes with our abilities to choose how we want to live or makes it 
more difficult for us to make those choices that are within our rights, then it seems that there is 
an additional rights-infringing harm to consider. The right to personal choice aids in the 
                                                 
343 See Chapter 5.4. Waldron, Hate Speech, 5; Matsuda, “Public Responses,” 2377, 2381. 
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development of individuality and diversity by making it more likely that individuals can choose 
their own experiments in living, and even being exposed to others acting on this right makes it 
more likely that individuals engage and utilize their deliberative capacities because in seeing 
how others live and chose their lives, one can see the consequences and benefits/drawbacks of 
choosing such a life which contributes to our well-being.  
 So, while it may be the case that Mill would not allow for displays of extreme hate 
speech to be prevented through the law if only the equivalent right to free speech was at stake, he 
at least would have to recognize that it falls into the domain of the law even if it would not weigh 
enough to justify legislation. However, when one considers that other rights and interests besides 
the right to free speech, such as the right to equal social standing, right to personal choice, and 
our significant interests in individuality and diversity, are implicated when someone utilizes their 
right to free speech to display extreme hate speech, it seems that there are much more rights-
infringing harms to consider when applying the balancing principle of maxim 2. Many other 
rights are implicated with hate speech than a mere competition between each person’s right to 
speech and these other rights-infringing harms help to place displays of extreme hate speech 
more firmly into the domain of the law and in contention for legislation. All of these rights-
infringing harms must be weighed and balanced against the harm to the speaker of hate speech 
and the infringements to the speaker’s liberty that would necessarily occur if such speech was to 
be regulated.344 However, my project only applies the jurisdiction principle and helps to place it 
within the domain of the law. It does not say whether such legislation on displays of extreme 
hate speech is a good idea, all things considered. If we decide that, all things considered, it ought 
                                                 
344 I want to be clear that I am not attempting to say that merely the number of rights infringements are to be 
weighed against each other—i.e. one rights infringement versus three—but rather that all these rights-infringing 
harms as well as the costs, the seriousness of the harms, and other relevant normative considerations must be made. 
This goes beyond merely placing it in the domain for contention. It requires the balancing principle. 
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to be prevented, we are saying that it is a rights violation. To determine that it is a rights 
violation, one needs to weigh the relative harm that results from regulation versus toleration. I 
am not going to give such maxims that ought to be considered in applying the balancing 
principle and my project is not meant to provide guidance as to which regulations ought to be a 
law. 
 
6.6 Mill’s Balancing Principles  
 However, I would like to close with a few thoughts on Mill’s use of the balancing 
principle which is thought to justify legislating against those acts that are in the legal domain. 
Part of the problem that arises with applying the legal harm principle based on Mill’s very 
general description of rights is that we must utilize other decision-making principles in order to 
interpret the harm principle. In discussing whether something like speech fits within the law we 
need to discuss specifics of the cases at hand, practical considerations. Feinberg calls these 
“mediating maxims”345 and many of the maxims or considerations he relies upon are consistent 
with Mill’s discussion in On Liberty and Utilitarianism. Feinberg claims in relation to his own 
formulation of the harm principle that  
whatever … the harm principle gains in plausibility, … it loses in practical utility 
as a guide to legislative decisions. Legislators must decide not only whether to use 
the harm principle in this somewhat dilute formulation, but also how to use it in 
cases of merely minor harms, moderately probable harms, harms to some interests 
preventable only at the cost of harms to other interests irreconcilable with them, 
structured competitive harms, accumulative harms, and so on. Solutions to these 
problems cannot be provided by the harm principle in its simply stated form, but 
absolutely require the help of supplementary principles.346 
 
The same mediating maxims are necessary to determine whether legislation is warranted or not. 
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Two considerations that are relevant to determining if there is a rights-infringing harm or not is 
the magnitude of the harm and the probability of the harm occurring.  
 One way in which we may weigh the relative importance of interests against each other is 
in its level of importance in other interests that we have. Sumner summarizes the issue nicely 
when he claims that  
when two important social values (such as liberty and equality) conflict, the 
optimal tradeoff or balance between them is that point at which further gains in 
one of the values would be outweighed by greater losses in the other. Freedom of 
expression would be better protected were there no legal constraints whatever on 
hate propaganda, while the equal status of minority groups would (arguably) be 
better safeguarded by legislation more restrictive than the hate propaganda law … 
Somewhere between these extremes lies a balance point at which the greater 
protection for these groups afforded by more restrictive legislation would be 
outweighed by the greater impairment of expression, while the greater protection 
for expression afforded by more permissive legislation would be outweighed by 
the greater risk of discrimination.347 
 
Many of our interests are interconnected and in some cases harming one of the interests we have 
may cause harm to other interests of ours which contributes to a greater degree of harm to our 
overall well-being. To use Feinberg’s analogy, “harm to one’s heart or brain will do more 
damage to one’s bodily health than an equal degree of harm to less vital organs.”348 So 
determining how central the interest is to the entire web of interests may aid in weighing the 
interest against the interests of others. 
 Another consideration that Mill seems to allow in weighing the relative strength in 
liberties is the intention of the speaker. If the speaker utilizes his/her right to speech in order to 
incite or bring about harm or encourage others to bring about harm, then they are an important 
causal factor in the harm occurring and the individual’s speech may be restricted or punished 
                                                 
347 Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene, 62–3. 
348 Feinberg, Harm to Others, 204–5. 
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after the fact for the effect of the speech by third parties. This is advocating or encouraging 
violence or harm. It is an unjustified increase in the risk of rights-infringing harm and as 
Feinberg notes “one party can be a cause of the voluntary actions of another party, and thus be 
coresponsible with him for the harmful consequences to a third party.”349 The right that is 
violated is the interest in safety and security of bodily integrity or property that Mill and most 
legal scholars agree is a significant and important interest. Indeed Mill goes so far as to say it is 
perhaps the most important of our interests.  
 In Utilitarianism Mill claims that many of the common maxims of justice are 
instrumentally valuable in applying his balancing principle. Several of the maxims he endorses 
as useful in considering legislation are  
That a person is only responsible for what he has done voluntarily, or could 
voluntarily have avoided; that it is unjust to condemn any person unheard; that the 
punishment ought to be proportioned to the offence, and [these] ... are maxims 
intended to prevent the just principle of evil for evil from being perverted to the 
infliction of evil without that justification (U V: 35). 
 
It seems he counts these among acceptable mediating maxims that will help in the application of 
justice which is the foundation of the harm principle generally.  
 When Mill develops the harm principle he talks in terms of harm and risk of harm. So, 
for the law it may be proper to talk in terms of rights violations or risk of rights infringement. 
Those things which undermine rights or contribute to a higher risk of rights violations may be 
included in the domain of the law. And if more harm results from such restrictions, such as 
increased cost to the public in terms of policing, decreased freedoms, monetary losses, etc., then 
it may not be prudent to have a legal restriction but a social or extra-legal restriction on it. The 
risk or likelihood of harm or infringement of a right is what matters for the legal harm principle 
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and the risk of harm is different for different groups. Those groups who are or were previously 
oppressed may have a higher risk of harm from certain speech acts than those who are either in a 
privileged position or a position of power. While freedom of thought and expression promotes 
autonomy, in a similar manner it can also restrict the freedom and autonomy of others. If certain 
kinds of expression lead to illegitimate oppression or defamation and/or to risk of safety and 
security of others, then it seems the speech acts in question ought to be prevented.  
 One of the benefits of Mill’s view is that rights are fluid and adaptable. We create new 
laws based on protecting those interests that are most socially useful and that contribute to our 
improvement as progressive beings. This is what Mill means by moral rights. So, rights that 
previously were not necessary become necessary and rights that are no longer needed can be 
removed. Issues with speech that contradict the safety and security of individuals and groups 
may be needed in societies in which there are unjust social institutions that prevent safety and 
security. However, once the previously oppressed groups actually do become the dominant 
group, such protections would no longer be afforded to them. This idea is reflected in Matsuda 
when she acknowledges that “should history change course, placing former victim groups in a 
dominant or equalized position, the newly equalized group will lose the special protection 
suggested here for expression of nationalist anger.”350 Now there are difficulties with applying 
this and I acknowledge that application requires interpretation but that is not a criticism against 
this view alone. All views have difficulty in application. The question for my approach is over 
the domain of the law. This categorization and understanding of the sort of speech that could be 
prevented asks whether rights are infringed. I believe that they are in the case of hate speech 
because of the very real risks of safety and security and rights-infringing harm that accompany 
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them. Interpreting application of the law is a separate and important question.351  
 It seems that while certain forms of speech are indeed harmful and studies concur that 
such things are harmful, Mill still has an important point about the importance of free speech. In 
arguing for free speech, Mill discusses many instances where those in power suppress the 
opinion of others because the contrary opinion is so strongly thought and believed to be true. The 
most notable example is a belief in a god (OL II: 11-12). If this is true and “everyone” (most 
people, the majority, all but the crazies, etc.) knows it to be true, then surely there is no harm in 
suppressing the opposite opinion, namely that a god does not exist. What harm can be done? Mill 
argues that a great harm can be done, especially when one considers that no matter how certain 
one feels about a proposition, it still may very well be true (OL II). Mill provides an additional 
apt example (though at the time he did not realize how apt) of Newtonian mechanics (OL II: 8). 
Even if people are so sure that they are right, they may still be wrong. Now, what does that have 
to do with the suppression of the speech, materials, and information that we know to be harmful 
(and obviously-to-us false)? For instance, a Ku Klux Klan member wishes to publish a racist 
book, billboard, etc. We know not only that the material is false but that it is harmful to 
individual African Americans and African Americans as a group (through the perpetuation of 
systemic racism, etc.). Why should we allow it? Mill’s point to this example is two-fold.  
 First, it may be the case that in order to prevent our views from being dismissed, silenced, 
and suppressed we must allow others with crazy racist, sexist, whatever-other-views-opposed-to-
those-that-we-know-to-be-the-truth, etc. to be expressed in various ways because it then allows 
us to express our views which may turn out to be true though not the dominant opinion. In other 
words, if we should not be silenced when we dissent, we ought not silence others. Mill argues 
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that “unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute 
others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must 
beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to 
ourselves” (OL IV: 15). In a way, if we want to be able to exercise our free speech, press, etc. in 
order to further the goal of truth seeking and develop our deliberative faculties, we must allow 
(at least not have laws that prevent) the views that we consider to not only be wrong but harmful 
in order to prevent a greater wrong. 
 Now, this argument is not without its valid criticisms. For instance, it is all well and good 
for me to make these claims since I likely have never experienced the racism, sexism, abuse, etc. 
that these harmful views engender and perpetuate which makes me underestimate the degree of 
harm that is actually occurring in these instances. This may be (and I think is likely) the case. 
However, it seems that those views that we are fighting to suppress (i.e. those we know to be 
false) could only be fought by allowing the free and open use of reason and discussion. We know 
these things to be false because we were able to argue against these harmful views.  
 Second, Mill’s argument about free speech highlights the progressive abilities of open 
dialogue. When we come across a particularly heinous view, we can and ought to refute it or 
show why it is mistaken (just because the law may create more harm than good does not mean it 
is not interfered with at all, but rather it is the extra-legal social pressures that must prevent it). 
This allows us to educate and change the dialogue. The worry is, with the suppression of speech, 
we may inadvertently suppress the very speech we ought to allow to occur. It seems that instead 
of using the criminal law to punish those who express harmful views, we ought to redirect our 
efforts to educating, engaging, and utilizing legitimate social pressures. However, this view is 
also making several assumptions. It is assuming that the harm of suppressing such speech is 
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worse than allowing it. This is a big assumption and I am not convinced that this is the correct 
assumption to make.  
 Regarding application of such speech regulation, Mill is concerned that such legislation 
would be difficult to control and maintain because those in power would likely do one of several 
things: misinterpret the scope of such laws, apply them prejudicially, or over reach its legitimate 
bounds. All of these are fair considerations in applying the balancing principle. These concerns 
do not really impact whether or not the sorts of speech regulation I claim are within the domain 
of the law, they apply to the question of creating actual legislation and the practical concerns that 
arise. Most of Mill’s arguments are not an application of the jurisdiction principle and in fact he 
admits that expression and publication of opinion is, by its very nature, other-regarding but he 
notes that more harm would likely result if such restrictions were enacted, not that they do not fit 
in the domain. This makes sense considering Mill was concerned with liberty and coercion much 
more generally than I am and in crafting his principle recognized a multi-step process for 
determining the domain and the practical application of the domain in legislation but did not 
discuss these as separate goals but rather intertwined both the jurisdiction principle and the 
balancing principle throughout his discussion. This explains his emphasis on the need to limit 
legislation for free speech while at the same time acknowledging that by its nature, publication 
and certain speech acts are other-regarding and that they also may cause harm that infringes 
rights. He notes that these acts are “almost” as important as the liberty of thought and that it is 
“practically inseparable from it” (OL I: 12) but practical matters aside, they are separate and part 
of the separateness rests on the fact that some of these publications and forms of expression (not 
all) may actually violate others’ rights. I have an inclination to accept most of what Mill says 
about free speech and recognize the practical problems that arise with what is commonly called 
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“censorship” and how likely it is to be abused. However, this argument against free speech does 
not actually impact my argument that the legal domain has jurisdiction in these cases and that a 
review of such speech acts and legislation is due. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 In writing On Liberty Mill is, in part, attempting to define the limits of liberty. In doing 
so he highlights the value of speech and for the most part, I believe that he is accurate in his 
assessment. Speech and expressing our opinions is essential to our autonomy and freedom. But 
part of the problem with Mill’s account is that it seems to prioritize speech in such a way that 
actually undermines part of his project. If his desire is to prevent violations of those socially 
useful actions that promote a robust and progressive well-being, then he is ignoring or at least 
downplaying part of the harm to other important values and rights such as dignity, equal social 
standing, safety and security, and liberties of personal choice (among others). All of these rights 
and interests aid in the development of our deliberative faculties and if displays of extreme hate 
speech undermine this project, then it seems that on balance, it may be better to prevent it. As 
Stanley Fish argues, in placing speech as a value above others that may have just as much if not 
more social utility, we are dismissing competing values without providing a proper argument. He 
claims that unless we compare these values, we are giving undue priority to speech and 
“mystifying—presenting as an arbitrary and untheorized fiat—a policy that will seem whimsical 
or worse to those whose interests it harms or dismisses.”352 And while Fish is not arguing from a 
harm principle, the point is that Mill seems to ignore other values that he recognizes as being in 
our significant interest in discussing free speech. Some speech is specifically designed to silence 
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groups of people and to intimidate or threaten. This seems to interfere in the liberty of others and 
cause harm. But Mill seems to resist that it is rights-infringing harm that should be prevented by 
legal means. 
 Mill’s argument seems to be parsed in the following way: unless we can convince the 
other side that they are wrong and unless opinions to the contrary can be heard and defeated or 
defended, we are appealing to mere dogma. What matters is getting the truth of the opinion to be 
understood by the others. While this may be the ideal case, what happens in the meantime is 
people are harmed, for example by displays of extreme hate speech. If it is the case, as Mill 
claims, that the reason why free speech is so valuable is because of the opportunity to gain 
insight into the truth, then certain sorts of speech that do not attempt to reflect an argument, 
position, or belief but are merely defamatory or meant to provoke, ought not to be protected 
through the law. Hate speech does not enhance, but rather undermines, our deliberative faculties. 
It is not just that we think such speech is false or offensive, though it may be, it is that such 
speech is not actually doing the work that Mill claims it is meant to do. And if it fails to do the 
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